Graduate Theses and Dissertations   Graduate School

2006

Freedom fighters, freedom haters, martyrs, and evildoers: The social construction of suicide terrorism

Cécile Valérie Van de Voorde
University of South Florida

Freedom Fighters, Freedom Haters, Martyrs, and Evildoers:

The Social Construction of Suicide Terrorism

by

Cécile Valérie Van de Voorde

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Criminology
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Thomas M. Mieczkowski, Ph.D.
Kimberly M. Lersch, Ph.D.
Christine S. Sellers, Ph.D.
Wilson R. Palacios, Ph.D.
Joseph A. Vandello, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
April 6, 2006

Keywords: Suicide bombing, constructionism, symbolic interaction, folk devils, moral panics, politics of fear, terrorism prevention, case study

© Copyright 2006, Cécile Valérie Van de Voorde

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my Godmother, Urszula Pedreira, an amazing woman whose untimely death in November 2004 made me reconsider my purpose in life at a time that was already particularly difficult for me. She faced terminal illness with dignity, serenity, and grace. Her strength and determination became mine. Her bravery and integrity will never cease to inspire me.

I also dedicate this work to current and future researchers in the field of terrorism. May you move beyond integrating literature and reworking old materials so as to ensure substantive new data and knowledge can effectively improve our objective understanding of the complex phenomenon of terrorism. Do exhort and exert yourself to contribute significant, original work and compelling analyses to your chosen area of studies. When in doubt, follow Sir Francis Bacon's words of wisdom: "If we are to achieve results never before accomplished, we must employ methods never before attempted."

Acknowledgments

My thanks and appreciation go to Tom Mieczkowski, chair of my dissertation committee, for encouraging and assisting me with my research and writing efforts. Many heartfelt thanks also go to the members of my committee, Kim Lersch, Chris Sellers, Wilson Palacios, and Joe Vandello, for investing their time and helping me improve my work. I am forever indebted to Mark Hamm and Jeff Ferrell for lighting my fire and opening my eyes to the real – albeit underground – world of criminology. Mark has always supported my research endeavors and made sure I knew where my priorities were. He will undoubtedly remind me of what is truly important in life in years to come. Jeff has inspired my work and worldview for many years now. Working with him over the next decades will be a delight – at TCU or wherever cultural criminology may take us… I am also thankful for my friends, relatives, colleagues, professors, students, and many others whose valuable advice (and often needed cool-headedness) helped me conduct my research and write my dissertation with a relatively sound mind. Finally, for their constant guidance, precious wisdom, and unconditional love, I ought to express my deepest gratitude to my parents, Anna and Hervé. They have taught me to be demanding but fair (a useful mix in any classroom), to challenge conventions, to have faith in myself and, above all, to strive to be happy. Merci du fond du coeur.

Table of Contents

i

iv

List of Tables

List of Figures

Freedom Fighters, Freedom Haters, Martyrs, and Evildoers:
The Social Construction of Suicide Terrorism

Cécile Valérie Van de Voorde

ABSTRACT

Suicide terrorism is characterized by the willingness of physically and psychologically
war-trained individuals to die while destroying or attempting to annihilate enemy targets
in furtherance of certain political or social objectives. Rooted in the historical, social, and
psychological dimensions of international terrorism, suicide terrorism is neither a unique
nor a new phenomenon. Its recent resurgence and the extensive media coverage it has
received account for the misleading uniqueness of this violent, complex, and adaptive
form of terrorism. This qualitative study examines the definitional and rhetorical
processes by which suicide terrorism is socially constructed. Using a social
constructionist theoretical framework coupled with a symbolic interactionist approach,
this multi-case study effectively moves the analysis of suicide bombings beyond
essentialist debates on asymmetrical warfare or terrorism and into a more nuanced
appreciation of cultural meaning and human interaction. Hence this case study
emphasizes how the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a
biased representation of events and their alleged causes that is conditioned by deliberate
attempts to stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and promote
certain political interests. The primary research question is: How are socio-political
processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures involved in the social

construction of suicide terrorism? Secondary research questions focus on determining how suicide terrorism is (a) a political weapon, (b) a communication tool, and (c) a politicized issue that fits into a moral panic framework. Methods used to conduct the analysis include in-depth interviews (phenomenological and elite interviewing) and document analysis (general document review and historical review). Findings highlight the interactions between suicide bombers (as contemporary folk devils), the news and entertainment media, the public, and agents of social control (politicians, lawmakers, law enforcement, and action groups), and their respective roles in the social construction of suicide terrorism. The limitations of the study, its significant theoretical and practical implications, as well as suggestions for future research are discussed.

Chapter One

Introduction

Suicide terrorism is characterized by the willingness of physically and psychologically war-trained individuals to die in the course of destroying or attempting to annihilate enemy targets in furtherance of certain political or social objectives. Suicide terrorism is rooted in the historical, social, and psychological dimensions of international terrorism, as a result of centuries of opposition between various groups and their actual or perceived enemies. As such, it is neither a unique nor a new phenomenon. Rather, it is an integral feature of the historical development of oppositional terrorism worldwide and the product of an assortment of tactics, goals, and motives characteristic of more conventional terrorism.

Over the past three years, more suicide terror attacks have been recorded worldwide than in the last twenty-five years. This resurgence of suicide terrorism in several countries and the extensive media coverage it has received account for the seeming, misleading uniqueness of the phenomenon. Until recently, it was witnessed in less than a dozen countries, primarily Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Israel. It has now spread across the world and even reached U.S. soil. Today, about twenty religious or secular terrorist groups have resorted to or are capable of using suicide terrorism against their own governments and foreign governments alike. Such an unprecedented propagation of suicide terror attacks against Western interests at the dawn of the twenty-first century has

made governments and the public glaringly aware of how vulnerable they are to this extremely violent, adaptive form of terrorism, and how imperative it is to devise effective and efficient measures to combat and prevent suicide terrorism.

Nonetheless, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, its etiology, outcomes, and implications are still misconstrued today by policymakers and scholars alike. There has been an outpouring of literature on terrorism since September 2001 and, in particular, articles and book chapters about suicide terrorism have multiplied in a variety of academic journals and more mainstream books. The majority of these pieces focus on the contemporary development of suicide bombings as the ultimate terrorist act and the legitimization of such a violent practice as a tool of war. They also typically focus on Islamic fundamentalism as the root cause of suicide terrorism, despite the fact that non-Muslim religious groups and even secular groups have resorted to suicide terrorism, and highlight the psychological or psychopathological features of typical suicide bombers.

This distinctive study shall advance our understanding of the complex and adaptive phenomenon that is suicide terrorism. The latter, much like terrorism in general, is a socio-political concept that is understood differently from one society to another and from one historical or political era to the next. As such, suicide terrorism is essentially the product of the interaction of social and political mechanisms, bureaucratic demands, and mass media organizations. The popular imagery and stereotypes manufactured by these processes, and perpetuated by government officials as well as many academics, do not provide us with an accurate representation of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Even the mere definition of suicide terrorism requires a very subjective, complex approach that is laden with political undertones and contradictions.

2

Suicide terrorism is not only a complex, adaptive phenomenon and a long-standing tool of asymmetric warfare, but also a concept that varies depending on the socio-political context involved. Certain events (objective actions) will be labeled as suicide terrorism in a specific context or segment of society, whereas similar events would not be construed as such in a different context or another segment of society. Hence, the interpretation (subjective meaning) of the concept suicide terrorism calls for further study in order to fully understand the mechanisms and dynamics involved and, ultimately, the growing threat it poses worldwide.

The interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is subjective and contingent upon rhetorical mechanisms by which diverse interest groups and bureaucratic agencies impose their particular opinion on suicide terrorism as the set of beliefs that must be recognized as right (i.e., the new and only acceptable norm). This study proposes to examine the subjective definitional and rhetorical processes by which suicide terrorism is socially constructed.

Using a constructionist and interactionist approach, the purpose of this multi-case study is to demonstrate that suicide terrorism is essentially a socially constructed problem, and how collective definitions, interpretations, and understandings of suicide bombings depend upon the interaction of the media, the public, and agents of social control (politicians, law enforcement, lawmakers, and interest groups). Such an approach shall effectively move the analysis of suicide terrorism beyond essentialist debates and into more nuanced understandings of cultural and ideological meaning, socio-political context, and human action. Hence, this study is designed to determine how the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a biased representation

3

of events (and their alleged causes) in official and media accounts that is conditioned by deliberate attempts to stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and promote certain political interests. Thus, the main research question on which this study focuses is: How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism? A subset of three research questions can be derived from this. (a) How is suicide terrorism a political weapon? (b) How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool? (c) How is suicide terrorism a politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework?

This chapter has presented the introduction, statement of the problem, significance of the present multi-case study, and research questions. Chapter 2 presents a conceptual framework, or theoretical perspective, with a review of the extant literature on suicide terrorism, social constructionism, and symbolic interactionism, as pertains to the issue under investigation. The methodology and procedures for data collection are described in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the study. Finally, Chapter 5 comprises a summary of the multi-case study, a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical and practical outcomes of the analysis, as well as an examination of the limitations of the latter and suggestions for future research.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

The extant literature on terrorism is sizable and diverse. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on U.S. soil, terrorism was already a topic of interest across many academic disciplines, mainly political science, sociology, and psychology. Since September 2001, thousands of articles and books on terrorism have been published in an attempt to understand the dynamics of this peculiar form of violence. The field, however, is dominated by historical surveys and literature integrators (less than 5% of published scholarly pieces rely on interviews, for instance). Most authors rely solely upon open-source documents, which accounts for the overall lack of meaningful primary data and substantive new knowledge. Thus "[t]errorism research exists on a diet of fast-food research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious" (Silke, 2004:68).

Unlike terrorism in general, the particular phenomenon of suicide terrorism remains largely understudied and fundamentally misconstrued. Impartial efforts (by scholars, governments or the media) to fully and methodically comprehend suicide bombings have been minor compared to efforts to prevent or control them. Without a clear, thorough understanding of suicide bombings within their specific context, any efforts to combat them with anti-terrorism (operational) or counter-terrorism (preventive) measures will remain futile. This analysis aims distinctively at determining whether suicide bombings are a product of specific socio-political processes and ideological

constructions, i.e., how they can be interpreted and politicized as terrorism or not based on a subjective construal of certain events and their alleged causes. Inasmuch as there have been more suicide terror attacks worldwide over the past four years than in the last two decades, it appears crucial to provide a sound understanding of the socio-political and ideological constructions of this significant contemporary phenomenon. The sociology of terrorism has been mostly neglected in the scholarly literature and the study of suicide terrorism, as noted below, has typically been limited to the overall use of suicide bombings as a political weapon without much attention being paid to the socio-political dynamics, institutional processes, and complex biases inherent in the phenomenon, its interpretation, and our understanding of it.

The following examination of the current literature on suicide terrorism, social constructionism, and symbolic interactionism shall provide an overview of the conceptual and theoretical foundation of this multi-case study of suicide bombings.

Suicide Terrorism

Defining Terrorism

Although scholars in various disciplines have focused on the phenomenon, and even though a plethora of articles are available on the topic, there is still no agreed upon, all-encompassing definition of terrorism (Archick & Gallis, 2003; Caracci, 2002; Crenshaw, 1992; Hewitt, 2000; Hoffman, 2003; Hudson, 2000; International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism, 2002; Jenkins, 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2000; Laqueur, 2003; Nyatepe-Coo & Zeisler-Vralsted, 2004; Poland, 2004; Simonsen & Spindlove, 2003; van Leeuwen, 2003c; White, 2003; Whittaker, 2001, 2002). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force against persons or

property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives (Poland, 2004; Simonsen & Spindlove, 2003; White, 2003).

As Schweitzer (2001) points out, "[d]efining a terror attack as a suicide bombing depends primarily on whether the perpetrator is killed." If the bomber dies, *as intended*, while completing his or her mission, the terror attack will qualify as a suicide bombing. A contrario, the bombing cannot possibly be a suicide bombing if the perpetrator does not die in the course of the attack. Hence, a suicide terror attack can be construed as

> *a violent, politically motivated attack, carried out in a deliberate state of awareness by a person who blows himself up together with his chosen target. The pre-meditated certain death of the perpetrator is the pre-condition for the success of the attack.* (Ibid.)

Phenomenology and Etiology

Virtually all the articles and books published on suicide terrorism focus on phenomenology, etiology, and promising prevention measures. Most articles on the "genesis of suicide terrorism" (Atran, 2003) underscore not only the processes by which suicide terrorism has developed from its early manifestations to contemporary times, but also the general characteristics of the phenomenon as observed around the world today (Beyler, 2003a; Council on Foreign Relations, 2004; Dale, 1988; Gunaratna, 2000, 2001; Hoffman, 2003; Hoffman & McCormick, 2004; International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2000; Kondaki, 2001; Pipes, 1986; Schweitzer, 2001; Sprinzak, 2000a, 2000b). In particular, Pape (2003) studied 188 suicide terrorist attacks perpetrated worldwide between 1980 and 2001. His study evidences that suicide terrorism follows a

7

"strategic logic" distinctively intended to obtain considerable territorial concessions by coercing contemporary liberal democracies.

Psychological explanations of suicide terrorism. Several authors have focused on the psychological issues inherent in the "making of" a suicide bomber, most notably the absence of major psychopathological traits or psychiatric features (Atran, 2003, 2004; Glausiusz, 2003; Mansdorf, 2003; Perina, 2002; Sprinzak, 2000; Van Biema, 2001). In an attempt to provide an understanding of "what makes suicide bombers tick," Shuman (2001) examines Palestinian bombers and highlights their strict religious education with promises of paradise in reward for martyrdom, the support they receive from their parents for their convictions, as well as the brainwashing process and the encouragement received "from a Palestinian society with no other means of fighting back against oppression and humiliation."

Socio-economic explanations of suicide terrorism. Yet others highlight the socio-economic and political processes involved in the development and perpetuation of suicide terrorism recruitment campaigns and missions. Strenski (2003) emphasizes the "social logic" of Muslim "human bombers." Atran (2003, 2004) firmly rebukes the position adopted by many government officials and political observers who deem contemporary suicide terrorists (especially in the Middle East) as "crazed cowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive on poverty and ignorance." Kushner (2002) focuses on the socio-political aspects of suicide terrorism, whereas Griset and Mahan (2003) put the phenomenon in perspective within a more general study of terrorism. The latter approach is in fact the preferred one in most terrorism books available today.

Religious and moral explanations of suicide terrorism. The religious and moral roots of suicide terrorism are also at the center of several articles, book chapters, and books. The "moral infrastructure" of suicide bombers is emphasized to offer an understanding of the phenomenon from a moral judgment perspective (Berko, 2004). The significance of suicide terrorism as religious violence, religious propaganda tool, and ultimate *jihad* is at the center of numerous articles and books published over the past few years (see, for instance, Ali, 2002; Bond, 2004; International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2001; Israeli, 2003; Laqueur, 2003; Selegut, 2003; Victor, 2003). The substantial role of religious fundamentalism and martyrdom in Islamic terrorism is typically favored (see, for instance, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2001; Israeli, 2002, 2003). The endorsement of suicide terrorism by top Muslim clerics (Fighel, 2002) garners as much attention from scholars and analysts as does the interdiction of the trend by senior officials and religious leaders (Paz, 2001; Pope, 2003).

Isolating issues and cases. Some articles or books provide more or less developed accounts (rather than analyses) of cases involving female suicide bombers (Beyler, 2003b; Eshel, 2001; Victor, 2003). Others concentrate on specific groups using suicide terrorism or countries affected by it. For instance, Abuza (2002) reports on Al-Qaeda's activities and allies in Southeast Asia, with an emphasis on suicide bombings perpetrated by Jemaah Islamyah and security concerns in the Philippines and Indonesia. Van de Voorde (2005) examines Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers, describing the LTTE's Black Tiger suicide unit as the masters of suicide bombing. Palestinian suicide terrorism is the focal point of many articles and books available today (see, for instance, Kimhi & Even, 2003; Luft, 2002; Moghadam, 2003; Simon & Stevenson, 2003; Stork, 2002; Telhami, 2002).

9

Moghadam (2003) analyzes suicide bombers of the al-Aqsa Intifada (from September 2000 to June 2002 only) in order to highlight the motivational and organizational elements involved in the process. Simon and Stevenson (2003) focus specifically on Hamas, its ideology, operations, and influence on the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism issues. Ways to "outsmart" suicide terrorists (Sprinzak, 2000b) or "defeat suicide terrorism" (Wolfson, 2003) are sporadically discussed in the extant literature. In 2001, the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) published a collection of chapters on countering suicide terrorism that provides both an overview of this worldwide phenomenon, brief case studies of specific countries or groups, as well as recommendations regarding realistic strategies and promising measures against suicide terrorism. Moghadam (2003) discusses counter-terrorism strategies targeting Palestinian suicide terrorism and suggests that Israel identify ways of eliminating or at least reducing the incentives that encourage some Palestinians to volunteer for suicide missions. Simon and Stevenson (2003) suggest ways for Israel to deal with Hamas and survey the role of the United States in handling the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Van de Voorde (2005) focuses on the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and offers policy recommendations to assess and effectively address the issue of ethnic separatism and violence in Sri Lanka.

The sociology of suicide terrorism. What is still missing from the extant literature is a thorough analysis of "the dynamics through which terrorism becomes a social phenomenon" (Turk, 2004:271). Sociologists have, however, contributed to the study of

10

terrorism in general by adopting an interpretive approach in order to determine that terrorism is a social construction (Ben-Yehuda, 1993; Turk, 2002a, 2004; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). As Turk (2004) stresses, "[c]ontrary to the impression fostered by official incidence counts and media reports, terrorism is not a given in the real world but is instead an interpretation of events and their presumed causes" (2004:271). For instance, it appears that the United States itself

> has a long history of violence associated with political, labor, racial, religious, and other social and cultural conflicts. . . . Assassinations, bombings, massacres, and other secretive deadly attacks have caused many thousands of casualties. Yet, few incidents have been defined as terrorism or the perpetrators as terrorists. Instead, authorities have typically ignored or downplayed the political significance of such violence, opting to portray and treat the violence as apolitical criminal acts by deranged or evil individuals, outlaws or gangsters, or 'imported' agitators. . . . In official public usage, terrorism is far more likely to refer to incidents associated with agents and supporters of presumably foreign-based terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda than with the violence of home-grown militants. (2004:272)

Suicide Terrorism in Perspective

Main Characteristics

Suicide terrorism is a form of terrorism characterized by the willingness of physically and psychologically war-trained individuals to die in the course of destroying or attempting to annihilate enemy targets in furtherance of certain political or social objectives. A suicide terror operation is a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by self-aware individuals who actively and purposely cause their own death through blowing themselves up along with their chosen target. The ensured death of the perpetrator is a precondition for the success of his or her mission.

11

Suicide operations are differentiated depending on whether they occur on or off the battlefield. *Battlefield* operations are those in which suicide bombers belong to the attacking groups. For instance, during World War II, scores of Japanese pilots known as Kamikaze (i.e., "the divine wind") used their planes as missiles to crash into U.S. military targets. Japan first used suicide attacks during the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. In the fall of 1944, the Japanese Imperial Army organized massive suicide attacks, known as "Tokkotai." In addition to destroying U.S. warships, the primary purpose of the Tokkotai was to launch a psychological warfare against Americans and discourage them from engaging in the conflict. The Kamikaze pilots believed that serving and honoring their Emperor by becoming human bombs would open the gates of heaven for them and guarantee their eternal happiness. Moreover, besides the promise of paradise and spiritual integrity, the majority of the Kamikaze were motivated by revenge and a desire to save their country from the invading, all-conquering Americans. The Kamikaze were therefore dying for a cause, serving both God and their country. Therefore, even though they target civilians instead of soldiers, Palestinian suicide bombers have been compared to Kamikaze terrorists since they typically also believe that they are fighting not only for their country but also against the enemies of God, that is, Israel and America. Operations taking place *off the battlefield*, on the other hand, usually involve single suicide bombers; however, multiple suicide bombers have also been used, as evidenced in attacks perpetrated by Hamas or the LTTE. The targets are generally varied: they can be either stationary or mobile, human beings or infrastructures; their nature can be civilian, military, political, economic, or cultural (International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism, 2002; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).

12

History shows that suicide attacks are indubitably a long-standing *modus operandi* for terrorist groups. In ancient times, a couple of legendary sects, the Jewish Sicarii (Zealots) and the Islamic Hashishiyun (Assassins), were well known for committing suicide terror attacks (Schweitzer, 2002; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). From the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, various Muslim communities in Asia also opted for terrorist suicide attacks in their fight against European colonialism. Suicide operations were carried out against Western hegemonists on the Malabar Coast of Southwestern India, in Northern Sumatra in Atjeh, as well as in the Southern Philippines in both Mindanao and Sulu. The terrorists belonged to a minority subcultural group within the Muslim community; although they were established along the coast of the Indian Ocean, they terrorized Europeans both in the region and on the Old Continent. The suicide attacks would take place whenever hopeless militant Muslims would give up on resisting the Europeans. Their purpose was not only to protect the honor of the Islamic community, but also to terrify Europeans or local Christians. The terrorists considered their actions as a private jihad: they were driven by their intense religious commitment and their aspiration to personal merit. Characteristic of the suicidal jihads was the heroic literature they spawned (e.g., songs, poems, legal and theological treatises, epic narratives); it glorified both martyrdom and the rituals performed prior to carrying out the attacks. Epics specifically celebrated the sacrifice made by the suicide terrorists and encouraged other Muslims in the community to emulate the martyrs. Since the suicide attacks typically happened when military opposition to colonialism had been

13

unsuccessful, they were suspended once innovative political prospects flourished in the area (sometimes as late as the 1920s) (Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).

As Dale (1988) explains in his study of anti-colonial terrorism in Islamic Asia, although the attacks did not involve bombings, they were "a premodern form of terrorism, and by studying them it is possible to appreciate why many Muslims regard the recent terrorist attacks in the Middle East as only a more politicized variant of a type of anticolonial resistance that long antedates the twentieth century" (1988:39). The contemporary trend of suicide terrorism in the Middle East is a result of the use and misuse of Islam as a political tool by Islamist, fundamentalist movements. Political Islam, even its most vicious and extremist manifestations, appeared early on in Islamic history owing to radical puritans such as the Kharijites, who would attack Muslims they did not deem devout or virtuous enough. Modern forms of politicized Islam are derived from the Wahhabi reforms initiated in Arabia in the late eighteenth century. Today, the extremist ideology developed by the Wahhabis is still promoted by their spiritual heirs in Saudi Arabia and the al-Qaeda network (Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).

Hence, put in the historical perspective of the development of oppositional terrorism across the world, the contemporary trend of suicide terrorism appears much less exceptional or unique. Rather, it is an essential factor of the profound, underlying animosity between terrorist organizations and their governmental foes. Suicide terrorism merely mirrors the development of general terrorist tactics, as well as the ability of terrorist groups to refine their methods of operation in order to wage the most efficient and cost-effective psychological warfare of all, which also coincides with the advancement of technology and the evolution of the socio-economic forces inherent in

14

today's society (International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2002; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).

As emphasized by Boaz Ganor (2002a), the executive director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, at the 2000 International Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism,

> Suicide terrorism constitutes a significant escalation in terrorist activity. In his ability to implement the attack at precisely the time and place where it will cause the maximum number of casualties and greatest damage, the suicide bomber is virtually guaranteed success. Even the least deadly of such attacks succeed in striking a devastating blow to public morale. (2002a:1)

Suicide terrorism is all the more threatening because of the difficulties of combating it, the large number of casualties it creates, and the religious and ideological zeal it inspires. It is a phenomenon that often, though not always, goes hand in hand with religious extremism – distorting religion in the service of political aims.

Contemporary Trends and Issues

Terrorism today is very different from ancient methods of warfare; likewise, contemporary suicide terrorism has departed from the ancient strategies that spawned it. The primary purpose of suicide terrorism is to cause maximum physical damage and subsequently paralyze entire populations with overwhelming fear and angst. This guarantees the devastating, negative psychological effect of the impromptu operations not only on the direct attack victims, but also on entire populations. The high number of casualties in suicide attacks further warrants worldwide media coverage, which guarantees the exposure of suicide terrorist organizations on the international scene. Suicide terrorism has consequently become one of the most spectacular and dreadful

15

weapons available to terrorists, along with blowing up airplanes in mid air and using weapons of mass destruction (Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).

The currently observed manifestations of suicide terrorism have typically involved terrorists carrying explosive charges concealed on their bodies or transported by various vehicles (generally cars, trucks, boats, or even bicycles and animals). Attacks usually involved one or two bombers. Terrorist bombings target enclosed spaces (e.g., buses, trains), semi-confined spaces (e.g., restaurants, cafés, hotels), and open spaces (e.g., open marketplace, bus stop, pedestrian areas) (Almogy, Belzberg, Mintz, Pikarsky, Zamir, & Rivkind, 2004). As Almogy et al. (2005) emphasize, "[t]he combination of military-grade explosive material, high-mass shrapnel, and precise control of the timing of detonation has transformed suicide bombing attacks into an ultimate tool in the hands of terrorists" (2005:390). The lethal effect of the bombs is often amplified by using explosives packed with metallic pellets, nails and bolts, or bombers who are carriers of viruses such as HIV or Hepatitis B and C (Almogy et al., 2005; Kluger et al., 2005; Siegel-Itzkovich, 2001).

The mass casualty situation that can ensue from a terrorist bombing is a concern to the emergency management community. "Suicide bombing attacks seriously challenge the most experienced medical facilities" (Almogy, Belzberg, Mintz, Pikarsky, Zamir, & Rivkind, 2004:295) and require even large-volume trauma centers to update and modify their protocol regarding casualty management, triage, and treatment. Furthermore, the likelihood of severe injury and multiple contamination resulting from blast exposure presents new challenges to the civilian medical corps in advanced and developing countries alike (Almogy, Belzberg, Mintz, Pikarsky, Zamir, & Rivkind, 2004; Mrena,

16

Paakkonen, Back, Pirvola, & Ylikoski, 2004; Siegel-Itzkovich, 2001; Zafar, Rehmani, Chawla, Umer, & Mohsin-e-Azam, 2005).

Using passenger airliners to organize airborne suicide attacks, on the other hand, is a relatively innovative and highly effective method. As explained by Rohan Gunaratna (2001) after the September 2001 attacks on U.S. soil, "[t]he use of passenger airliners in a suicide role demonstrates an escalation in the threat aimed at causing mass casualties. As the threshold has been crossed, it is very likely that several other terrorist groups will attempt similar operations in the immediate or foreseeable future" (2001:8).

The concept of hijacking and employing passenger airliners in a suicide mission can be traced back to the Middle East. The idea first developed in the mid-1980s as Middle Eastern terrorist groups attempted to develop an air capability, primarily to gain access from Lebanon into Israel, and therefore acquired light air vehicles and trained soon-to-be-kamikaze pilots with much sophistication throughout the 1990s. Until the fall of 2001, although "the Western security intelligence community has been aware of terrorist consideration of the airborne suicide option for nearly three decades" (Ibid.), there had been little to no assessment of what should be done in order to safeguard the individuals and infrastructures that could be targeted by airborne suicide activities. Prior to the September 2001 unprecedented attacks on symbolic landmarks on U.S. soil, there are only two examples of terrorist groups trying to use passenger airliners in order to carry out a suicide attack. First, in 1986, Hizballah followers hijacked a TWA commercial jetliner and were determined to crash it into buildings in downtown Tel Aviv. The second attempt dates back to December 24, 1994, when the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers in an effort to raise international concern

over the Algerian struggle and punish France for supporting the Algerian government. The aircraft, which had over 225 passengers and crew on board, left for France after several women and children were released and three men killed. The GIA cell, led by 25-year-old Abdul Abdallah Yahia (a.k.a. Abou), intended to crash the fully fueled plane into the Eiffel Tower in Paris or, if their effort failed, to blow the plane up in mid-air over the French capital. Seemingly however, because of the strong likelihood of significant governmental retaliation, Islamic terrorist groups (whether Asian or Middle Eastern) have overall been reluctant to carry out mass-casualty attacks (Jacinto, 2002).

The Global War on Terror: War of Ideas and War of Words

   Ideological warfare and the terrorist label. Terrorism is fundamentally a socially constructed problem (Ben-Yehuda, 1993; Turk, 2002a, 2004; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). Hence the subjective interpretations involved in the construction process "are not unbiased attempts to depict truth but rather conscious efforts to manipulate perceptions to promote certain interests at the expense of others. When people and events come to be regularly described in public as terrorists and terrorism, some governmental or other entity is succeeding in a war of words in which the opponent is promoting alternative designations such as 'martyr' and 'liberation struggle'" (Turk, 2004:271-272). Indeed, "parties in conflict are trying to stigmatize one another. The construction and selective application of definitions of terrorism are embedded in the dynamics of political conflicts, where ideological warfare to cast the enemy as an evildoer is a dimension of the struggle to win support for one's own cause" (2004:273). "Terrorism" thus becomes a convenient label that is used in a "pervasive and indiscriminate" manner (Bassiouni, 1981:2) to vilify one's enemy. As Davidson (1986) explains,

18

Labeling one's opponent a terrorist is one way to barbarize both his image and his cause. Many world leaders see terrorism as monolithic: that is, they trace all important terrorist actions – either directly or indirectly – to the same source. In the U.S. they are branded as degenerative acts of immoral enemies. . . . The terror of one's foes is real terror, premeditated and pathological, while that of one's friends is only a temporary aberration, a mistake, to be addressed, if at all, by quiet diplomacy. . . . One of the consequences of the bipolar struggle in which states like Israel and the U.S. believe themselves to be involved is that the space for objectivity becomes considerably narrowed . . . [and] it is hard to seek the causes of the individual acts of terrorism dispassionately. (1986:109)

The FTO solution: Denomination or demonization? Terrorism is a dynamic and complex phenomenon. It is therefore difficult to determine exactly how many terrorist groups or organizations exist today. In the United States, the Office of Counterterrorism of the Department of State is responsible for identifying Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), the groups and organizations designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. Being labeled as a terrorist group has legal, political, and fiscal consequences. FTO designations play a critical role in the fight against terrorism and can be an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business. The 42 current FTOs (as of October 2005) are listed in Appendix A.

On the other hand, "pronouncements by the U.S. State Department . . . reflect assessments not only of objective threat but also of the political, economic, and military implications of naming particular entities as terrorist" (Turk, 2004:272). Ultimately, the process of labeling people or entities as terrorists results in the demonization of that group, organization, individual, or sponsor based on criteria unilaterally determined and selectively applied by the U.S. administration. Categorizing terrorists as "evildoers" or "evil cowards" has indeed been the approach of choice in the past few years, especially in

19

reference to members and supporters of the Al-Qaeda network (Atran, 2004; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). President Bush has, in effect, repeatedly declared that it is the responsibility of the United States "to rid the world of Evil" (Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). He also named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea the three major components of the "Axis of Evil" that ought to be fought relentlessly in the war on terror, much like President Reagan had targeted the U.S.S.R. as the "Empire of Evil" two decades earlier.

Such reductionist and moralistic rhetoric unfortunately contributes nothing positive or productive to the fight against suicide terrorism or international terrorism. Publicly pitting the moral world of Good, as defined by the United States, versus the amoral world of Evil of the terrorists only promotes a rhetorical style that actually feeds into the similarly dichotomous extremist Islamic worldview pitting the House of God (*Dar al-Islam*, or House of Submission) against the House of War (*Dar al-Harb*). This "simple dualism of violence . . . is . . . reminiscent of Edward Said's notion of Orientalism . . . a discourse about the East which carries with it notions of the chaotic, the violent, the disorderly, the treacherous, and the irrational . . . [to create] an Other in a binary mode which, by contrast, serves to define the West, the Occident" (Young, 2004:1). This dualism of violence is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1
Binary of Violence – The West vs. the Other

The West	The Other
Us	Them
Good	Evil
Moral	Immoral / Amoral
Rational	Irrational
Justified	Hysterical
Focused	Wanton
Response	Provocation
Defensive	Offensive
Generating Security	Inspiring Terror
Modernity	Anti-Modernity

Although the tendency to adopt double standards is recurrent in foreign policy and the somewhat naive good vs. evil worldview is prevalent in American culture and politics, demonizing one's foes is neither constructive nor commendable. The success of suicide terrorist campaigns depends on the ability of the bombers to dehumanize their enemy (Sprinzak, 1998; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). Applying the same kind of rhetoric and reasoning to suicide terrorism policy-making and prevention is rather senseless. Instead of imposing the American style of democracy onto others as the one and only sustainable mode of civilization across the globe, the United States and its allies must work towards bettering their understanding of the socio-cultural and religious values of the countries where suicide terrorism sponsors and supporters are found (Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).

Rationale for a Social Constructionist Approach to the Study of Suicide Terrorism

Contrary to popular belief and what policymakers and the media have insinuated in the past few years, suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It originated in ancient times and has simply evolved over time, developing as other forms of terrorism have. Rather than a new weapon in the arsenal of terrorists groups, suicide terrorism is a long-standing, highly adaptable and extremely violent tool of "propaganda by deed" that is constantly reshaped by technological advances and contemporary social events.

Terrorist suicide attacks are characterized by the use of rather primitive means which, thanks to meticulous planning (including the recruitment, formation, and training of the bombers or attack teams), result in considerable psychological and physical harm. Terrorist suicide attacks happen without warning and are virtually always successful in wreaking utter chaos upon entire populations. They are prime weapons of psychological

21

warfare and, as such, constitute one of the most dangerous weapons available to terrorists today.

Studies typically focus on the "who, when, and where" instead of the "why and how" of suicide bombing attacks. The scholarly literature on suicide bombings therefore fails to provide a thorough, objective analysis and a critical understanding of dynamics and patterns. It merely offers an erroneous interpretation of suicide terrorism as a homogenous phenomenon, thus ignoring that it is a fundamentally adaptive, resilient, complex phenomenon involving a wide array of actors and a variety of activities. The literature on suicide terrorism is further characterized by a lack of applied focus: it generally relies on an arbitrary extension of terrorism research findings to suicide terrorism without further analysis or inquiry into the distinctive features of the latter.

In order to thwart and pre-empt suicide terrorism, the international intelligence community and governments around the world must concentrate their counterterrorism efforts on interrupting suicide terror attacks in their preparatory phase. To prevent suicide terrorism, it is crucial to fully comprehend the complex combination of factors that exhort people to join a terrorist group and unite them behind common ideologies and grievances. It is furthermore important to bear in mind that the sustainability and growing popularity of suicide terrorism are partially affected by the foreign policies of the Western nations leading the "global war on terrorism," as well as their overall social, political, economic, and cultural agendas.

Social constructionism "is a well-developed model for studying the contested claims that are made – by victims, interest groups, social movements, professionals and politicians – in the construction of new social problem categories" (Cohen, 2002:xxii). It

22

has been used to study the moral signification of a variety of cases, from "drunken driving, hate crime, stalking, environmental problems" (2002:xxiii) or psychiatric disorders to, more recently, terrorism (Jenkins, 2003; Turk, 2004).

Applying a social constructionist approach to the study of suicide terrorism in particular can help understand the recent emergence of terrorists as contemporary folk devils, as well as the moral campaign and panic that ensued. Social constructionism further makes it possible to highlight the negative (and usually unintended) effects of social control policy, including the increased cohesion of terrorist groups and their polarization against the rest of society and, specifically, agents of control as represented by the entities involved in the global war on terror. The role of the mass media in publicizing attacks, triggering a "contagion effect," and encouraging the ideological and commercial exploitation of suicide terrorism is also worthy of a thorough social constructionist investigation.

There can be no immediate or long-term solution to suicide terrorism if the significance of its historical and socio-cultural dimensions is persistently overlooked. Likewise, it is unsuitable to keep ignoring the dynamics of the moral signification of the phenomenon by agents of control, the media, and society at large. A social constructionist approach combined with a symbolic interactionist stance can help determine how the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a biased representation of events (and their alleged causes) that is conditioned by deliberate attempts to stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and promote certain political interests. It shall do so by (a) focusing the analysis on mechanisms of moral sensitization and symbolization; (b) evidencing how socio-political processes,

23

bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures contribute to the social construction of suicide terrorism; (c) highlighting how agents of social control and the mass media contribute to the commercial and ideological exploitation of suicide terrorism, as well as its dramatization, politicization, and escalation; and (d) improving our understanding of group solidification and polarization processes so as to improve anti- and counterterrorism policies regarding suicide bombing campaigns.

It is of utmost importance that we fully comprehend how all these social entities have interacted to exploit suicide terrorism as a pressing social problem, to dramatize it by magnifying its symbolic nature and ramifications, and to further polarize ideologically opposed entities. In effect, they have mobilized extremists and helped them structure more cohesive networks. Once this intricate process of moral signification, exploitation, amplification, and polarization is explained, we may address the incongruity of arbitrary social policy and indiscriminate social action to assess why moral campaigns, panics and crusades have not worked to prevent suicide terrorism. Hence, such a progressive approach shall shed light on ways to develop the efficient and effective prevention strategies that have yet to be soundly devised.

Social Constructionism

The phrase "social construction" has become a recurrent catchphrase in scholarly books and articles since Berger and Luckmann introduced it in the sociological literature in *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966). Social constructionism is a postmodernist school of thought that focuses on the processes involved in constructing, or creating, social phenomena and social reality. Social constructionism focuses on how social rules are shaped, altered, institutionalized, and passed on traditionally from generation to

24

generation (Adler & Adler, 2003; Blumer, 1969; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Hacking, 1999).

Defining Social Problems and Social Reality

Social constructionists are interested more in institutional- or structural-level analyses of social problems than in etiological approaches. They claim that specific issues, or putative conditions, become social problems as a result of their collective definitions (Blumer, 1969; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Loseke & Best, 2003; Searle, 1995). Indeed, "objective conditions become social problems only when they are defined as or felt to be problematic – disturbing in some way, undesirable, in need of solution or remedy" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:88). According to Kitsuse and Spector (1995), social problems are a "process by which members of groups or societies define a putative condition as a problem" (1995:296). More specifically, they can be defined as "the activities of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions" (Spector & Kitsuse, 1977:75).

> The *emergence* of a social problem, then, is contingent on the organization of group activities with reference to defining some putative condition as a problem, and asserting the need for eradicating, ameliorating, or otherwise changing the condition. The central problem for a theory of social problems, so defined, is to account for the *emergence and maintenance of claim-making and responding activities*. (Kitsuse & Spector, 1995:296)

Hence, "social problems do not exist 'objectively' . . . they are *constructed by* the human mind, *called into being* or *constituted by* the definitional process" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:88). "All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generalizations, formulations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization"

25

(Schutz, as cited in Prus, 1996:xvii). Social constructs, therefore, shape what could be called "reality by consensus." As further explained by Fuller and Myers (1941:320), "[s]ocial problems are what people think they are, and if conditions are not defined as social problems by the people involved in them, they are not problems to these people, although they may be problems to outsiders." Social problems therefore exist where a group of people identify something as wrong, concerned, and attempt to correct it. They have to not only be considered a problem, but also a "remediable condition" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:89). As Becker (2003) emphasizes, "*social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance*, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders" (2003:70).

Constructionist perspectives on social problems "ask how and why particular social problems emerge and become the focus of demonstrations and protests, front-page news stories and television coverage, and new social politics" (Loseke & Best, 2003:ix). In addition, social constructionists "examine how public consciousness of social problems can change the world around us as well as our understanding of this world" (Ibid.). Ultimately, "it is the *social construction* or *subjective interpretation* of conditions that defines a social problem, not the nature of the condition itself" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:91). Social construction indeed describes subjective, rather than objective, reality. Subjectivity is the antithesis of the epistemic virtue of objectivity; it implies judging something based on one's personal opinion, values or intuitions, not objective examination, analysis, and beliefs. As a philosophical principle, subjectivism holds subjective experiences paramount: it implies that the very existence of any object or condition depends only on people's subjective awareness of it.

26

Socially constructed reality is a continuing, dynamic process; such reality is constantly perpetuated as a pervasive set of norms by individuals who rely on their subjective interpretation and knowledge of it. Social constructionists essentially seek "to understand exactly how, and by whom, social problems are 'discovered'" (Ibid.). They focus on the significance of "interests, resources, and legitimacy" (1994:92) involved in the process of creating or "discovering" social problems.

> Members or representatives of organizations or groups that stand to profit from the discovery of a problem are likely to be motivated to do so; organizations or groups that can command resources – many members, access to the media or to influential political figures, financial resources, and so on – are likely to be more successful in defining a condition as a social problem; and spokespersons who are considered credible, reliable, and respectable, likewise, are more likely to be taken seriously as the definers of a new problem. (Ibid.)

Strict vs. Contextual Constructionism

Social constructionism is either strict (hard) or moderate (soft or contextual). Moderate constructionists take into consideration the "objective seriousness" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:94) of conditions that may or may not be re-defined as social problems. Social reality is constructed by conditions and problems that are both epistemologically objective and ontologically subjective (Searle, 1995). According to Pinker (2002), an adherent of moderate or contextual constructionism, "some categories really are social constructions: they exist only because people tacitly agree to act as if they exist" (Pinker, 2002:202). On the other hand, according to strict constructionists, "it is impossible to determine the relationship between objective damage and subjective concern because *there is no such thing as objectivity in the first place*" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:94). Strict constructionists dismiss the efforts of contextual

27

constructionists "to privilege a scientific version of reality over a popular or public one . . . [as] a fallacy, a bias, an inappropriate mixing of levels of analysis, a case of 'ontological gerrymandering' . . . [and] an improper enterprise" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:95-96).

Following a contextual constructionist approach, it appears that "definitions of and concern about conditions are far more sociologically relevant, while the objective threat that conditions present stems from a wide variety of sources" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:96). This implies that "the objective seriousness of a given condition" is not what solely "determines the public's reaction to it" (Ibid.).

> Social movement activity, legislation, a prominent ranking on the public's list of society's most serious problems, and media attention, are all generated by a variety of factors. . . . Public concern and action about a certain issue rise and fall in part for political, ideological, and moral reasons. There is, in other words, a 'politics of social problems.' . . . [T]he public may be stirred up as a result of the efforts of a 'moral entrepreneur' or moral crusader – an individual who feels that 'something ought to be done' about a supposed wrongdoing, and takes steps to make sure that certain rules are enforced. (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:97)

Social Problems and Audiences

The sociological "focus on deviance as subjectively problematic implies the importance of an *audience*, that is, those individuals who directly or indirectly witness, hear about, and evaluate the behavior or the individuals in question" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:71). In order to determine if a certain type of behavior is deviant or can be labeled a social problem, one must determine who constructs the behavior as deviant or problematic, what audience's reaction matters, and whose assessment of the behavior is of importance. Essentially, the construction of social problems and deviance "is completely meaningless without reference to a specific, relevant audience" (Ibid.). Hence, a behavior that may be interpreted as immoral or evil by an audience may not be

28

viewed as such by another audience. Audiences therefore play a crucial role in the construction of meanings and, ultimately, social problems.

Public Images of Social Problems

   Rhetoric and random violence. Best's (1999) interdisciplinary approach to the study of social problems posits that some new crime problems emerge and rapidly wither out of the public's attention, whereas others will proliferate and turn into long-term social problems. Best highlights the processes through which these crimes are purposely described as new, random, and epidemic in nature, even though they truly are not, in order to both sustain private fears and influence public policies. Best not only focuses on the cultural framework of "random violence" as pertains to contemporary crime trends, but also exposes the erroneous claim that violence is ever more increasing. He thus analyzes how it is now conventional to "declare a war" on social problems and institutionalize crime problems with the help of the mass media, activists, officials, and crime or policy experts. The description and interpretation of social problems are characterized by a type of rhetoric, or language, chosen specifically to shape policies and control outcomes, which in turn promotes widespread social distrust and may lead to moral panics.

   Mass media, symbolic violence, and representations of crime. As Barak (1994) points out, "[m]ass news representations in the 'information age' have become the most significant communication by which the average person comes to know the world outside his or her immediate experience" (1994:3). Our understanding of social concepts is influenced and determined by our moral assessments of these concepts, that is, how we

29

perceive them. These subjective perceptions of crime and justice therefore vary across human groups or societies. They are, in effect,

> influenced by the different ways in which the interplay between criminals, apprehenders, and victims are socially and ethically perceived by ordinary citizens, criminal justice policy makers, those responsible for carrying out legal norms, criminologists, and the press. The mass communication of these perceptions construct [sic] a cultural awareness of crime, of victim/offender encounters, and of the administration of justice. (1994:4)

The mass media are inherently "active and subject to changing norms and values" and "also have a dialectical relationship with their object matter" (1994:13). As a result, the interaction of the mass media and symbolic deviance is at the core of the "mainstream set of outlooks, assumptions and beliefs about behavior" (1994:12). It is therefore crucial to analyze the dialectic nature of the dynamic interface of mass media coverage of crime news, the social trends the media either follow or create, the political change they may instigate, as well as the rhetorical processes involved in the categorization or labeling of certain acts and their presumed causes.

Social Problems and Moral Panics

Overview of moral panics. Moral panic "is characterized by the feeling, held by a substantial number of the members of a given society, that evildoers pose a threat to the society and to the moral order as a consequence of their behavior and, therefore, 'something should be done' about them and their behavior" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:31). Five criteria define the concept of moral panic: concern, hostility, consensus, disproportionality, and volatility.

The first indicator implies the need for "a heightened level of *concern* over the behavior of a certain group and the consequences that that behavior presumably causes

30

for the rest of society" (1994:33). Such concern should be genuine and measurable (media attention, social movement organizations, new legislation, etc.). This is different from the concept of fear, which is an expectable but not required element of the response to a tangible threat.

In addition, moral panic is characterized by "an increased level of *hostility* toward the group or category regarded as engaging in the behavior in question. Members of this category are collectively designated as the enemy, or an enemy, of respectable society; their behavior is seen as harmful or threatening to the values, the interests, possibly the very existence, of the society" (Ibid.). This entails identifying a group or segment of society as "*responsible* for the threat" (1994:34). As a result, "a division is made between 'us' – good, decent, respectable folk – and 'them' – deviants, bad guys, outsiders, criminals, the underworld. . . . This dichotomization includes *stereotyping*: generating 'folk devils' or villains and folk heroes in this morality play of evil versus good" (Ibid.).

There must also be "substantial or widespread *agreement* or *consensus* . . . that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group members and their behavior" (Ibid.). People of course react differently to threats. Thus, moral panic can be observed throughout society, but it can also be limited to sub-cultures, as well as local or regional levels.

The fourth criterion is more implicit and focuses on the "sense on the part of many members of the society that a more sizable number of individuals are engaged in the behavior in question than actually are, and the threat, danger, or damage said to be caused by the behavior is far more substantial than, is incommensurate with and in fact is 'above and beyond that which a realistic appraisal could sustain'" (1994:36). In other

31

words, moral panic involves excessive public concern compared to the objective harm or threat. Clearly establishing the objective dimension at stake is difficult, if not impossible, but taking it into consideration helps understand the existence of various levels or degrees of disproportionality.

Finally, moral panics are inherently volatile. Indeed, "they erupt fairly suddenly . . . and, nearly as suddenly, subside. Some moral panics may become *routinized* or *institutionalized*, that is, the moral concern about the target behavior results in, or remains in place in the form of, social movement organizations, legislation, enforcement practices, informal interpersonal norms or practices for punishing transgressors, after it has run its course" (1994:38-39). Still, it is also important not to neglect the "structural or historical antecedents" (1994:39) that moral panics may have.

In sum,

> the concept, moral panic, does *not* define a concern over a given issue or putative threat about which a given cynical observer is unsympathetic, or feels is morally or ideologically inappropriate. . . . The moral panic is a phenomenon – given its broad and sprawling nature – that can be located and measured in a fairly unbiased fashion. It does not matter whether we sympathize with the concern or not. What is important is that the concern locates a 'folk devil,' is shared, is out of synch with the measurable seriousness of the condition that generates it, and varies in intensity over time. . . . [I]f that concern is focused exclusively on moral or symbolic issues as ends in themselves, it cannot be regarded as a moral panic. (1994:41)

Deviance and morality. The concept of deviance entails behaviors that are in violation of standards of conduct within a group or society, or behaviors that are interpreted as violating such standards. Deviance is determined by societal reaction. It is inherently relative to cultural norms and its definition varies depending on the social context and processes at stake, as well as the actors and audiences involved. Morality, on

32

the other hand, is a system of ethical principles and codes of conduct that distinguishes

right from wrong and may be either relative or absolute.

> The absolute or objectively given approach is the traditional, conventional
> perspective; it assumes that we all know – or should know – what good
> and bad, right and wrong, virtue and evil, are. The quality of evil or
> immorality resides in the very nature of an act itself; it is inherent,
> intrinsic, or *immanent* within certain forms of behavior. If an act is wrong,
> it is wrong now and for ever; it is evil *in the abstract*. . . . Behavior is
> wrong if it violates an absolute, eternal, final law. It need not be *seen* or
> *judged* by external human observers to be regarded as wrong; its
> immorality is a simple, objective fact, even if it takes place in a society or
> group that condones it. . . . Moreover, the objectively given approach
> assumes that "evil causes evil," or "the doctrine of evil consequences,"
> that is, that consequences universally agreed to be negative and harmful
> inevitably flow from immoral practices. . . .
>   [Conversely, considering] morality as relative or *subjectively
> problematic* . . . attempts to understand how and why behavior is regarded
> as evil or deviant. The focus is on the definition or understanding that
> members of a society hold with respect to the acts designated as
> undesirable. The existence of the evil in the indwelling, objectively given,
> or immanent sense is not so much negated as put aside for a focus on how
> morality is defined and acted out. What is regarded as evil in one place or
> situation, or at one time, may be acceptable or even rewarded at others. . . .
> [D]esignating certain behaviors and individuals as deviant is problematic,
> non commonsensical, and it is the members of the society who decide, not
> the external observer. . . . What is crucial is how behavior is defined,
> judged, and evaluated in a particular context. What counts is these varying
> definitions and evaluations; it is they and they alone that determine the
> status of an act with respect to morality and immorality. (1994:66-67)

Morality may serve as a universal guide that rational individuals use to control the

behavior of moral agents and hold them accountable should they fail to abide by the

established moral codes. This notion of universal moral consciousness is similar to what

such philosophers as Kant or Mill focused on when analyzing how individual behavior

affects other people. As Gergen (1999) stresses, "[b]eliefs in individual knowledge and

reason are closely related to . . . another cultural talisman: moral principles. In a sense,

most of our actions are congenial with a *moral order* – standards of what is appropriate or

33

acceptable. And it is because we endow individuals with the capacity for knowledge and conscious reasoning that we hold them responsible for deviations from this order" (1999:15).

Moral crusades and moral entrepreneurs. "Societies everywhere have at times been gripped by moral panics" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:51). When government officials, authorities, or segments of society redefine certain forms of behavior as major social problems, they are often influenced by "the *intensity* of the concern that was aroused" (1994:19) and focus on deviant behavior they equate with "immoral wrongdoing" (Ibid.) as the root cause of the problem. This illustrates the notion of moral crusade, which is different from a moral panic (though the two are not mutually exclusive). "The moral crusades concept implies that the activists who are working to bring about change are motivated by moral, and not rational or protectionist, interests" (1994:20). Examples of moral crusades include the Prohibition movement of the early twentieth century, the frenzied campaign for anti-marijuana laws of the mid-1930s, or the more recent Satanism scare (Adler & Adler, 2003; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994).

Adler and Adler (2003) stress that "[t]he process of constructing and applying definitions of deviance can be understood as a *moral enterprise*. That is, it involves the constructions of moral meanings and the association of them with specific acts or conditions" (2003:133). The concept of the moral crusade necessarily entails that of *crusaders* or, as they are sometimes referred to, moral entrepreneurs (Adler & Adler, 2003; Becker, 1994; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Hawkins & Tiedeman, 1975). These moral entrepreneurs launch their moral crusades to target new or past "folk devils," which inevitably translates into a demonization process and feeds into a dichotomous

34

worldview pitting Good against Evil. "Once the public viewpoint has been swayed and a majority (or a vocal and powerful enough minority) of people have adopted a social definition, it may remain at the level of a norm or become elevated to the status of law through a legislative effort. In some cases both situations occur" (Adler & Adler, 2003:135).

The "deviance-making enterprise" (Adler & Adler, 2003:134) is twofold. On the one hand, it involves the creation of rules (rule-creating), otherwise there would be no deviant behavior; on the other hand, it entails the enforcement of these rules (rule-enforcing), which requires the application of the rules to certain groups of people. As a result, there are two types of moral entrepreneurs: the rule creators and the rule enforcers (Adler & Adler, 2003; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994).

Rule creation and rule enforcement. Rules can be created either by individuals or by groups. The latter are more commonly involved in rule-creating, inasmuch as groups of moral entrepreneurs can more easily and efficiently "use their collective energy and resources to change social definitions and create norms and rules" (Adler & Adler, 2003:134).

> These groups of moral entrepreneurs represent interest groups that can be galvanized and activated into *pressure groups.* Rule creators ensure that our society is supplied with a constant stock of deviance and deviants by defining the behavior of others as immoral. They do this because they perceive threats in and feel fearful, distrustful, and suspicious of the behavior of these others. In so doing, they seek to transform private troubles into public issues and their private morality into the normative order. (Ibid.)

Moral rules and legal systems can therefore be viewed as the products of a conscious enterprise to create them and ensure they become institutionalized and

35

guarantee the evildoers will be punished accordingly (Adler & Adler, 2003; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). As Adler and Adler (2003) explain,

> Moral entrepreneurs manufacture public morality through a multi-stage process. Their first goal is to generate broad *awareness* of a problem. They do this through a process of claims-making where they assert "danger messages" about a given issue. Claims-makers use these messages to create a sense that certain conditions are problematic and pose a present or future potential danger to society. . . . Because no rules exist to deal with the threatening condition, claims-makers construct the impression that these are necessary. In so doing, they draw on the testimonials of various "experts" in the field, such as scholars, doctors, eyewitnesses, ex-participants, and others with specific knowledge of the situation. These testimonials are disseminated to society via the media as "facts." (2003:134)

The rhetorical processes involved in the making and dissemination of such "facts" include using statistics to "show the rise in incidence of a given behavior or its correlation with another social problem" (Ibid.). Furthermore, "dramatic case examples can paint a picture of horror in the public's mind, inspiring fear and loathing" and various issues can be lumped together to purposely create "a behavioral pattern portrayed as dangerous" (Ibid.). Rhetoric further "requires that each side seek the (usually competing) 'moral high ground' in their assertions and attacks on each other, disavowing special interests and pursuing only the purest public good" (Ibid.).

Moral entrepreneurs additionally strive to beget a moral conversion by persuading others of the righteousness of their stance on the given issue or issues. "They have to convert neutral parties and previous opponents into supporting partisans. Their successful conversion of others further legitimates their own beliefs. To effect a moral conversion, rule creators must compete for space in the "public arena," often a limited resource" (Ibid.).

36

Moral entrepreneurs must draw on elements of drama, novelty, politics, and deep mythic themes of the culture to gain the visibility they need. They must also enlist the support of sponsors (opinion leaders who need not have expert knowledge on any particular subject, but are liked and respected) to provide them with public endorsements. . . . At times the efforts of moral entrepreneurs are so successful that they create a "moral panic." A threat to society is depicted, and concerned individuals promoting the problem, reacting legislators, and sensationalist news media whip the public into a "feeding frenzy." Moral panics . . . tend to develop a life of their own, often moving in exaggerated propulsion beyond their original impetus. (2003:135)

Once the rules are created, they need to be enforced. Rule enforcers typically follow a subjective, selective pattern when applying moral rules and social norms. Indeed, they take advantage of the fact that "[v]arious individuals or groups have greater or lesser power to resist the enforcement of rules against them due to their socioeconomic, racial, religious, gender, political, or other status" (Ibid.).

Differential social power. Adler and Adler (2003) stress that "[s]pecific behavioral acts are not the only things that can be constructed as deviant; this definition can also be applied to a social status or lifestyle. When entire groups of people become relegated to a deviant status through their social condition (especially if it is ascribed through birth rather than voluntarily achieved), we see the force of inequality and differential social power in operation" (2003:136). As evidenced by the social construction perspective and conflict theory alike, it can be argued that "those who control the resources in society (politics, social status, gender, wealth, religious beliefs, mobilization of the masses) have the ability to dominate, both materially and ideologically, over the subordinate groups" (Ibid.). This implies that rules, laws, or norms, as well as their application and enforcement, are the result of "political action by moral entrepreneurial interest groups that are connected to society's power base" (Ibid.).

37

One way to do this is to pass and enforce norms and rules that define others' behavior as deviant. Thus, the relative deviance of [certain putative] conditions . . . can be seen to reflect the application of differential social power in our society. Individuals in these groups may find themselves discriminated against or blocked from the mainstream of society by virtue of this basic feature of their existence, unrelated to any particular situation or act. This application of the deviant label emphatically illustrates the role of power in the deviance-defining enterprise, as those positioned closer to the center of society, holding the greater social, economic, political, and moral resources, can turn the force of the deviant stigma onto others less fortunately placed. In so doing they use the definition of deviance to reinforce their own favored position. This politicization of deviance and the power associated with its use serve to remind us that deviance is not a category inhabited only by those on the marginal outskirts of society: the exotics, erotics, and neurotics. Instead, any group can be pushed into this category by the exercise of another group's greater power. (Ibid.)

Critique of Social Constructionism

Detractors of the social constructionist perspective posit that the contributions of the scientific inquiry are enough to discredit any claim made by the constructionists (or the postmodernists, for that matter). Many denounce what they call the "social construction of social constructionism," while others criticize the paradigm because they view it as a form of solipsism or an illustration of dogmatic narrow-mindedness (Best, 1995; Gergen, 1999). Yet others contend that "constructionists either make assumptions about objective conditions or worse, believe they know when objective conditions have changed or not. If so, they are unable to fulfill the constructionist imperative which requires information on the beliefs of the people involved in the social problem process rather than the beliefs of sociologists" (Best, 1995:341). This concern was in fact strong enough amongst constructionist scholars to prompt the abovementioned rift between "strict social constructionists, those who only study the claims-making process, and

contextual constructionists, who take into account what is known about objective conditions" (Ibid.).

Objectivists further argue that the peculiar approach adopted by constructionists is intrinsically flawed, inasmuch as their "focus on claims-making ignores a far more important subject: the harmful social conditions which are the 'real' social problems" (1995:343). Both perspectives are radically different and, indeed, their relative value depends on exactly *what* one is trying to understand. To the objectivists' criticism corresponds a dual social constructionist rejoinder: "(1) there is nothing wrong with studying social conditions, but decades of objective research on social conditions have failed to lay a foundation for general theories of social problems; and (2) it is important to remember that we only recognize social conditions as 'really' harmful because someone made persuasive claims to that effect" (Ibid.).

Thus, a social constructionist approach to the study and prevention of suicide terrorism appears to be a more fertile one than what has been favored thus far by scholars, practitioners and policymakers alike. Indeed, it shall shed light on the mechanisms involved in the construction of meaning, the misinterpretation of socio-cultural factors and fundamental belief systems, and the lack of understanding or knowledge concerning the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Furthermore, in order to explicitly focus on the interaction of the social entities involved in the interpretive process, it appears useful to borrow from a complementary perspective that specifically examines the social construction of subjective meanings: symbolic interactionism.

Overview and Underlying Assumptions

Symbolic interactionism is a sociological perspective that borrows theoretically from both cultural studies and humanistic tradition. It focuses on how individuals and groups interact and, more specifically, how personal identity (the self) is created through interaction with others. Of particular interest is the relationship between individual action and group pressures. The symbolic interactionist perspective posits that subjective meanings are socially constructed and that these subjective meanings interrelate with objective actions (Charon, 2004; Farberman & Perinbanayagam, 1985; Plummer, 1991a, 1991b; Prus, 1996; Stryker, 1980).

Precursors of the sociological tradition of symbolic interaction include the Scottish moralists (common sense school of moral philosophy), especially Adam Smith, who "propounded the symbolic-interactionist assumptions that society is necessarily antecedent to the individual, self and mind develop through interaction with others, self-control derives from social control, and people are actors as well as reactors" (Shott, 1976:39). Heralds of the symbolic interaction perspective also include American Pragmatists, such as George Herbert Mead, William James, and John Dewey. It was fully developed by sociologists of the Chicago School, mainly Herbert Blumer, Robert E. Parke, and Everett C. Hughes (Blumer, 1969; Becker & McCall, 1990; Charon, 2004; Farberman & Perinbanayagam, 1985; Plummer, 1991a, 1991b; Prus, 1996; Stryker, 1980). Blumer (1969) described symbolic interactionism as "a down-to-earth approach to the scientific study of human group life and human conduct" that "lodges its problems in

40

[the] natural world, conducts its studies in it, and derives its interpretations from such naturalistic studies" (1969:47).

Symbols play a significant role for human actors. Indeed, "[h]umans name, remember, categorize, perceive, think, deliberate, problem solve, transcend space and time, transcend themselves, create abstractions, create new ideas, and direct themselves – all through the symbol" (Charon, 2004:63-64). Symbolic interactionism is founded upon three fundamental assertions:

> The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them. . . . The second premise is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows. The third premise is that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters. (Blumer, 1969:2)

Symbolic interactionism thus considers *meaning* not as a product of "the intrinsic makeup of the thing that has meaning," but "as arising in the process of interaction between people" (1969:4). The use of meanings by social actors implies a necessary "process of interpretation" (1969:5) that is determined by self-interaction and the way meanings are handled by the actors. Interpretation is more than the mere use of previously integrated meanings. Instead, Blumer argues, interpretation is an active process of formulation, reconsideration, and revision.

The Interpretive Tradition

Interpretivist social science has developed "concurrently with a critique of positivist social science" (Prus, 1996:3). Unlike the positivist (structuralist) approach, which studies human behavior in an objective fashion, the interpretive approach considers "human group life as actively constituted by people in interaction with others"

41

(1996:9). The interpretive tradition is therefore based upon an interactionist and hermeneutic analysis of human lived experience.

Symbolic interaction and the study of human lived experience. The interactionist/interpretive perspective assumes, explicitly or not, that human group life is intersubjective, multi-perspectival, reflective, activity-based, negotiable, relational, and processual (Prus, 1996). Indeed, "interpretivists observe that the *study of human behavior is the study of human lived experience and that human experience is rooted in people's meanings, interpretations, activities, and interactions*" (1996:9). Intersubjectivity and reflective interchange thus emerge as the core elements of human essence.

As further explained below, the Chicago School (or Blumerian School) of symbolic interactionism puts strong emphasis on "the thoroughly intersubjective nature of community life," while it "draws attention to the active dimensions (human struggles and enterprise) of the accomplishment of intersubjectivity" (1996:22).

Hermeneutics and interpretivists. Hermeneutics is the study of the methodological principles of interpretation. The word initially described the interpretive study of Greek classics and religious texts. As such, hermeneutics "reflects an awareness that recorded statements are inevitably subject to interpretation" (Prus, 1996:34). The development of the interpretive tradition as it relates to social theory came about in the late 1800s with the works of German theorist Wilhelm Dilthey. Other major German scholars who have contributed to the growth of the interpretive framework include Georg Simmel, Max Weber, and Wilhelm Wundt. American Pragmatists, mainly Charles Horton Cooley and George Herbert Mead, further played a significant part in the emergence of the Chicago

42

School of symbolic interaction and strongly influenced the works of its founder, Herbert Blumer.

Wilhelm Dilthey, who many regard as "the founder of contemporary interpretive social science" (1996:35), approached human science from a purely hermeneutical viewpoint. Indeed, "it was Dilthey who most explicitly extended the hermeneutic or interpretive insight or *Verstehen* (interpretive understanding) beyond textual interpretations to all other instances of human behavior" (Ibid.). He laid strong emphasis on the intersubjectivity that is inherent in human behavior and interchange. He further understood human life or group life as "built on a *sharedness of understandings*" (Ibid.). According to Dilthey, interpretation "depends pivotally on making sense of the other by reference to the *community context* in which the actions of the other are embedded" (Ibid.).

Georg Simmel considered that society was essentially defined by the interaction that took place among and between individuals. Simmel, "best known for his pronounced emphasis on sociology as the study of the *forms* of human association" (1996:39), viewed human existence, or group life, as an ensemble of continuous social processes. Human interaction, thus, occurs through such ongoing processes as "conflict, cooperation, compromise, mediation, domination and subordination" (Ibid.).

Max Weber is often, though erroneously, credited for inventing the concept of Verstehen (interpretive understanding) and contributing to the advancement of ethnography. Weber's synthetic social theory merely built upon Dilthey's hermeneutical contributions on Verstehen, which were in effect more thorough and coherent than Weber's. "Within Weber's contextual analysis . . . *verstehen* tends to be largely implicit

43

and group-oriented, as opposed to denoting an attentiveness to the viewpoints of particular people and to the ways in which they go about accomplishing their activities on a 'here and now' basis" (1996:42). Weber was further influenced by other German social scientists like Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, whose works actually neglected the quintessential intersubjective nature of human interaction. "Weber generated an intellectual stance in which the hermeneutic thrust was largely dismissed from a more active consideration in social research" (1996:41). Weber ultimately attempted to bring together the interpretive and positivist paradigms, but his mostly empirically-driven efforts remained futile and his outlook on human group life, in the end, appears more obscure than enlightening. Indeed,

> Weber sought to develop "objective," causal statements about group life while simultaneously claiming an intellectual primacy in the foundations of "subjective experience." At the same time, Weber appears intent on using modes of historical-cultural-legalistic analysis to formulate more generic statements on the religious, political, and economic orderings of human societies. In particular, Weber seemed concerned with stipulating the historical and material conditions that fostered particular world views and the ways in which these collectively established beliefs or group mind-sets might find expression in the forms of association and practices characterizing particular societies. (Ibid.)

Wilhelm Wundt's major contribution to the interpretive paradigm came in the form of *Volkerpsychologie*, or folk psychology (sometimes also referred to as psychical anthropology), which provided "a significant source of stimulation for a number of scholars working in the interpretive and (emergent) ethnographic traditions" (1996:45). The basic premise of folk psychology is that human behavior is conditioned by culture and language. Primitive culture is at the core of this approach, rather than western cultural concepts and ideals. Wundt thus focused his interpretive analyses of social

44

thought and interaction on primitive or elementary modes of human group life, specifically communal spirit and its relation to human interchange (*Gemeinschaftpsychologie*).

Pragmatists equally played a key part in the development of the interpretive and interactionist traditions (Farberman, 1985; Lewis, 1976; Prus, 1996). The works of Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George H. Mead were highly influential in the emergence of the philosophical movement that became known as American Pragmatism. The movement was started by Peirce and popularized by James (James and Mead were, incidentally, Wundt's students). The basic premises of Pragmatism are that the meaning of concepts lies in their practical bearings, that the purpose of thought is to direct action, and that truth ought to be evaluated depending on the practical outcomes of belief. "The pragmatists' emphases were somewhat diverse, but they generally opposed to 'rationalist' or 'determinist' (i.e., positivist) philosophy and wanted to develop conceptualizations of human behavior that attended to the actualities and practices of people" (Prus, 1996:46).

George H. Mead's contribution to the sociology of knowledge, in particular, is remarkable for it encompasses three fundamental areas of study: philosophy, history, and social psychology (Farberman, 1985; Fine & Kleinmann, 1968; Fisher & Strauss, 1979a, 1979b; McKinney, 1991; Maines, Sugrue, & Katovich, 1983; Miller, 1973; Ropers, 1973). "Mead's approach to behavior may be characterized by such generally descriptive terms as pragmatic, empirical, bio-social behavioristic, naturalistic, voluntaristic, instrumental, and functional" (McKinney, 1991:112). Mead focused on social acts as "the unit of existence" (Miller, 1973:294), the source of "all socio-cultural behavior,"

45

analyzing "self-awareness, thinking, purposive behavior, and moral discrimination" in order to evidence "that mind and self are social emergents, and that language constituted the mechanism for that emergence" (McKinney, 1991:113). Hence, human action was "the key to the Meadian model of man and to the human construction of meaning and knowledge" (Franks, 1985:39). Ultimately, Mead's "extraction of mind, self, thinking, and meaning from the context of the social act via the delineation of such mechanisms as role-taking, the generalized other, symbolization, and attitude systems, constitutes an expansion of the frame of reference of the sociology of knowledge" (McKinney, 1991:118).

　　The Chicago School of interactionism: Blumerian contributions to the interpretive tradition. Herbert Blumer has been presented by several scholars as "the single most important social theorist of the twentieth century" (Prus, 1996:75). His critical work on human lived experience and social interaction drew together the interpretive framework and the ethnographic tradition. Blumer, a student of George Herbert Mead, unequivocally and methodically expanded upon the works of Dilthey, Simmel, and the American Pragmatists (Becker, 1988; Prus, 1996; Shibutani, 1988). He acknowledged early on that human behavior was intrinsically complex, "reflective, interactive, emergent" (Prus, 1996:68). Relying on Mead's analysis of social behaviorism and drawing from Dilthey's hermeneutical approach, Blumer "explicitly established *the vital link of the interpretive tradition with ethnographic research*" and harshly criticized the "core features of positivist social science" (1996:69). Blumer's work on human interchange and intersubjectivity, similarly to Mead's, also focused on human group life as the product of "the ongoing production of action" (1996:71) and, as such, further "synthesized and

46

developed the theoretical and methodological significance of Mead's ideas for the social

sciences" (1996:70). Blumer's pivotal role in the development of social science and

interpretivism is threefold:

> First, building on the works of George Herbert Mead, Blumer develops a clearer, more coherent and sociologically focused statement pertaining to the implications of the interpretive paradigm for the study of human lived experience than Dilthey, Cooley, or Mead had been able to generate. Furthermore, by emphasizing Cooley's notion of sympathetic introspection, Blumer helps establish the relevance of the interpretive approach for the ongoing study of human group life. Second, Blumer challenges the prevailing positivist (quantitative) traditions that dominate the social sciences. . . . Blumer forcefully and clearly lays bare the central weaknesses of mainstream social science. . . . Third, Blumer provides a conceptual framework which not only theoretically undergirds ethnographic research . . . in the social sciences, but which also encourages the development of generic or transsituational social processes. (1996:74-75)

Critique of Symbolic Interactionism

Scholars within the symbolic interactionist paradigm have voiced their criticism

of the theoretical and practical frameworks involved. Besides its potential for

methodological problems and operationalization issues, symbolic interactionism is

viewed as overemphasizing self-consciousness, having "an obsession with meaning" and

promoting "a metaphysic of meaning" (Meltzer, Petras, Reynolds, 1975:84-85). As a

result, some fear the "danger that a fetish will be made out of everyday life, especially if

the perspective comes to give a totally relativistic account of human interaction"

(1975:85). Moreover, some interactionists deplore the "unwarranted demotion of the

psychological," which may have "robbed human needs, motives, intentions, and

aspirations of their empirical and analytical reality by treating them as mere derivations

and/or expressions of socially defined categories" (1975:84). Overall, the major "in-

47

house" criticism is aimed at the apparent inability of symbolic interactionism "to come to grips with either human emotions or the unconscious" (1975:85).

Scholars outside the realm of symbolic interaction have also criticized the approach. Positivists have been the most vocal opponents thus far. As explained by Prus (1996), however, the positivist/structuralist critique of symbolic interactionism as "a subjective social science or a microlevel sociology" (1996:22) is the result of a misinformed interpretation of interactionist tenets. In fact,

> symbolic interaction is *intersubjective* to the core and envisions the development of language or ongoing symbolic interchanges as fundamental to the human essence (and the human struggle for existence). People are seen to develop (multiple) worldviews or definitions of reality as they interact with one another and attempt to incorporate particular objects of their awareness into their activities. Notions of community, self, action, reflectivity, symbolic realities, human interchange, and collective behavior are fundamental to interactionism, as are the processes of conflict, cooperation, and compromise. Likewise, while interactionism builds on situated definitions and interchanges, and insists on the pursuit of research g rounded rigorously in human lived experience and the ongoing production of action, it is quite able to deal with more molar matters such as fashion, the media, social problems, industrialization, economic development, law and policy formation, and other political processes. (Ibid.)

As for concerns regarding the potential methodological shortcomings of a theoretical perspective relying heavily (if not exclusively) on a qualitative approach, some have counter-argued that ethnographic inquiry is as scientific as more quantitative and, in fact, likely more reliable than positivist methods to accurately and soundly examine human behavior and the interaction of individuals with their environment. Indeed,

> the methodology (open-ended inquiry, participant-observation, and observation) of ethnographic research may seem less rigorous or scientific than some other approaches in the social sciences, especially to those who

48

have been encouraged to envision positivist structuralism and quantification as synonymous with scientific progress. However, this inference is highly inaccurate. Ethnographic inquiry is a singularly powerful technique for studying the ways in which human behavior takes its shape. (Ibid.)

Herbert Blumer (1956) wrote, "We can, and I think must, look upon human life as chiefly a vast interpretative process in which people, singly and collectively, guide themselves by defining the objects, events, and situations which they encounter. . . . Any scheme designed to analyze human group life in its general character has to fit this process of interpretation" (1956:686). True to the interpretivist theoretical tradition, the purpose of this inquiry is to apply the symbolic interactionist approach to the study of suicide terrorism in order to expose it as a socially constructed phenomenon. Thus, we may focus on mechanisms of moral signification, sensitization, and symbolization, and demonstrate their effects on extremist groups that favor suicide terrorism to fight their real or perceived enemies. Such mechanisms may in turn emphasize processes of group solidification and polarization, which are very important to account for and understand if we want to devise efficient and effective prevention measures addressing the fundamental socio-cultural aspects of suicide terrorism.

"All reality, as meaningful reality, is socially constructed" (Crotty, 1998:54). Thus, suicide terrorism is a reality, a real issue indeed – no one shall deny that –, but it must be regarded essentially as a socially constructed one. This does not mean that suicide terrorism is a mere figment of the social scientist's imagination or purely the byproduct of socio-political rhetoric. It is a genuine social problem, with tangible causes and dramatic real-life outcomes. Nonetheless, our *interpretation* of bombings as suicide terrorism is first and foremost a social construction. As Shadish (1995b) emphasizes,

49

social constructionism "refers to constructing knowledge about reality, not constructing reality itself" (1995b:67). It is therefore our knowledge, as well as the very cognitive mechanisms which influence our understanding of suicide terrorism that are at the core of this social constructionist inquiry into the phenomenon and related meaning-making processes. A theoretical framework allowing for the analysis of "how people in particular contexts . . . individually and collectively construct meaning and knowledge" (Patton, 2001:78) therefore appears to be a *sine qua non*.

Summary of Literature and Purpose of Study

A long-standing modus operandi of asymmetric warfare, suicide bombings are an extremely violent and adaptive form of oppositional terrorism that has been increasingly witnessed around the world. The contemporary wave of suicide bombings, which started in the early 1980s in Lebanon and grew stronger mostly in Israel and Sri Lanka over the following two decades, has now reached Western Europe and the United States. Since the suicide attacks of September 2001 in the United States, a plethora of articles about suicide terrorism have appeared in a variety of academic journals and more mainstream books. The majority of these pieces focus on the contemporary development of suicide bombings as the ultimate terrorist act and the legitimization of such a violent practice as a tool of war. They also highlight Islamic fundamentalism as the root cause of suicide terrorism, despite the fact that non-Muslim religious groups and even secular groups have resorted to suicide terrorism, and emphasize the psychological or psychopathological features of typical suicide bombers.

Thus the available literature typically focuses on the "who, when, and where" and the recent globalization of suicide terrorism, instead of the "why and how" of suicide

50

bombings. As a result, it fails to provide a thorough, methodical analysis and a critical understanding of the dynamics and patterns involved. It ignores that suicide terrorism is not a homogenous phenomenon but a fundamentally adaptive, resilient, and complex one. The literature on suicide terrorism is further characterized by a lack of applied focus: it generally relies on an arbitrary extension of terrorism research findings to suicide terrorism without further analysis or inquiry into the distinctive features of the latter. Finally, much like the terrorism literature in general, scholarly and mainstream articles or books on suicide terrorism rely almost entirely on secondary data analysis and literature integration. Without primary data and meticulous case studies, such literature contributes little to no original information to our understanding of the phenomenon.

The popular imagery and stereotypes created and supported by government officials and the mass media, as well as many academics, do not provide an accurate representation of suicide terrorism. This distinctive study shall advance our comprehension of the phenomenon. The latter, much like terrorism in general, is a socio-political concept that is understood differently from one society to another and from one historical or political era to the next. Suicide terrorism therefore appears to be the product of the interaction of social and political mechanisms, bureaucratic demands, and mass media organizations.

"Qualitative research approaches have traditionally been favored when the main research objective is to improve our understanding of a phenomenon, especially when this phenomenon is complex and deeply embedded in its context" (Audet & d'Amboise, 2001). Hence this study focuses on suicide terrorism from a qualitative angle, the most promising approach to analyzing how individuals construe their experience (i.e., human

51

lived experience) and how their understanding in turn affects or determines their way of life.

From a theoretical standpoint, the present analysis is based on social constructionism and a complementary symbolic interactionist approach. Social constructionism "is a well-developed model for studying the contested claims that are made – by victims, interest groups, social movements, professionals and politicians – in the construction of new social problem categories" (Cohen, 2002:xxii). Applying a social constructionist approach to the study of suicide terrorism in particular can help understand the recent emergence of terrorists as contemporary folk devils, as well as the moral crusade and moral panic that ensued. Social constructionism further makes it possible to highlight the negative (and usually unintended) effects of social control policy, including the increased cohesion of terrorist groups and their polarization against the rest of society and, specifically, agents of control as represented by the entities involved in the global war on terror. The role of the mass media in publicizing attacks, triggering a "contagion effect," and encouraging the ideological and commercial exploitation of suicide terrorism is also worthy of a thorough social constructionist investigation. Socially constructed reality is a continuing, dynamic process; such reality is constantly perpetuated as a pervasive set of norms by individuals who rely on their subjective interpretation and knowledge of it. Constructionist perspectives on social problems "ask how and why particular social problems emerge and become the focus of demonstrations and protests, front-page news stories and television coverage, and new social politics" (Loseke & Best, 2003:ix). Social problems are defined by the way certain acts or conditions situations are socially constructed or subjectively interpreted, not by

the very nature of these acts or conditions. The construction and application of definitions of deviance is a moral enterprise that entails the construction of moral meanings and their connection to certain acts or conditions.

In a noteworthy study entitled *Images of Terror: What We Can And Can't Know About Terrorism*, Philip Jenkins (2003) used a social constructionist approach to provide a critical analysis of mass media representations of terrorism. Jenkins argues that academics, journalists, and the general public naively trust the interpretations of terrorism provided by governments and official agencies. He further claims that our understanding of terrorism is the product of the interaction of bureaucratic agencies, private experts, scholars, and the mass media. Thus, he contends, "bureaucratic interests create and sustain the image presented in the mass media and popular culture" (2003:189) and the imagery and stereotypes we are exposed to do not reflect social reality. To conduct his research on mass media images of terrorism, Jenkins used open-source data drawn from the extant scholarly and mainstream literature on terrorism. He relied on a variety of documents such as articles, books, official statistics, news media reports, as well as entertainment media sources (domestic and foreign feature films) to gather the essence of "terrorism pop culture" and study how socio-political processes are involved in the social construction of terrorism, terrorist movements, groups, and actions. Although the overall analysis provides valuable insight into the role of the media and the interaction between all the social actors involved in the definition and interpretation processes, Jenkins relied exclusively on available data – sometimes prosaically and, in fact, occasionally inaccurately – and derived "frequent overgeneralizations" (Ross, 2004) that undermined the validity of an otherwise inspirational critique of terrorism research and policies.

This study provides a narrower, more methodical application of Jenkins' paradigm to the social construction of suicide terrorism. Based on his approach, the main research question is: How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism? A subset of three research questions was derived: (a) How is suicide terrorism a political weapon? (b) How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool? (c) How is suicide terrorism a politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework?

In order to remedy the shortcomings of a study relying solely upon secondary data analysis, the research project was designed as a multi-case study in order to provide a comprehensive description and a holistic understanding of suicide terrorism. This multi-site study was designed as an instrumental collective case study. It was collective as it consisted of the analysis of multiple cases (sites or groups) and instrumental inasmuch as it focused on a specific issue – suicide terrorism – instead of each individual case. Borrowing from Jenkins' basic methodology – albeit with a much larger and more diverse sample –, the present study relies on the use of open-source documents for a review and content analysis of available data sources regarding suicide terrorism. However, in an effort to significantly improve on Jenkins' design, over three dozen interviews conducted with key informants in various countries that have dealt with suicide bombings over the last two-and-a-half decades were also used. The goal of collecting and analyzing primary data was to contribute in-depth and innovative information to our empirical knowledge of the phenomenon.

Furthermore, to complement Jenkins' social constructionist stance, an interactionist/interpretive perspective was chosen insofar as it focuses specifically on how

54

individuals and groups interact. The symbolic interactionist perspective posits that subjective meanings are socially constructed and that these subjective meanings interrelate with objective actions. Hence meanings arise through interaction between people and the use of these meanings by social actors implies interpretation, i.e., an active process of formulation, reconsideration, and revision. The interactionist/interpretive perspective assumes that human group life is intersubjective and reflective: "the study of human behavior is the study of human lived experience and that human experience is rooted in people's meanings, interpretations, activities, and interactions" (Prus, 1996:9).

Qualitative inquiry, social constructionism, and symbolic interactionism allow for more fruitful approaches to study such a multifaceted social phenomenon as suicide terrorism, which not only comprises a substantial human element, but also encompasses political, social, historical, and psychological dimensions. Suicide terrorism cannot be combated or prevented if the significance of its historical and socio-cultural dimensions is persistently overlooked. Likewise, the dynamics of the moral signification of the phenomenon by agents of control, the media, and society at large cannot be ignored. A social constructionist approach combined with a symbolic interactionist stance within the qualitative framework of a multi-site study can help determine how the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a biased representation of events (and their alleged causes) conditioned by deliberate attempts to stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and promote certain political interests. The present multi-case study shall do so by (a) focusing the analysis on mechanisms of moral sensitization and symbolization; (b) evidencing how socio-political processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures contribute to the social construction of

55

suicide terrorism; (c) highlighting how agents of social control and the mass media contribute to the commercial and ideological exploitation of suicide terrorism, as well as its dramatization, politicization, and escalation; and (d) improving our understanding of group solidification and polarization processes so as to improve anti- and counterterrorism policies regarding suicide bombing campaigns.

Chapter Three

Methodology

Multi-Case Study

"Case study research holds a long, distinguished history across many disciplines"
(Creswell, 1997:62). A case study provides an in-depth description and understanding of
one or more events, settings, groups, or other bounded systems. Audet and d'Amboise
(2001) describe the multi-site or multi-case study as an "adaptive and innovative"
qualitative research approach "designed to gain an in-depth knowledge of an
organizational phenomenon." This further "combines several approaches to case study
research, borrowing from the positivist tradition, the interpretative approach and the
qualitative research corpus" and "involves the observation and analysis of several sites
using . . . cross-case comparisons and explanation building techniques to analyze data."
By examining more than one case, researchers have the opportunity not to adulterate their
global approach, but rather to compare cases and discern possible themes or patterns
across cases, which in turn adds depth to the study and helps corroborate or solidify its
findings and implications.

> The type of analysis of these data can be a *holistic analysis* of the entire
> case or an *embedded analysis* of a specific aspect of the case. . . . Through
> this data collection, a detailed *description* of the case emerges, as do an
> *analysis of themes* or issues and an interpretation or *assertions* about the
> case by the researcher. . . . This analysis is rich in the *context of the case*
> or setting in which the case presents itself. . . . When multiple cases are
> chosen, a typical format is to first provide a detailed description of each
> case and themes within the case, called a *within-case analysis*, followed

57

by a thematic analysis across the cases, called a *cross-case analysis*, as well as assertions or an interpretation of the meaning of the case. In the final interpretive phase, the researcher reports . . . the 'lessons learned' from the case. (Creswell, 1997:63)

In keeping with such rationale for the use of multi-case studies in qualitative research, and given the purpose of this research, the study was designed as an *instrumental collective case study*. It is *collective* as it consists of the analysis of multiple cases (sites or groups). It is *instrumental* (as opposed to intrinsic) inasmuch as it focuses "on a specific issue rather than on the case itself . . . [and] the case becomes a vehicle to better understand the issue" (Stake, 1995).

In case studies, the unit of analysis "is typically a system of action rather than an individual or group of individuals" (Tellis, 1997). As such, "[c]ase studies tend to be selective, focusing on one or two issues that are fundamental to understanding the system being examined" (Ibid.). In this particular study, suicide terrorism is the issue at stake, not specific suicide terror attacks or groups using suicide bombings. What the analysis focuses on is the tactic and strategy of suicide bombings, not terrorism as an ideology. The purpose of such analysis is to shed light on the one-sided interpretations and social construction of suicide bombings. Socio-political biases and ideological constructions are in fact the *common theme* highlighted in all the cases studied, a pattern which emerged early on during the data collection and analysis phases. In order to bring such theme to light, a *cross-case analysis* was necessary, whereby "themes across cases" were examined "to discern themes that are common to all cases" (Ibid.). Finally, the *context* of each case was broadly conceptualized in order for each setting to include wide-ranging social, political, historical, and psychological issues (see Creswell, 1997).

58

The information gathered for the present study may be summarized in a matrix highlighting the research questions, the sites selection process, the data sources, and the themes inherent in the analysis of the social construction of suicide terrorism (Figure 1).

Main Research Question	How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism?

Secondary Research Questions	(a) How is suicide terrorism a political weapon? (b) How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool? (c) How is suicide terrorism a politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework?

Cases Selected	• Afghanistan • France • Iraq • Israel • Kashmir • Lebanon • Russia • Sri Lanka • Turkey • United Kingdom • United States

Sources of Evidence	• Primary Data: Interviews • Secondary Data: Open-Source Documents

Themes and Concepts	• Occurrence / Episodic Threats • Signification / Media Coverage • Galvanization of Public Interest and Policymakers' Attention • Claims-Making • Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation, Demonization (Folk Devils), Radical/Moralizing Rhetoric • Construction of Collective Insecurity • Moral Panics and Moral Crusades • Social Control Mechanisms / Rule Creation and Enforcement • Construction of Social Problem (Suicide Terrorism) and Exacerbation of Issue

Figure 1: Social Construction of Suicide Terrorism: Multi-Case Study Data Matrix

59

Overview of Research Design

Herbert Blumer recommended approaches to the study of human behavior and lived experience that have now "become highly valued and widely used qualitative methods" (Patton, 2001:112). He viewed "qualitative inquiry as the only real way of understanding how people perceive, understand, and interpret the world. Only through close contact and direct interaction with people in open-minded, naturalistic inquiry and inductive analysis could the symbolic interactionist come to understand the symbolic world of the people being studied" (Ibid.). Qualitative research focuses on how individuals construe their experience (i.e., human lived experience) and how their understanding in turn affects or determines their way of life. As emphasized by Audet and d'Amboise (2001), "qualitative research approaches have traditionally been favored when the main research objective is to improve our understanding of a phenomenon, especially when this phenomenon is complex and deeply embedded in its context. . . . Qualitative research has now grown into a wide domain, having evolved much beyond its original scope of qualitative data collection." Furthermore,

> Strauss and Corbin (1990) claim that qualitative methods can be used to better understand any phenomenon about which little is yet known. They can also be used to gain new perspectives on things about which much is already known, or to gain more in-depth information that may be difficult to convey quantitatively. Thus, qualitative methods are appropriate in situations where one needs to first identify the variables that might later be tested quantitatively, or where the researcher has determined that quantitative measures cannot adequately describe or interpret a situation. (Hoepfl, 1997)

This multi-case study of suicide bombings draws upon methods used consistently in previous examinations of the social construction of crime (secondary data analysis). It also broadens the field of suicide terrorism analysis by combining document analysis,

literature integration, and series of interviews within an innovative case study framework. The main research question at the core of this multi-case study is: How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism? Hence a subset of three research questions can be derived: (a) How is suicide terrorism a political weapon? (b) How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool? (c) How is suicide terrorism a politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework?

Qualitative inquiry, social constructionism, and symbolic interactionism allow for more fruitful approaches to study such a complex and adaptive phenomenon as suicide terrorism, which not only comprises a substantial human element, but also encompasses political, social, historical, and psychological dimensions. Constructionism has been established as "an influential methodological paradigm" (Patton, 2001:99) that enables researchers to use a qualitative approach to study human behavior and lived experience, group life, and social phenomena in general.

Philip Jenkins has relied on social constructionism to enlighten us about a variety of social problems. In one study, Jenkins (1994a) offers a social constructionist interpretation of the "ice" (smokeable crystal methamphetamine) epidemic and analyzes the overall structure of drug scares via an examination of Congress reports and hearings, media accounts in dailies and weeklies, and the overall context in which policies are developed and national problems created out of local issues. In order to contribute to our understanding of the serial murder mythology, Jenkins (1994b) focuses on rhetoric and the process of social construction, the context of news making, changing media patterns, as well as the role of the media, popular culture, federal law enforcement and the Justice

61

Department in the making of the myth and the relentless exploitation of fear. Jenkins (2000) also used the social constructionist approach to further study the serial killer panic of recent years via an analysis of media publications related to serial murderers, including a search of the New York Times archive since 1960. In another notable study, Jenkins (2003) focused on "images of terror" and provides a critical analysis of mass media representations of terrorism. As noted in the previous chapter, Jenkins' work on the social construction of terrorism which had much bearing on the design and implementation of this multi-case study. Other researchers have also employed a social constructionist approach to the study of social problems. For instance, Jacobs & Potter (1998) explain the social construction of the hate crime epidemic by analyzing hate crime legislation and news media coverage to demonstrate that political ambitions, powerful advocacy groups and lobbies, and diehard legislation were the source of extreme social reaction concerning hate- and bias-motivated crimes. Jacobs and Henry (2000) additionally argue that the "hate crime epidemic" is a myth, although it has been decried by politicians, academics, and journalists alike, as well as spokespersons for various minority advocacy or lobbying groups. Despite what has been reported since the mid-1980s, there has been no "explosion" of hate crimes and statistics have not "skyrocketed" in the United States. Jacobs and Henry focus on the inadequacy of data gathering methods at the local, state, and federal levels, review existing legislation throughout the United States, highlight the slanted interpretation of dubious statistics, and analyze media coverage of hate or bias incidents. They emphasize the propensity of the news media to eagerly "embrace the most negative interpretation of intergroup relations" (2000:51). They conclude that identity politics played a significant part in the creation of symbolic and subjective laws

62

that are based on vague definitions of the concept of hate crime and enforced inconsistently, thus undermining generic criminal law and intensifying social divisions and conflict. Likewise, a study of the social construction of child abduction (Kappeler, Blumberg & Potter, 2000) assessing the sensationalism of news media representations of child-related kidnapping cases systematically highlights the use of distorted official definitions, misleading statistics, and media accounts to demonstrate a pattern in the presentation of a crime issue and the subsequent creation of images and crime myths. The authors essentially focus on how politicians and the media exploit the imagery of missing children, as well as the legal reforms that spring from emotional societal reaction and in effect create a new type of crime and a new class of criminals without offering a productive solution or an actual prevention option against criminality.

As for the symbolic interactionist approach, it is highly adaptive and flexible. Hence it has been applied to a variety of contemporary issues to help understand the interaction of agents and institutions, and the use of symbolic resources (such as governments and global media networks) to create meanings persuasively. The interpretation of media representations and ideological claimsmaking related to a given issue involves a creative and selective process that can be efficiently analyzed with a sound symbolic interactionist approach. For example, two studies on cybersex (Patton, 2001; Waskul, 2003) used in-depth interviews to analyze the symbolic interaction between cybersex chat-room users and applied the interaction framework to explain the social processes and structures that can emerge in the virtual community. Waskul (2002) focuses specifically on televideo cybersex (as opposed to text-based cybersex) and, through a series of in-depth interviews, studies the relationships between individuality

63

(selfhood) and the body, as well as the context in which they are both located. The context for interaction is thus singled out as an important aspect to consider in order to fully comprehend the relationships between the involved agents and their social situation.

More recently, Arena and Arrigo (2005) published a study relying upon a structural symbolic interactionist analysis of the terrorist identity. They used five major organizing concepts (symbols, definition of situation, roles, socialization and role-taking, and the self) in order to develop a conceptual framework focusing on "the importance of culture, self, and society when investigating one's membership in and identity through militant extremist organizations" (2005:485). The article resorts to structural symbolic interactionism to improve our "understanding of how terrorist identities are created, embraced, and maintained, as well as how they influence the behavior of members in militant extremist subculture" (Ibid.).

> Patton (2001:113) notes that
>
> the importance of symbolic interactionism to qualitative inquiry is its distinct emphasis on the importance of symbols and the interpretive processes that undergrid interactions as fundamental to understanding human behavior. . . . [T]he study of the original meaning and influence of symbols and shared meaning can shed light on what is most important to people, what will be most resistant to change, and what will be most necessary to change if the . . . organization is to move in new directions. The subject matter and methods of symbolic interactionism also emphasize the importance of paying attention to how particular interactions give rise to symbolic understandings when one is engaged in changing symbols as part of . . . [an] organizational development process.

Case Identification and Selection Criteria

Purposeful sampling was used in order to select unique research sites and key participants for this qualitative multi-case study. Unlike probability sampling, which derives its logic and strength from its very objective of generalization, purposeful

sampling consists in selecting, as Blumer himself suggested, *information-rich cases* for an in-depth study aimed at providing a better understanding of a complex social phenomenon. "Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research, hence the term *purposeful* sampling" (Patton, 2001:46). Contrary to quantitative studies using probabilistic sampling, the need for generalization in qualitative research is secondary – or even nonexistent – compared to the significance of the in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of interest. Types of purposeful sampling include site selection, comprehensive sampling, maximum variation sampling, network sampling, and sampling by case type.

"In choosing what case to study, an array of possibilities for *purposeful sampling* is available . . . [from selecting] cases that show different perspectives on the problem, process or event . . . [to selecting] ordinary cases, accessible cases, or unusual cases" (Creswell, 1997:62). A combination of purposeful sampling strategies was used to select cases for this large-scale study. These favored strategies included:

1. Site selection: specific sites were selected because the phenomenon of interest (i.e., suicide bombings or suicide terrorism) has occurred or is considered likely to occur there; likelihood of occurrence was determined based on the socio-political context of a given site, recent increases in overall terrorist activities and recruitment practices, and documented presence (e.g., training camps) of groups linked to the phenomenon of interest;

2. Typical-case sampling: sites/groups were selected for analysis if they presented the typical characteristics of sites/groups using or likely to experience/use suicide bombings;

3. Critical-case sampling: sites/groups were selected for analysis if they represented dramatic examples of the phenomenon of interest;

4. Concept-based sampling: information-rich (key) participants were sampled due to their scholarly knowledge of, professional experience with, or personal exposure to the phenomenon of interest.

As a result of this sampling strategy, eleven countries were selected for interviewing and document analysis purposes. They are listed below, as well as the rationale for their inclusion. Cases where suicide terrorism has occurred or is likely to occur, but for which little to no data or informants were available were omitted. Sampling strategies are summarized in Table 2.

1. Afghanistan: the network known as al-Qaeda, or "the Base," was established in Afghanistan; suicide bombings have occurred regularly in various parts of the war-torn country;

2. France: representatives of the Ministry of Interior and the Anti-Terrorism Coordination Unit (U.C.L.A.T., or Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste) were interviewed to discuss attempts by the Algerian GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé) to perpetrate a suicide attack in Paris in the mid-1990s, as well as current efforts to prevent suicide terrorism across the European Union and at the international level; INTERPOL representatives of the Fusion Task Force were also interviewed for the same purposes;

66

Table 2
Sampling Strategies and Case Selection

Site selection	Typical-case sampling	Critical-case sampling	Concept-based sampling
Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Al-Qaeda	France
France	Israel	Russia	Israel
Iraq	Kashmir	Lebanon	Turkey
Israel	Iraq	Sri Lanka	United Kingdom
Kashmir		Turkey	United States
Lebanon		United Kingdom	
Russia		United States	
Sri Lanka			
Turkey			
United Kingdom			
United States			

3. Iraq: the Iraqi insurgency has been resorting to suicide bombings on a regular basis since the U.S.-led invasion of the country in 2003;

4. Israel: researchers from the International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT; Herzliya, Israel) were contacted due to their scholarly knowledge of, and professional or personal experience with suicide terrorism;

5. Kashmir: since the late 1990s, a separatist movement of Kashmiri terrorists has perpetrated over a dozen suicide bombings aimed at India's Hindu government;

6. Lebanon: Hizballah, the Party of God, pioneered the contemporary use of suicide terrorism in the early 1980s;

7. Russia: Chechen rebels opposing the Russian occupation of Chechnya have been increasingly resorting to suicide bombings since 2000;

8. Sri Lanka: the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) began their suicide bombing campaign in 1987 and they are still the most prolific users of suicide bombings in the world;

9. Turkey: the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party; today's KONGRA-GEL or KGK) perpetrated several suicide attacks in the mid-1990s; Turkish government and intelligence officials were interviewed;

10. United Kingdom: researchers at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence were selected due to their scholarly, professional, and personal experiences with suicide terrorism; in addition, a series of four suicide bombings occurred in central London in July 2005;

11. United States: the September 2001 attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were the first suicide terror attacks on American soil; the United States had also suffered losses from suicide attacks overseas before (e.g., Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassy bombings in 1998, USS Cole attack in 2000).

The Role of the Researcher

My interest in suicide terrorism grew steadily over a decade ago, soon turning into a downright fascination with this complex, captivating social phenomenon. Growing up in France, where I was exposed to daily news coverage of suicide terror attacks occurring mainly in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Israel, I became particularly sensitive to and intrigued by the phenomenology and etiology of this peculiar form of terrorism. Long before the September 2001 suicide attacks on American landmarks by members of the Afghanistan-based Al-Qaeda terror network, which essentially introduced both the U.S. government and the general public to the reality of suicide terrorism and its dramatic practical consequences, I decided to focus my research efforts on this extremely violent and adaptive form of terrorism.

Soon after (and ever since) the September 2001 terrorist attacks, a plethora of articles, books and other reports flourished in scholarly journals, news reports, think tanks, and bookstores across the U.S. and most of the world. Many authors, unfortunately, have been self-proclaimed experts on terrorism whose knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon have been as flawed and inconsistent as the reductionist interpretations and reactionary policies that have been adopted as a result of an obvious misconception of suicide terrorism and its outcomes.

What is featured in political and media discourse on terrorism today? Cases that emphasize the simplistic "Good vs. Evil" or "Us vs. Them" binaries promoted by the current administration. Such an approach illustrates the construction of deviant identities via the stigmatization, marginalization, and demonization of entire groups of people officially labeled as "evildoers" or "evil cowards." Publicly setting the civilized and moral world of Good, as defined by the United States, against the barbaric amoral world of Evil of the terrorists only promotes a reductionist rhetorical style that actually feeds into the similarly dichotomous extremist Islamic worldview pitting the House of God (*Dar al-Islam*) against the House of War (*Dar al-Harb*).

The mechanisms involved in the construction of suicide terrorism as a social problem have come to intrigue and fascinate me the most. Hence, the focus of my dissertation shifted from a phenomenological and etiological analysis of the issue to an approach centered specifically on the social construction of suicide terrorism, the commission of objective acts vs. the subjective meanings ascribed to such actions, the symbolic interaction involved in the interpretive process, and the detrimental effects of the ideological and commercial exploitation of the phenomenon. Years of research on the

69

topic have given me insight into the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism as a subjective process that is contingent upon various rhetorical mechanisms that are worth studying more closely. Interest groups and bureaucratic agencies are deeply involved in the interpretation phase and it is essential to explore, uncover, and understand the subjective definitional and rhetorical processes by which suicide terrorism is socially constructed. Failing to do so will only result in developing more inadequate strategies and arbitrary policies that ignore the inherently socio-cultural dimension of the problem and the fact that it is first and foremost an institutional-level issue. Suicide terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon that involves a substantial human dimension and deals with the complexity of social interaction. Studying human behavior and human experience, as well as the interaction between individuals and their environment therefore calls for a pragmatic and interpretive approach effectively factoring the lived experiences of people into the analysis. This is what a qualitative study allows, which explains why I selected such a paradigm.

Prior to directing a qualitative study, a researcher must: (a) "adopt the stance suggested by the characteristics of the naturalist paradigm"; (b) "develop the level of skill appropriate for a human instrument, or the vehicle through which data will be collected and interpreted"; and (c) "prepare a research design that utilizes accepted strategies for naturalistic inquiry" (Hoepfl, 1997; also see Lincoln & Guba, 1985). One's competence and skills to conduct qualitative research depend largely upon one's "theoretical sensitivity" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Hoepfl, 1997; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

> Theoretical sensitivity refers to a personal quality of the researcher. It
> indicates an awareness of the subtleties of meaning of data. . . . [It] refers
> to the attribute of having insight, the ability to give meaning to data, the

capacity to understand, and capability to separate the pertinent from that which isn't. (Strauss & Corbin, as cited in Hoepfl, 1997)

Theoretical sensitivity is the product of various sources, including personal and professional experience, as well as knowledge of the extant scholarly literature. As a result, "[t]he credibility of a qualitative research report relies heavily on the confidence readers have in the researcher's ability to be sensitive to the data and to make appropriate decisions in the field" (Hoepfl, 1997; also see Patton, 2001).

If humans are the "instrument of choice" when it comes to qualitative or naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), it is mainly because

Humans are responsive to environmental cues, and able to interact with the situation; they have the ability to collect information at multiple levels simultaneously; they are able to perceive situations holistically; they are able to process data as soon as they become available; they can provide immediate feedback and request verification of data; and they can explore atypical or unexpected responses. (Hoepfl, 1997)

LeCompte (1993) further posits that "positivistic science imposes a false distance between researchers and the researched by mandating that the researcher maintain an artificially impersonal stance toward the people studied" and that such detachment results "in data that present a partial and therefore false, and an elitist and therefore biased, reality" (1993:11-12). Authenticity is thus possible only where it is genuinely reflected in the relationship between the researcher and the participant(s), i.e., beyond the simple narrative. LeCompte even argues that the researcher acts as a *mediator* to help participants voice their thoughts on and understanding of events and circumstances within the broader context of their own lived experience.

Researchers conducting structured interviews are typically physically involved but emotionally removed observers who play "a neutral role," at the same time "casual

71

and friendly" and "directive and impersonal" (Fontana & Frey, 1994:367). Semi-structured interviews, on the other hand, allow for a more open, casual questioning – a format that favors more flexibility and authenticity.

The interview protocol selected for this study was *semi-structured*, which made it possible for me to effectively interact and develop a trust rapport with the research participants while gathering insightful data on the problem of interest. My involvement in the *in-depth interview* process was both *intensive* and *extensive*. Indeed, conducting the interviews required me to make several overseas trips to meet with the key participants selected for the research in Turkey, Scotland, France, and the United States. The length of each stay ranged from two to ten days, depending on the destination and how many participants had to be interviewed. Only one participant was interviewed per day (in some cases, the interview even spanned two days) in order to ensure that I could spend enough time with each of them and give them enough time for additional questions, formal or informal feedback, etc.

Active listening played a significant part in conducting the interviews; responses were taped so intensive note-taking would not distract me or the interviewees. Study participants were therefore naturally encouraged to become more engaged in the interview process and to openly discuss not only their experience but also their thoughts on suicide terrorism, the meaning-making mechanisms inherent in our understanding of the phenomenon, and various related socio-political issues. The interview process, at times, resembled more an informal conversation than an interview (albeit a semi-structured one), which never interfered with the progression of the discussion.

72

Reciprocity issues were also anticipated and addressed wherever necessary. Since interviewing is an obtrusive method that requires me to intrude on participants, even though they have formally agreed to participate in the study, it is important for me to reciprocate when needed. Key informants have shared information with me that I would have otherwise had no access to via document analysis. Hence, I was clearly indebted to them for their input and insight, and if an interviewee felt the need to ask additional questions or inquire about my credentials and background, or the progress of the study, the information was provided overtly and candidly. Meanwhile, I bore in mind that too much self-disclosure (or, worse, unsolicited self-disclosure) could have a negative effect on the participant and therefore hamper the interview process. As emphasized by Reinharz (1992), it is crucial that I, as a qualitative researcher, learn how to "pace my interactions and look for cues from the participant as to readiness to know more about me" (1992:33). Thus, aware of the necessity to both time and measure any type of self-disclosure, I made sure participants received the right amount of information about me when they needed it, in a reasonable and balanced fashion.

Data Collection Methods

Creswell (1997) emphasizes that, "[i]n qualitative research, the convergence of sources of information, views of investigators, different theories, and different methodologies represents the triangulation of ideas . . . to help support the development of themes" (1997:251). With case studies, "[t]he data collection is extensive, drawing on *multiple sources of information*, such as observations, interviews, documents, and audio-visual materials" (1997:62-63). Such a diversity of information sources and collected data guarantees a more "complete picture" (Patton, 2001:307) of the phenomenon being

73

studied. Such a research strategy based upon triangulation enables researchers to base their case study on multiple sources of information and therefore evidence (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). For this multi-case study, data were obtained and triangulated using two complementary information sources: in-depth interviews and document analysis. Table 3 describes the sources from which data were collected and analyzed for the purpose of this multi-case study. They are further detailed below.

Table 3
Sources of Data, Type of Evidence Collected, and Sample Size

Data Sources	Type of Data	Sample Size
Interviews	Phenomenological Interviews	22
	Elite Interviews	17
	Total	39
Documents	News Articles	1450
	Television News Clips	112
	Scholarly Articles	25
	Books	9
	Archival Records	19
	Administrative Documents	24
	Government Reports & Memos	43
	Private Organization Reports	13
	Unclassified Military Reports	16
	Feature Films	5
	Documentary Films	4
	Recruitment Videos	11
	Short Films & Animations	5
	Militant Websites	18
	Speeches & Letters	21
	Total	1775

Interviews

Thirty-nine on-site interviews were conducted in France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as part of a two-year grant project on suicide terrorism funded by the U.S. Office of Naval Research via the Global Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action (G-CDMHA) at the University of South Florida

74

(USF). While the interviews focused more on the phenomenology and etiology of suicide terrorism, risk assessments and prevention, the respondents provided answers that continually reflected the significance of social contexts, socio-political forces, and ideology, thus echoing issues inherent in social constructionism. Such patterns in the initial data collection phase prompted me to later focus my attention – and my subsequent dissertation work – on the constructions and interpretations of suicide bombings around the world.

The interviews were semi-structured in nature since specific interview questions had to be used within a research protocol approved by the USF Institutional Review Board. The interviews typically lasted from 60 to 120 minutes, depending on how many additional comments the interviewees had. Each interviewee signed an informed consent form for minimal-risk research and was asked about 20 questions, which centered on the issues listed below. Table 4 summarizes relevant interviewee demographics. Due to confidentiality requirements, the exact identity and related professional or personal details about each interviewee cannot be revealed. The actual interview questions, although they relate more directly to the G-CDMHA project than to this current study, are listed in Appendix B.

In-depth one-on-one interviews with information-rich participants were selected as a data collection method following the Blumerian tradition of using key informants as interviewees. Blumer indeed "considered a carefully selected group of naturally acute observers and well-informed people to be a real 'panel of experts' about a setting or situation, experts who would take the researcher inside the phenomenon of interest" (Patton, 2001:112). "In-depth interviews with multiple informants at each site" also made

it possible "to triangulate findings across sources and test issues of reliability and validity" (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:60). Potential informants were selected due to their current or past involvement with suicide terrorism policy, prevention or research and contacted to participate in the study. Some declinedfor security or ideological reasons, including a representative of the Arab European League who, in January 2004, wrote:

> Dear Madam, I do not wish to collaborate on your project, but i can give yuou a tip though. you want to stop people from blowing themselves up? Give them weapons that are equal to those of their opressors or stop opression. Give the palestinians appachi helecoptors and F 16, that would be a good idea to stop people from using their bodies as a weopon to detter the oppressor. (sic)

Table 4

Interviewee Demographics for On-Site One-On-One Phenomenological and Elite Interviewing Process, By Country

Country	Total of Interviews	Affiliation	Gender	Status
France	9	Ministry of Interior; UCLAT; Interpol	Male: 8 Female: 1	Civilian: 9 Military: 0
Turkey	15	Turkish National Police; TADOC; UNODC; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defense; Turkish Intelligence Agency; University	Male: 15 Female: 0	Civilian: 12 Military: 3
United Kingdom	6	CSTPV; University; London Police	Male: 6 Female: 0	Civilian: 6 Military: 0
United States	9	University; Army; Air Force; Navy	Male: 9 Female: 0	Civilian: 4 Military: 5

Two forms of in-depth interviewing were used and, ultimately, merged into the interview process: phenomenological interviewing and elite interviewing. *Phenomenological interviewing* is rooted in phenomenology, "the study of lived experiences and the ways we understand those experiences to develop a worldview," and its goal is to thoroughly "describe the meaning of a concept or phenomenon that several

76

individuals share" (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:112). Phenomenological interviewing is a useful tool inasmuch as "it permits an explicit focus on the researcher's personal experience combined with those of the interviewees" (1998:113). However, a strict introspective exercise – called epoche – is necessary for researchers to become fully aware of their own biases and ensure that their own experiences and worldviews do not interfere with those of the interviewees. In the present study, respondents selected for phenomenological interviews were the ones who could provide an academic understanding of the phenomenon (i.e., scholars in Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States), as well as law enforcement and military personnel having had exposure to suicide terrorism or related training (in all four countries visited). Out of the thirty-nine interviewees, twenty-two were involved in the phenomenological interviewing process.

Elite interviewing, on the other hand, focuses specifically on interviewees who are "considered to be influential, prominent, and/or well-informed people in an organization or a community . . . on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research" (Ibid.). Invaluable data can be gathered by interviewing these knowledge-rich people. In addition, elites can "report on an organization's policies, past histories, and future plans from a particular perspective" (Ibid.), which can yield very useful information that would not be easily obtained elsewhere. The major limitations of elite interviewing are typically gaining access to the elites and their lack of flexibility when dealing with a relatively or fully structured interview format. In this study, these obstacles were circumvented thanks to federal sponsorship for the grant the interviews were conducted through, as well as a network of contacts in the various agencies or governmental offices included in the project. The quality of the information thus gathered was invaluable. Seventeen of the

77

thirty-nine interviewees were considered elite respondents due to their top positions and responsibilities within specific national or international agencies (i.e., government, law enforcement, and military senior officials).

Document Analysis

   Document analysis was the second data collection method adopted for this study to not only supplement and triangulate the interview data, but also ensure more flexibility in the data collection and data analysis phases. This is a commonly used method that allows researchers to verify other observations or complement interview data. Documents used in this study included either primary sources (i.e., original work) or secondary sources (i.e., secondhand analyses of original work). Focusing on oral narratives (interviews), textual narratives (broadsheet media coverage, scholarly journals, official policy statements, formal and informal governmental memoranda, speeches and reports, archival records), and visual narratives (videotaped news coverage, feature films, documentaries, recruitment videos) made it possible to fully explore all available materials concerning suicide terrorism.

   Articles published worldwide in newspapers and news magazines between December 1980 and December 2005 were accessed through the LexisNexis Academic database and compared to results from the Associated Press (AP) news archive. Keywords used for the search included: suicide terrorism, suicide bombing, martyrdom operation, suicide bomber, suicide attack, suicide terror attack, suicidal bombing, and homicide bombing. The number of articles thus found is presented in Table 5.

   The search was then narrowed down using the LexisNexis database option to use only "major news" reports published in English-language major newspapers and news

78

magazines for the 1980-2005 period. Articles were randomly sampled from the results. This process yielded a total of 1450 relevant articles.

Table 5
Number of Articles Published in Major Newspapers and News Magazines, By Keyword, 1980-2005

	LexisNexis Academic	Associated Press Archive
Suicide Terrorism	6470	5389
Suicide Bombing	7870	10313
Martyrdom Operation	126	0
Suicide Bomber	9790	7256
Suicide Attack	13200	14541
Suicide Terror Attack	2920	938
Suicidal Bombing	41	79
Homicide Bombing	36	73

A total of 1775 documents were collected and systematically analyzed. Besides news articles (n=1450), other open-source documents on suicide bombings that were used in the present study include television news clips (n=112), scholarly articles (n=25), books (n=9), archival records (n=19), administrative documents (n=24), government reports and memoranda (n=43), private organization reports (n=13), unclassified military reports (n=16), feature films (n=5), documentary films (n=4), recruitment videos (n=11), short films and animations (n=5), militant websites (n=18), as well as speeches and letters (n=21). Most documents were obtained via Internet-based archives; the rest was acquired from the interviewees involved in the phenomenological and elite interviewing process described above.

The data gathering phase of this study was twofold and required a general review of documents, as well as a systematic historical analysis of documents. A *general review of documents*, an unobtrusive interpretive method that allows for the use of content analysis for the examination of various materials on suicide bombings, as well as a

systematic *historical analysis of documents* occurred prior to conducting in-depth interviews (inasmuch as it provided me with a thorough knowledge of suicide terrorism, its emergence many centuries ago, its contemporary developments and current trends, as well as the groups that have used / use / could resort to this method). Both were also used during the content analysis phase of the study in order to provide more insight into the subjective interpretation of suicide bombing events over time and across countries.

Content analysis made it possible to examine and categorize the contents of the sources used. As "a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding" (Stemler, 2001), content analysis may be broadly defined as "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages" (Holsti, 1969:14). Hence, the method is not limited to textual analysis. It has in fact been used in other areas, such as coding drawings (Wheelock, Haney, & Bebell, 2000) and coding actions observed in videotaped studies (Stigler, Gonzales, Kawanaka, Knoll, & Serrano, 1999). The advantage of content analysis is that it "enables researchers to sift through large volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion" (Stemler, 2001). As Weber (1990) points out, content analysis is a valuable method for observing and depicting "the focus of individual, group, institutional, or social attention." Furthermore, researchers can use content analysis to make inferences that may be corroborated by additional, complementary data collection techniques. As Krippendorff (1980) mentions, "[m]uch content analysis research is motivated by the search for techniques to infer from symbolic data what would be either too costly, no longer possible, or too obtrusive by the use of other techniques" (1980:51). Here, content analysis began with a word-frequency count

80

and also entailed devising codes to divide the data into sensible concept-based groups. A specific coding scheme was thus applied to the data and the latter were classified so that the frequency of specific concepts could be recorded and computed more easily. The frequency breakdown of the codes for each concept is explained and tabulated later on.

Concept mapping was then used in order to methodically analyze emerging patterns and themes in the data. Miller and Riechert (1994) provide a thorough discussion of concept mapping, a scaling technique that enables researchers to observe and depict themes or categories of content within larger amounts of text. Their analysis highlights three major benefits of concept mapping over a more traditional take on content analysis: (a) concept mapping is a fast and convenient tool to draw attention to significant themes in large textual bodies; (b) such themes, rather than being subjectively designed and imposed by the researcher, emerge from the data themselves; and (c) concept mapping emphasizes the significance of and associations between themes. The concept map for this study is provided later on in this chapter, under the "Data Interpretation" section.

For instance, the collection of data on suicide bombings in Turkey was a twofold process. On the one hand, in-depth one-on-one interviews were conducted in Ankara, Turkey, between April 13 and April 21, 2004. The main focus of these interviews were the fifteen suicide bombings perpetrated by the PKK (today's KONGRA-GEL) between June 30, 1995, and July 15, 1999, as well as known aborted missions. Interviewees included senior officials from and researchers affiliated with the Turkish Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC); top officials from the Information Ministry; top officials from the Bomb Squad and Anti-Terrorism Unit of the Turkish National Police Academy; top officials at the Anti-Terrorism Ministry and

81

representatives of the Security Department; senior officials from the Interior Security Department; top officials at the headquarters of Turkey's Intelligence Services; and senior members of the Organized Crime Unit at the Ministry of Interior. On the other hand, documents were obtained from the abovementioned interviewees and a variety of other authoritative sources, such as governmental Websites and official publications, published state and research reports, available press archives (Associated Press coverage and Lexis-Nexis-Academic drawn data), as well as the official Website currently maintained by KONGRA-GEL and associated Kurdish and PKK-related Websites and publications. The contents of the documents and other sources were systematically analyzed by following a twofold approach. First, a *conceptual* analysis was carried out to highlight the presence and frequency of certain key words or concepts related to suicide terrorism (e.g., suicide, bombing, martyrdom, martyr, sacrifice, jihad, infidels, mission, Kurdistan, Kurdish, PKK, nationalism, ethnic conflict, separatism). Second, a *relational* analysis of the documents and sources made it possible to lay emphasis on the relationships between these words or concepts, in order to infer their meaning within the text and deduce specific characteristics of their authors and intended audience. As a result of the association of certain words or concepts, various patterns and subjective meanings emerged.

Methodological Concerns

Smith (1998) contends that "a critical pragmatist stance . . . rejects the dominant empiricist goal of research as generating knowledge or adding to scientific theorising, and instead proposes a moral base of reasoning." Indeed, the purpose of qualitative research "is not to produce knowledge of the social world as an entity but to engage in

82

knowledge making as a human activity. This is fundamentally a normative undertaking. It requires that we come to terms with a sense of moral purpose and responsibility in human inquiry . . . to persuade one another of the value or goodness of a way of thinking" (Schwandt, 1993:19-20). As Smith (1992) posits, interpretive inquiry is consequently both a practical and a moral activity: "the pursuit of knowledge must be understood in practical and moral terms" (1992:102). Thus, owing to the moral element involved, one cannot differentiate belief and opinion using epistemology (see Smith, 1992; Schwandt, 1993).

Conducting research consists in offering "a publicly scrutinizable analysis of a phenomenon with the intent of clarification" (Reinharz, 1992:9). The purpose of this study, as stated before, is to expand our theoretical and practical understanding of suicide terrorism by providing some much needed insight into the social construction of suicide terrorism. While gathering and analyzing data to conduct this study, several issues or concerns arose that had to be methodically addressed.

First, it appeared primordial to ascertain the "truth value" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985:290) of the study, as well as "its applicability, consistency, and neutrality" (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:192). Researchers, in their efforts to determine the best possible estimate of the veracity of their studies, are mostly concerned with what is commonly referred to as *validity*. Campbell and Stanley (1966), amongst others, have highlighted two types of validity: internal and external. *Internal* validity can be described as the level of authority with which we infer that the relationship between two variables is causal. On the other hand, *external* validity refers to the level of certainty with which we can infer that the alleged causal relationship can be generalized to and across various

83

measures of the cause-and-effect link, and across different settings, times, or groups of people.

> The strength of a qualitative study that aims to explore a problem or describe a setting, a process, a social group, or a pattern of interaction will rest with its validity. An in-depth description showing the complexities of processes and interactions will be so embedded with data derived from the setting that it cannot help but be valid. Within the parameters of that setting, population, and theoretical framework, the research will be valid. A qualitative researcher should therefore adequately state those parameters, thereby placing boundaries around the study (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:192-193).

Much like reliability and objectivity, internal validity and external validity both relate to a more "conventional positivist paradigm" (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:192) and therefore do not seem to adequately fit the inherently naturalistic qualitative research framework. Although the issue of validity is mostly relevant to quantitative studies, the same terms are sometimes used in the context of qualitative research – albeit with a slightly different understanding. More specifically, in qualitative research, internal validity is influenced by the research design, whereas external validity refers to the extension or transferability of the qualitative findings. Some scholars, however, recommend the use of distinct constructs in order to assess the value and logic of qualitative research. Munro (as cited in Smith, 1998) further argues that validity "is not a useful [term] in research that seeks understanding and meaning." For the purpose of qualitative research, then, the term "validity" must be reconceptualized and clearly distinguished from the empiricist logic that drives quantitative inquiry. Four original constructs have been proposed in the scholarly literature: *credibility*, *transferability*, *dependability*, and *confirmability* (see Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Marshall & Rossman,

1998; Smith, 1998). Each one was scrupulously addressed within the framework of this study.

Credibility

Establishing the credibility of a study consists in showing that "the inquiry was conducted in such a manner as to ensure that the subject was accurately identified and described" (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:192). The credibility of the qualitative study essentially depends upon the common understanding and interpretation of concepts by the researcher and the study participants. This is comparable to what quantitative researchers focus on when determining the *internal validity* of their research design.

In order to optimize the credibility of the qualitative research design of this study, following recommendations by McMillan and Schumacher (1997), various strategies were resorted to. First of all, prolonged fieldwork was a priority during and well after the phase involving the initial G-CDMHA grant project on the phenomenology and etiology of suicide terrorism. That allowed for interim data analysis as well as data substantiation, which ensured that study findings matched participant reality. Furthermore, precise accounts of interviews using verbatim statements made by the interviewees, in addition to strictly quoted excerpts from documents ensured that the exact language used by the participants or in the analyzed documents were transformed into objective data. Likewise, low-inference descriptors were used, so as to accurately record detailed descriptions of specific situations. The use of mechanically recorded data (through the extensive use of digital voice recorders, videotapes, and photographs) further ensured the accuracy and easy corroboration of the data collected. Interviewees were asked to double-check the accuracy of the information collected. After each interview, participants were also asked

85

to review the exactness of the information gathered and transcribed during their interview(s). Finally, negative cases or conflicting data likely to either stand out as exceptions to observed patterns or alter data patterns, if any, were controlled for, recorded, analyzed, and reported.

Transferability

Qualitative researchers must demonstrate that their study findings "will be useful to others in similar situations, with similar research questions or questions of practice" (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:193). With qualitative studies, *external validity* depends on whether the findings can be extended or transferred – either as grounded theory or as an analytic synthesis that may be used by other researchers to conduct further research on the phenomenon or at least appreciate comparable cases. Thus, knowledge can be produced not by replicating studies but, rather, where extensive corroborating data gathered via additional case studies (or even more positivist quantitative analyses) of the phenomenon become available.

"A qualitative study's transferability or generalizability to other settings may be problematic. The generalization of qualitative findings to other populations [or] settings . . . is seen by traditional canons as a weakness in the approach" (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:193). The transferability, or extension, of qualitative findings is influenced by several factors. In this study, finding transferability was maximized by paying special attention to: (a) the researcher's role and relationship with the study participants; (b) the site and key informant selection process via purposeful sampling; (c) the social context of both the phenomenon and the study itself; (d) the data collection and analysis strategies; (e) the accuracy of the narrative data; (f) the typicality of the selected groups or sites; (g)

86

the specificity and flexibility of the analytic framework; and (h) potential alternative interpretations.

It is important to note that the chosen intellectual framework of this study ensures that both the collection and the analysis of the data are constantly steered by the use of specific theoretical concepts and models. Since this study is explicitly informed by a body of theory – namely social constructionism and, more specifically, symbolic interactionism – researchers or policymakers focusing on similar parameters are ultimately free to decide if the cases presented in this analysis are transferable to new and comparable research settings, or generalizable for policymaking purposes.

One of the strengths of this study derives from its likelihood to significantly contribute to our empirical understanding of suicide terrorism. The qualitative research design used here is both empirical and interpretive, aimed at fostering substantive knowledge about the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and its socially constructed nature. Hence, although it is not purely empirical, this study has a strong potential for yielding empirically significant results by providing researchers and policymakers with much insight into the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and, ultimately, its prevention.

In order to safeguard the empirical integrity and optimize the transferability or generalizability of the study, another important strategic tool was used in addition to systematic data collection procedures: *triangulation*, a concept that "has been fruitfully applied to social science inquiry" (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:194). The triangulation of multiple data sources "is the act of bringing more than one source of data to bear on a single point. . . . Data from different sources can be used to corroborate, elaborate, or illuminate the research in question. . . . Designing a study in which multiple cases,

87

multiple informants, or more than one data-gathering method are used can greatly strengthen the study's usefulness for other settings" (Ibid.). Triangulation is therefore a corollary of the use of multiple sources of data; both ensure the collection of high-quality qualitative data.

Patton (2001) stresses that "multiple sources of information are sought and used because no single source of information can be trusted to provide a comprehensive perspective. . . . By using a combination of observations, interviewing, and document analysis, the field worker is able to use different data sources to validate and cross-check findings" (2001:306). As explained by Marshall and Rossman (1998) and further clarified by Patton (2001:306), "[e]ach type and source of data has strengths and weaknesses. Using a combination of data types – triangulation . . . – increases validity as the strengths of one approach can compensate for the weaknesses of another approach." Triangulation, like any other method, has its flaws. It is important to bear in mind that "triangulation is not a strategy of validation but an alternative to validation" and that "the various forms of triangulation can produce at best only an expanded interpretive base in a study rather than an objective account (an account which assumes a single, objective reality)" (Smith, 1998). While "there is no magic in triangulation" (Patton, as cited in Smith, 1998), it is still useful and advantageous for researchers to "include triangulation of data sources and analytical perspectives to increase the accuracy and credibility of findings" (Patton, 2001:93).

Dependability

Guaranteeing the dependability or trustworthiness of a study requires researchers "to account for changing conditions in the phenomenon chosen for study and changes in

88

the design created by an increasingly refined understanding of the setting . . . [which follows] the qualitative/interpretive assumption that the social world is always being constructed and that the concept of replication in itself is problematic" (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:194). During the course of this study, the initial focus on the phenomenology and etiology of suicide terrorism shifted towards a more specific analysis centered around issues of social construction and symbolic interaction. Conducting interviews with key informants, analyzing the phenomenon via the study of typical cases, and reviewing documents related to suicide bombings worldwide, from guerilla movements to war-zone insurgents, all contributed to the realization that there is an apparent underlying theme in the presentation and interpretation of bombings as suicide terrorism – a social constructionist theme with clear symbolic interactionist underpinnings. As a result, the focal point of the study became the analysis of suicide terrorism as a socially constructed problem. Data were subsequently aggregated, examined, summarized, and synthesized in a critical and systematic fashion to look for, identify, and interpret patterns evidencing the socially constructed nature of suicide terrorism.

Overall reliability was optimized by: (a) prolonging the data gathering processes on site in order to ensure the dependability of the findings by providing more concrete information upon which to base interpretations; (b) triangulating across methods and sources so as not to rely exclusively on one type of observation; (c) having participants actively check and corroborate the interpretation of collected data; and (d) collecting referential materials in order to complement or support the data collected on site.

89

The limitations of purposeful sampling were of course considered. So was the subsequent likelihood of error. Indeed, "[i]n spite of the apparent flexibility in purposeful sampling, researchers must be aware of three types of sampling error that can arise in qualitative research. The first relates to distortions caused by insufficient breadth in sampling; the second from distortions introduced by changes over time; and the third from distortions caused by lack of depth in data collection at each site" (Hoepfl, 1997; also see Patton, 2001). The sampling breadth of this study was wide enough that it included cases from very diverse areas of the world, political or religious origins, etc. Changes over time were not a significant risk factor insofar as the socially constructed understanding of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism appears constant regardless of time and place. As for case-specific data collection methods, they were as thorough as possible, including all available and accessible information sources.

Additionally, it is well understood that gathering data via interviews is not a flawless collection method (see Marshall & Rossman, 1998; Patton, 2001). Indeed, "[i]nterview data limitations include possibly distorted responses due to personal bias, anger, anxiety, politics, and simple lack of awareness. . . . Interview data are also subject to recall error, reactivity of the interviewee to the interviewer, and self-serving responses" (Patton, 2001:306). However, in this study, the triangulation of information across sources (interviews and document analysis) helps ensure the depth and associated dependability of the research. It is further taken into account that "[d]ocuments and records also have limitations. They may be incomplete or inaccurate . . . notoriously variable in quality and completeness, with great detail in some cases and virtually nothing in others" (2001:306-307). Nevertheless, the analysis of documents was essential to the

90

study for it complemented and strengthened the data gathered from in-depth interviews, while providing "a behind-the-scenes look . . . that may not be directly observable and about which the interviewer might not ask appropriate questions without the leads provided through documents" (2001:307).

Confirmability

This construct "captures the traditional concept of objectivity . . . to ask whether the study could be confirmed by another . . . [and whether] the data help confirm the general findings and lead to the implications" (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:194). Due to the very nature of qualitative inquiry, it is likely that the subjectivity of the researcher will influence the research. However, such subjectivity can be disciplined enough to ensure that the researcher not only subjects himself or herself to a scrupulous self-examination, but also constantly reconsiders and reassesses all the stages of his or her research process (see Hoepfl, 1997; Kushner & Norris, 1981; Maxwell, 1992; Norris, 1997).

For the purpose of this study, as suggested by McMillan and Schumacher (1997), research bias was systematically monitored and subjectivity therefore reduced by: (a) keeping a *field log* of dates, times, locations, people, and activities for every data set collected; (b) keeping a *field journal* in order to record all decisions made while designing the study (including rationale for such decisions and data validity evaluation); (c) documenting pertinent *ethical considerations*, i.e., logging ethical issues, decisions, or actions where applicable; (d) ensuring *audibility* by documenting data management techniques, codes, categories; and (e) formally *corroborating initial findings* by conducting confirmation interviews.

91

As explained above, the conceptual framework of this study relies upon the social constructionist perspective and a symbolic interactionist approach to study and provide a better understanding of the interpretation and subjective meaning of suicide terrorism. Figure 2 presents a concept map that summarizes the research design of this study, including its goals, conceptual framework, research questions, methods, and validity issues.

Data Interpretation

This comprehensive research project yielded a profusion of rich qualitative data that had to be meticulously organized and analyzed. The collection and analysis of the data were part of a continuous cycle and iterative process. In order to structure and interpret the meanings derived from the raw data, the latter were methodically transcribed, coded, categorized, and analyzed following procedures and mechanisms described below.

Constant Comparative Analysis

As "the most complex and mysterious of all the phases of a qualitative project" data analysis is "an explicit step in conceptually interpreting the data set as a whole, using specific analytic strategies to transform the raw data into a new and coherent depiction of the thing being studied" (Thorne, 2000:68). Data were constantly analyzed throughout each and every phase of this study. Constant comparative analysis was the chosen analytical strategy to sort, organize, conceptualize, refine, and interpret the data collected.

92

Figure 2: Research Design Concept Map

93

"Naturalistic inquiry, thematic analysis, and interpretive description are methods that depend on constant comparative analysis processes to develop ways of understanding human phenomena within the context in which they are experienced" (2000:69). Constant comparative analysis was initially "developed for use in the grounded theory methodology of Glaser and Strauss, which itself evolved out of the sociological theory of symbolic interactionism" (Ibid.). It consists of comparing individual parts of the data (e.g., an interview, an article or a theme) with the rest of the records "in order to develop conceptualizations of the possible relations between various pieces of data" (Ibid.). This suits another important goal of the study: to generate findings and new knowledge about common patterns and themes within human experience as relates to suicide terrorism.

Data Transcription and Storage

Collected data were systematically transcribed using a basic word processor (Microsoft Word). This process yielded over 4,500 pages of notes. As explained before, substantial amounts of data were gleaned from recorded observations (in-depth interviews), texts and archival documents (hundreds of relevant articles compiled from newspapers and magazines published since 1980), multi-media sources available in the public domain (e.g., documentaries, recruitment videos, television news, Websites, Internet documents), policy statements and governmental handbooks, and more. Hypermedia data were transcribed into text and later analyzed and interpreted as was the rest of the data. Hence both raw data (observations and comments as captured in notes and on recording devices) and summary data (objective interpretations of the raw data, including statements regarding emerging patterns) were transcribed and stored into a database created to organize all the data and help with its analysis. A traditional filing

94

technique (with a color-coded system and typed data summaries) was preferred over the use of a computer software program. Although the technologically advanced option would have been a time-saving one, many researchers – including this author – consider the introduction of computerized qualitative data analysis as a menace to "methodological purity" (Bourdon, 2002:1).

Codes and Analytic Categories

"A key ingredient in structuring collected data for analysis is how that data is [sic] captured in the first place" (Kantner, Sova, & Anschuetz, 2005:1). The higher the quality of the data and collection process is, the more reliable the interpretive understanding will be. Text and sub-texts may thus be deconstructed more efficiently and multiple meanings may be uncovered, which will in turn help deconstruct the meanings of the phenomenon of interest and present an accurate representation of social reality. This all depends on the quality of the thematic interpretation of meaning based on the data collected.

> The difficulty, of course, is in the coding of texts and in finding the patterns. . . . Deciding on themes or codes is an unmitigated, qualitative act of analysis in the conduct of a particular study, guided by intuition and experience about what is important and what is unimportant. (Bernard, 1996:2-3)

Interpreting the qualitative data gathered throughout the course of the project thus required developing coherent coding and category systems. The data were coded to help with their systematic analysis and to increase the overall reliability and validity of the study. Variables (concepts) and values (positive, negative, neutral) were identified by carefully examining indexed interview notes (transcripts), researcher memos, and all other forms of data available. The data were then segmented into significant analytical units and subsequently labeled with specific codes or category names, which were

95

purposely selected to be short and mnemonic. The categories and codes of the words and

concepts present in the data are summarized in Table 6.

Table 6
Master List of Categories and Codes

Categories	Codes
Actors	ACT
Media	MED
Public	PUB
Social control agents	SC AGTS
Suicide bombers	SB
Groups (terrorist or otherwise)	GRP
Political context	POL CON
Terrorism	TERR
Separatism	SEPAR
Nationalism	NATIO
Elections	ELECT
Other	AUTR
Religious context	REL CON
Islam	ISL
Radical Islam	RAD ISL
Other	AUTR
Situational context	SIT CON
Civil war	CIV WAR
War	WAR
Insurgency	INSURG
Rebellion	REBEL
Guerrilla	GUERR
Democracy	DEMO
Other	AUTR
Stages of moral panic	MOR PAN
Occurrence and signification	SIGNIF
Social implications	SOC IMPL
Social control measures	SOC CTRL
Media coverage	MED COV
Fact-based	FACT
Opinion	OPI
Contradiction	CONTRAD
Distortion	DISTORT
Sensationalism	SENSAS
Moralization	MORAL
Politicization	POLITZ
Demonization	DEMON
Religiosity	RELIG
Moral discourse	MORAL
Agenda setting	AGDA

96

Key concepts formed the *master codes*: actors (ACT), political context (POL CON), religious context (REL CON), situational context (SIT CON), stages of moral panic (MOR PAN), media coverage (MED COV), and politicization (POLITZ). *Sub-codes* (second-level coding) emerged from these major analytic categories. *A priori codes* were developed before examining the data, whereas *inductive codes* were created upon examining the data. *Co-occurring codes* were observed where codes partially or completely overlapped, i.e., where segments of data got coded with more than one code. A codebook was then created following three different but complementary strategies that fit the design and purpose of this study: coding according to theory, coding by induction, and coding by ontological categories.

Coding according to theory consists of listing variables and corresponding codes based upon theoretical reasoning: the analytical framework or research questions of the study guided the creation of this part of the codebook. Such coding occurred in the present study with concepts inherent in the constructionist and interactionist perspectives. These codes include: actors (media, public, agents of social control) and stages of moral panics (occurrence and signification, social implications, social control measures). They refer to such concepts as the nature of the threat (episodic suicide bombing), the signification of the threat as serious and violent (by the media to the community), the ensuing galvanization and intensification of public attention and policymaking, the claims-making process inherent in the construction of fear and social problems, risk inflation, demonization (suicide bombers as folk devils), specific or radical rhetoric in official statements and media reports, moral panic, agenda setting, rule creation and enforcement, social control process, and so on.

97

Coding by induction follows grounded theory principles and calls for the incremental coding of the data set as theoretical questions emerge. It is rooted in four general observation categories: conditions (causes of the perceived phenomenon), interaction between actors, strategies and tactics used by actors, and consequences of actions. On the other hand, *coding by ontological categories*, as a middle-ground approach, borrows from the two previous types of coding and helps to focus on the context of the events, objective actions, subjective interpretations, socio-political processes, social structures, and strategies or responses. This type of coding was used to label concepts related to: political context (terrorism, separatism, nationalism, elections, other), religious context (Islam, radical Islam, other), situational context (civil war, war, insurgency, rebellion, guerrilla, democracy, other), media coverage (fact-based, opinion, contradiction, distortion, sensationalism, and moralization), and politicization (demonization, religiosity, moral discourse, agenda setting).

Relationships among codes or between categories were also labeled using *pattern coding* in order to detect and tag inter-thematic articulations, common characteristics, discrepancies, and peculiarities (e.g., co-existence of two variables; exceptions to the norm). Whatever trends and patterns emerged within the data structure were methodically encoded and summarized to maximize the thoroughness and objectivity of the analysis. Hence, certain words and concepts were coupled with the abovementioned coding scheme in order to classify the concepts emerging from the data. Recurring words and concepts were then color-coded, labeled, tallied up, and condensed into a frequency table (Table 7).

98

Table 7

Concept Frequencies, Count and Percentage By Categories

Categories	Codes	Count and Percentage
Actors	ACT	n=11163
Media	MED	1328 (11.9%)
Public	PUB	947 (8.5%)
Social control agents	SC AGTS	1423 (12.7%)
Suicide bombers	SB	4179 (37.4%)
Groups (terrorist or otherwise)	GRP	3286 (29.4%)
Political context	POL CON	n=9553
Terrorism	TERR	8689 (90.9%)
Separatism	SEPAR	234 (2.4%)
Nationalism	NATIO	451 (4.7%)
Elections	ELECT	156 (1.6%)
Other	AUTR	23 (0.2%)
Religious context	REL CON	n=2481
Islam	ISL	975 (39.3%)
Radical Islam	RAD ISL	1267 (51.1%)
Other	AUTR	239 (9.6%)
Situational context	SIT CON	n=3399
Civil war	CIV WAR	206 (6.1%)
War	WAR	1374 (40.4%)
Insurgency	INSURG	806 (23.7%)
Rebellion	REBEL	234 (6.9%)
Guerrilla	GUERR	326 (9.6%)
Democracy	DEMO	164 (4.8%)
Other	AUTR	289 (8.5%)
Stages of moral panic	MOR PAN	n=7641
Occurrence and signification	SIGNIF	2181 (28.5%)
Social implications	SOC IMPL	2896 (37.9%)
Social control measures	SOC CTRL	2564 (33.6%)
Media coverage	MED COV	n=2676
Fact-based	FACT	364 (13.6%)
Opinion	OPI	566 (21.1%)
Contradiction	CONTRAD	98 (3.7%)
Distortion	DISTORT	167 (6.2%)
Sensationalism	SENSAS	983 (36.7%)
Moralization	MORAL	498 (18.6%)
Politicization	POLITZ	n=2546
Demonization	DEMON	254 (10%)
Religiosity	RELIG	365 (14.3%)
Moral discourse	MORAL	659 (25.9%)
Agenda setting	AGDA	1268 (49.8%)

Synthetic Network Diagram

A synthetic network diagram is a data-based analytic tool that helps to structure the collected data and present them in a visually simplified fashion. Diagrams are useful tools to identify and explicate relations between the various elements of a phenomenon of interest. They also enable researchers and the reader to more clearly observe conceptual, categorical, situational, temporal, and causal links. Figure 3 provides such a visual aid, emphasizing the connections between the categories and concepts at stake in the current multi-case study of the social construction of suicide terrorism.

Suicide bombing (episodic threat)

Dramatic media coverage

Signification as violent and serious threat to community/society

Media exposure
of terrorist group → Increased public concern → Galvanized attention
of policymakers

Claims-making process

Threat inflation   Demonization   Fearmongering rhetoric

Constructed collective insecurity

Moral panic → Agenda setting and enforcement   Radical discourses

Demand resolution of endemic crisis ⟶ Social control mechanisms

Figure 3: Network Diagram for the Social Construction of Suicide Terrorism

101

Chapter Four

Findings

Overview of Patterns and Themes

The subjective definitional and rhetorical processes involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism are evidenced by examining the comprehensive data collected via in-depth interviews, as well as the general and historical review of public and official documents. The outcome of the analysis, summed up below, indeed sheds light on the symbolic interaction of socio-political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism. The use of suicide terrorism as a political weapon, its exploitation as a communication tool, and its politicization to fuel moral panics are discussed in details later on in this chapter.

Overall, the study findings show that representations and interpretations of suicide bombings in public policy and the mass media are unrefined and overwhelmingly one-dimensional: they ignore the dynamics of the historical, social, cultural, economic, and psychological dimensions of the events. The media and agents of social control use unsophisticated portrayals of suicide bombings as religiously motivated acts and usually describe suicide terrorism as a mere manifestation of evil. However, suicide terrorism is more a political act than a religious one and the main motivating factor of contemporary suicide bombing campaigns has consistently been foreign occupation.

News coverage of suicide bombings is characteristically sensationalized and uses overly dramatic, newsworthy stories about selected incidents or conflicts. Suicide bombers are selectively depicted as simplistic enemies, crazed cowards, and demonized foes. The vast majority of cases that are publicly acknowledged and widely analyzed concern Middle Eastern incidents involving Islamic fundamentalists. Likewise, public policy is almost exclusively based on suicide terrorism by Middle Eastern, Islamist groups or bombers that are described following an "Us vs. Them" outlook on the issue within the greater "War on Terror" framework. Secular groups, however prolific in their use of the deadly tactic, are seldom the focal point of policymaking efforts or media exposure.

Media portrayals and public policy rely on radical perceptions and intrinsically flawed interpretations of suicide terrorism. They usually hinge upon erroneous "typical profiles" of the average bombers. Suicide attacks are thus presented as extremely violent and elaborate propaganda tools in the hands of dangerous religious fanatics who are distressed, wrathful, unstable and suicidal, and have nothing to lose. Bombers are also habitually described as poor, uneducated, young males who were brainwashed by the fundamentalist precepts of Wahhabist Islam and the promise of a glorious afterlife. This is in total contradiction with the reality of suicide bombings. The latter are, in fact, characterized by a combination of primitive means and meticulous planning (recruitment, formation, and training) that results in extensive physical and psychological harm. Moreover, suicide bombers are not primarily suicidal and generally do not suffer from any diagnosable psychological disorders or cognitive impairments impeding effective problem-solving skills. Not all suicide bombings are perpetrated by exponents of a

103

fundamentalist interpretation of Islam or any other religion, for that matter: some secular groups have resorted to the tactic, including the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. The Tigers, in fact, are to this day the most prolific users of suicide bombings. Finally, women and children are increasingly recruited for suicide missions by several secular and religious groups that view them as providing invaluable tactical advantages. Though media coverage of these two rising types of bombers is growing, it usually misidentifies their motivations for getting involved in suicide missions and minimizes their involvement in such operations.

Suicide Bombings as Political Weapons

Suicide bombings have been a *modus operandi* for terrorist groups for centuries. The contemporary wave of suicide terrorism started in the early 1980s and clearly demonstrates that the phenomenon is not primarily religious, unlike what is described in the Western news media. Indeed, as confirmed by a recent review of "every suicide terrorist attack around the world since 1980" and over 460 suicide bombers, "what over 95 percent of suicide terrorist attacks since 1980 have in common is not religion, but a clear strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland or prize greatly" (Pape, 2005). Suicide terrorism as a political weapon appears to be a strategically "logic" choice (Pape, 2003; 2005) that can result in mass casualty situations, causes extensive physical damage and psychological harm, requires no escape plan for the bombers, and poses negligible security threats to the group since suicide bombers characteristically die in the course of the attacks and therefore cannot be interrogated by security forces afterward. In addition, suicide terrorism is as inexpensive as it is effective.

104

Estimates are that it can cost as little as $150 to conduct a suicide attack. Although extremely complicated attacks may cost more, the effectiveness of these attacks is usually worth the investment. For instance, the estimated cost to plan and conduct the 9/11 attacks is between $400,000 and $500,000, yet the resulting massive casualties, economic expense to the United States, and the notoriety received by al Qaeda made this attack exceptional in terrorist value with minimal money cost. (U.S. Army, 2005:III-1)

As one interviewee (a former British military analyst) put it:

What you must remember is that suicide bombings constitute a form of armed violence that is characteristic of asymmetric warfare... This essentially means that suicide bombings will unmistakably happen in violent, politically-based conflicts where one side does not have the same means available to fight equitably – conventional weapons, expensive tanks, cruise missiles, sophisticated helicopters, advanced technology, etc. Martyrdom operations are much cheaper than conventional warfare and they can cause extensive damage on the targets, whether it is material or psychological damage, in addition to killing many people. It is easy to see why they would be preferred as strategic weapons.

At the same time, suicide bombings do not happen in a vacuum. They become political weapon as a result of the context they occur in, the way they are dealt with by the various socio-political forces involved, and how the public reacts to them. According to one of the British scholars interviewed:

A suicide attack only becomes a political weapon once it is publicized by the media and people respond with a certain state of panic. The wave propagates throughout the population and then you have people who have never heard of a given group but fear for their life and want protection, a solution.

"A suicide bombing is nothing more than an explosion in an enclosed or open space," another American scholar argued. "The initial response involves only first responders: law enforcement and emergency services, really. The rest – the mass hysteria, the fear that spreads like wildfires throughout the country like it did after 9/11 – that's a response we can thank the media for." The same respondent later added: "Some

bombings could be suicide terrorism, but no one will talk about them if they're not spectacular. You have two symbolic towers collapsing in New York, that's news. That sells. And it's easier to convince people it could affect them all the way to Topeka, Kansas."

A top official from the French Ministry of Interior declared during his interview:

If someone crashes a plane into the Eiffel Tower tomorrow, we'll treat the scene as a plane crash. If a man goes into the metro and blows himself up, we'll dispatch police and emergency personnel. Nothing is a terrorist incident until you label it as such, but what does that change for the first response stage? Victims need to be treated, the scene needs to be processed no matter who or why. If a building burns down, you send firefighters whether it is arson or an accidental fire, don't you? It's the same with terrorism. We don't need to induce more chaos by frightening the population with terrorism rhetoric and spectacular media coverage. That would be like adding oil to the fire – and it would certainly serve the purpose of the individual or group behind the attack or give ideas to other groups. We basically withhold as much information as we can during the investigation phase and do not overemphasize the human dimension of the political act.

Hizballah's Brand of Destruction

As mentioned earlier, the first attack in the contemporary wave of suicide bombings occurred in the Middle East when the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut was destroyed in December 1981 by pro-Iranian terrorists. In September 1982, the potential of suicide terrorism as an influential strategic political weapon was increased by the suicide-mission assassination of pro-Israeli Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel. The suicide bombing tactic was quickly transformed into a full-blown geopolitical tool by Hizballah, the Iran-backed Lebanese Party of God, during the Lebanese Civil War. Hizballah claimed responsibility for the October 1983 Beirut barrack attacks against French and U.S. troops, which led to the southward retreat of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and prompted the

United States and France to withdraw their forces from Lebanon (Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). The systematic suicide attack campaign also forced "Israel to abandon most of the territorial and political gains made during [its] 1982 invasion of Lebanon" (Atran, 2004, August:2). By 1992, Hizballah "had dramatically lessened its strategic reliance on suicide bombing . . . when it decided to participate in parliamentary elections and become a 'mainstream' political party" (Ibid.).

LTTE Suicide Bombings and Sri Lankan Politics

In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or Tamil Tigers, have consistently been the most prolific users of suicide bombings since their first suicide attack in 1987. Although many will argue that the LTTE terror campaign has been essentially unsuccessful at bringing about the political change the Tamil Tigers have been fighting for for decades – the creation of an independent Tamil state – their suicide terror campaign has become a model and an inspiration for many groups across the globe. Sporadic acts of violence have been increasingly documented in Sri Lanka since the late 2002 ceasefire. Since November 2005, violence has in fact been rising in the rebel-held northeastern part of the island after LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran threatened to take up the struggle for a Tamil homeland again if the Sri Lankan government failed to attend to the LTTE's grievances. On December 25, 2005, pro-rebel Tamil legislator Joseph Pararajasingham was assassinated during midnight mass at a Christmas service in eastern Sri Lanka. Following the shooting, for which responsibility was not immediately claimed, a pro-LTTE Website, *TamilNet*, posted a statement by a Tamil National Alliance parliamentarian placing the blame squarely on the government. The official declared that "targeting key Tamil political actors to weaken the Tamil struggle" was

107

typical of a state-sponsored action against the Tamils. He added, "This strategy will fail and in its wake will likely bring an unprecedented catastrophe to Sri Lanka." Later that day, the Sri Lankan government responded in a similarly firm statement blaming the LTTE for assassinating one of its own supporters: "The LTTE, closely judged by the series of criminal acts being perpetrated in the northeast in recent few days, [was] desperately trying to divert the attention elsewhere and create mayhem and havoc while eschewing political discussions." The building tension between the Tamil Tigers, the Tamil community, and the Sri Lankan government may foreshadow a resurgence of violence, especially a multiplication of suicide bombings, and possibly a resumption of the civil war that tore the island apart for many years (see Van de Voorde, 2005; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).

Chechen Suicide Bombing Operations

Chechen suicide bombings did not occur until 2000: before that, the tactic was not once employed throughout the First Russo-Chechen War (1994-1996) or during the first year of the second Russo-Chechen War. Two dozen such attacks have occurred since and this emergence of suicide bombings can be attributed to war-related cultural and demographic crises, extensive human rights violations by the Russian Forces against Chechen civilians, and the radicalization of the resistance forces that has followed.

The October 2002 Moscow theater hostage-taking situation marked a turning point in the fight between Chechen rebels and the Russian government. On October 23, 2002, three dozen Chechen rebels took control of a crowded theater and held over 700 people hostage. They threatened to execute the hostages if their demands were not met, most notably the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. A two-and-a-

108

half-day siege followed and, on the morning of October 26, 2002, the theater was raided by the Spetsnaz, an elite commando unit of the Federal Security Service (FSB, former KGB). They pumped a powerful anesthetic gas into the structure and stormed the building. They proceeded to shoot all the rebels in the head at close range. The gas also killed 130 hostages, whereas two were killed by the hostage-takers, which means that Russian forces were eventually responsible for over sixty times as many hostage deaths as the Chechen rebels were. The Russian government backed the intervention despite the outcry it caused in the international media and general public, justifying it by the fact that the rebels had strapped explosive to themselves and the only way to prevent suicide bombings, extensive structural damage and mass casualties was to take the terrorists out fast and by any means necessary.

In September 2004, another highly-publicized hostage crisis took a disastrous turn when Russian police and soldiers intervened to put a stop to the situation in Beslan, Russia. Demanding the usual withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, rebel leader Shamil Basayev and his fighters took hundreds of children and teachers hostage at a school on September 1, 2004. Three days later, the building was stormed, 336 people were killed, and 747 were injured. Thirty-two terrorists were killed in the explosive standoff, including five women. All of them had been wearing explosive belts and other devices. Regardless of the "imminent threat" of suicide terrorism, the intervention of the Russian police and military was awfully criticized by the media, the public, and foreign governments, including the United States and many Western European countries. A parliamentary inquiry was launched after the siege, especially following widespread accusations that the crime scenes had been arranged by the authorities and evidence

destroyed to cover up the abuses and failures of the officials in charge. The final report is due in early 2006, but a preliminary report made available on December 28, 2005 puts the blame squarely on Russian security forces. This has been a surprising development, since most people "assumed that a parliamentary inquiry into the attack would play down public accusations that Russian police and soldiers were partly to blame for the deaths of hundreds of hostages" (Griffiths, 2005). However, the victims in Beslan still believe that blame will be avoided in the end and that the officials responsible for the deadly siege will not be held accountable:

> I think that the parliamentary inquiry would like to disclose the truth, but I believe they will fail to do so. They will not dare do it because revealing the truth would implicate top officials, high echelons who are to blame, who let the situation go, who are corrupt. So, they will probably not dare give their names because of their high rank. (Ibid.)

It is important to note that religious extremism is almost nonexistent as a motivation for Chechen suicide terrorism, which appears to above all be "a strategic tactic" and a political weapon being used "in an increasingly asymmetrical struggle with the Russians" (Reuter, 2004:2). The purpose of the Chechen suicide bombing campaign is "to attract support while attempting to coerce Russia into leaving the Chechnya" (Ibid.). Hence the major objective of Chechen implementers of suicide bombings is "a combination of a genuine desire to liberate the Chechen homeland and the necessity to attract supporters, recognition, and funding to continue their efforts" (2004:21). In 2003, the leader of the Chechen separatists "warned that the Chechen opposition had enough strength, finance and resolution to keep on fighting for people's freedom until Chechnya was absolutely free" (Suicide, 2003). They view suicide bombings as the most effective tool to achieve such goals while advancing their radical agendas. Incidentally, one of the

110

staunchest supporters of the Chechen rebel cause has been the United States (Horton, 2005).

"Taking cues from the 'successful' suicide campaigns of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al-Qaeda, Chechen extremists came to view suicide terrorism as their last best option" (Reuter, 2004:21). Nonetheless, there has been a decline in Chechen suicide bombing operations since 2004. On the one hand, human rights abuses have decreased in both amount and frequency. On the other hand, analysts argue, it is possible that "calculating implementers realized that suicide terrorism was not achieving the ambitious goals that they had envisioned" (Reuter, 2004:21).

The London Bombings and European Politics

Another recent example of the use – and relative success – of suicide terrorism as a political weapon can be found in the suicide bombings that occurred in London, England on July 11, 2005. The four coordinated bombings targeted the public transportation infrastructure, namely the underground network (first three attacks) and the bus system (fourth bombing). They killed 56 people and injured more than 700. Of the four bombers involved, three were Britons. The attacks have been blamed on al-Qaeda, which had previously publicly threatened the United Kingdom in widely broadcast speeches attacking the British government for being a key member of the group of countries supporting the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, also known as the "Coalition of the Willing." Osama bin Laden once stated: "We reserve the right to retaliate at the appropriate time and place against all countries involved, especially Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan, and Italy."

These suicide attacks were all the more significant as they were followed ten days later by an attempt at another series of five bombings in central London, which proved unsuccessful. As the bombers eluded the police, a manhunt was launched and panic spread throughout the population. People feared more bombings would happen and, via the media, began to pressure Prime Minister Blair to pull troops out of Iraq. Security alerts reached their highest level throughout the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe. The London attacks compounded the social and geopolitical consequences of the ten coordinated train bombings of March 2004 in Madrid, Spain, which have the highest toll of all European bombings thus far in terms of dead and injured (the Madrid bombings, which have been attributed to al-Qaeda, had a direct impact on the outcome of the Spanish general elections that month and prompted the new government to pull all Spanish troops out of Iraq). Thus the London bombings illustrate the main political objective of the uses of suicide terrorism: to combat (and ideally bring to an end) the foreign occupation of one's homeland or sacred land. Iraq is located in what used to be Mesopotamia, the Cradle of Humanity, and part of the Arabian Peninsula, which is a Holy Land for Muslim.

Suicide Terrorism as a Communication Tool

Suicide bombings are a spectacular weapon in the arsenal of terrorist groups today more than ever. We are in a media-saturated era where global communication networks make it possible to spread news of suicide terror attacks across the world in a matter of seconds. "Propaganda by deed" has taken a whole new global meaning now that groups can easily promote their agendas and share their accomplishments via satellite television,

112

the Internet, and more high-end technological tools. As one of the Interpol representatives put it in his interview:

> Terrorist groups have grown international by cleverly networking around the world, with supporters, sympathizers, and other groups alike. They have created a web that enables them to find well-wishers, new recruits, financial assistance, or popular support far away from their base. Look at Al-Qaeda, for instance, or the LTTE. They started out as small groups fighting for a specific cause within a specific region or against a specific ideology. Today, they are international organizations with roots in several countries and tens of thousands of supporters worldwide. All of that happened because they have mastered the use of the mass media, particularly the news and the Internet, to serve their purpose. Same thing with the Chechens. They came out of nowhere and became media icons thanks to their constant use of television and newspapers to spread their message against the Russian occupation.

Indeed, Chechen separatist leaders have repeatedly used the media, including the Website of the Chechen-Press news agency, to call upon the international community to interfere into the conflict in Chechnya (Suicide, 2003; Reuter, 2004). They have also exploited the strategic advantage presented by female suicide bombers to cause greater psychological harm on their targeted audience and "attract more publicity and attention" (Reuter, 2004:27), as evidenced by the sudden increase in the summer of 2003 of international media coverage of female suicide bombings. The Chechen suicide bombing campaign thus illustrates the potential uses of the violent tactic as a communication tool.

Overview of Media Coverage of Suicide Bombings

The suicide attack method, favored to this day by military and paramilitary groups, was introduced to the general public during World War II, when Japanese kamikaze pilots crashed their airplanes into Allied military targets. The first use of the phrase "suicide bombing" in the news can be traced back to an August 1940 *New York Times* article about World War II German military tactics. In March 1942, the same

113

newspaper ran an article about Japanese troops that had tried to carry out a "suicide bombing" against a U.S. carrier. In August 1945, the *London Times* described a kamikaze plane as a "suicide bomb." In April 1947, referred to a new type of radio-controlled missile in those terms: "designed originally as a counter-measure to the Japanese 'suicide-bomber,' it is now a potent weapon for defence or offence."

The use of the expression "suicide bombing" in its current context dates back to 1981, when the Associated Press introduced it in relation to the first attack of the contemporary wave of suicide bombings: the December 15, 1981 car-bomb destruction of the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 61 people. It was then used heavily to describe and analyze two major events of the Lebanese Civil War: the April 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing perpetrated by Hizballah in Beirut, as well as the October 1983 barrack attacks against U.S. Marines and French Paratroopers who were part of the international peacekeeping corps. These bombings claimed over 300 lives and left hundreds of people injured.

Since the mid-1980s, suicide bombings have become prime weapons in the arsenal of guerrilla, insurgent, and terrorist groups. Sri Lanka and the Middle East, as explained earlier, have been pivotal regions for the development of the deadly tactic. Sri Lanka, however, has not received nearly as much coverage in the news or official policy as the Middle East, especially in recent years. Although the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) were the main users of suicide bombings in the world until 2001 (in terms of both number of attacks and death toll), little to no attention has been paid to their terrorist campaign in the Western news media or official policy. They are never part of any "Global War on Terror" speech and barely make the news when a bombing or any LTTE-related incident

occurs. In fact, although the transnational organization has been listed as an FTO by the U.S. Department of State (in contradiction with the policies of other Western countries), it is not referred to as terrorist in U.S. news. The Tamil Tigers, including the Black Tigers of the suicide bombing squad, are typically described more neutrally or positively as "separatists," "fighters," "attackers," "rebels" or "truce violators."

As a top-ranking U.S. military officer stressed in his interview,

> Words have an amazing power. We called them terrorists while they call themselves freedom fighters. Israelis call suicide bombings mass murder or crimes against humanity, whereas Palestinians argue that 'martyrs don't commit murder.' We consider the Tamil Tigers 'rebels' because they are in Sri Lanka and our interests in the area are limited to nonexistent, but in Iraq we fight the 'War on Terror' against immoral suicide bombers who are hell bent on destroying freedom. Think about it… Who in the United States would pay attention to news reports about suicide bombings by Hindu nationalists in Sri Lanka? Most people equate terrorism with Islamic extremists from the Middle-East and, if it happens elsewhere like southeast Asia, it had to be perpetrated by Middle-Eastern fanatics. It's going to be hard to shake that out of people's heads if they are bombarded with the wrong information in the media.

Islamist terrorists do seem to have a monopoly on suicide bombings – at least in today's mainstream media and official policy. News coverage and governmental guidelines tend to have adopted a myopic vision of suicide terrorism that focuses predominantly – if not solely – upon radical Muslims or "fundamentalists." In particular, suicide bombings of the al-Aqsa Intifada and the Iraqi insurgency have dominated the general, contemporary understanding of the concept of suicide terrorism. Although these have been the most frequent and cumulatively damaging bombings since 2000, they certainly should not obscure the significant global patterns and worldwide dynamics of suicide terrorism.

As emphasized by one of the interviewees, a French anti-terrorism agent:

115

Of course, there is a problem with Islamic militants. Of course, there are growing issues throughout the Islamic world that ought not to be ignored. However, suicide terrorism is not about Islamic world domination. There are non-Muslim groups that have used this technique for years –and successfully so in some cases, as shown by the LTTE. People need to be very careful in their appraisal of what suicide terrorism entails. Once you have labeled a certain group of people 'evil' or 'crazy terrorists,' as is the case with Muslim extremists in Western politics and in our mass media, you end up stigmatizing an entire population and you exacerbate tensions between people who basically don't know anything about each other's religions or cultures. The media – whether in the US or Western Europe – always portray the 'evil Islamists' as the perpetrators of suicide bombings. First in Israel, now in Iraq. They never really focus on the source of the problem: why suicide bombings are considered by their perpetrators and supporters to be legitimate weapons in a war where using conventional tactics and strategies is simply impossible.

The Media as Publicity Agents

Television – both traditional networks and satellite television – is a primary tool for communication between terrorist groups, the media, governments, and the general public. "Suicide bombing is, after all, perfectly suited to the television age" (Brooks, 2002). Newspapers are also often used by terrorist groups to relay messages to the general public or other members of the organization. For example, in recent years, Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev has repeatedly used the mass media in order to arouse public awareness of the Chechen cause and the state-sponsored acts of violence committed by the Russian military against the Chechen population. In 2002, during the Moscow theater hostage crisis mentioned above, Basayev issued the following video-recorded statement through the news media:

> Every nation has the right to their fate. Russia has taken away this right from the Chechens and today we want to reclaim these rights, which God has given us, in the same way he has given it to other nations. God has given us the right of freedom and the right to choose our destiny. And the Russian occupiers have flooded our land with our children's blood. And we have longed for a just solution. People are unaware of the innocent

116

who are dying in Chechnya: the sheikhs, the women, the children and the weak ones. And therefore, we have chosen this approach. This approach is for the freedom of the Chechen people and there is no difference in where we die, and therefore we have decided to die here, in Moscow. And we will take with us the lives of hundreds of sinners. If we die, others will come and follow us—our brothers and sisters who are willing to sacrifice their lives, in God's way, to liberate their nation. Our nationalists have died but people have said that they, the nationalists, are terrorists and criminals. But the truth is Russia is the true criminal.

Using the media can be an excellent tool for propaganda and publicity in general. Osama Bin Laden has been consistently portrayed in Western news as a universal threat to the very fabric of our free society. In the spring of 2003, one of the interviewees in Turkey's Ministry of Interior declared:

Bin Laden is going to take over airwaves one way or another. Since the September 11 attacks, he has been omnipresent already, in news coverage, special media reports, and with video and audio tapes of his messages. That is not going to stop. The repercussions on September 11 are going to be felt for many years, even if another spectacular attack against American interests happens. The media will not let go of a story like that one. The government, President Bush will not either. He is going to play with the global fear of insecurity, inflate it, disseminate it with the help of the mass media, and probably get re-elected because of all that. The invasion of Iraq is a bonus. It shows the U.S. is actively doing something to fight terrorism. In reality, however, none of it is true. They are fighting the wrong people in the wrong region, but the public does not see that. They see action and initiative: that is enough for them.

Within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, "Palestinian and Arabic regional media outlets have followed the events of the Israeli-Palestinian clashes closely, and the degree of media coverage reflects the immense impact that the clashes have had on Palestinian and Arab society" (Human Rights Watch, 2002:36). Palestinian media outlets have been accused of actively encouraging support for suicide bombings. "Israeli and other critics have argued that the Palestinian media contribute to suicide attacks on civilians by placing an inappropriate, commendatory emphasis on martyrdom" (Ibid.).

117

Due to curfews and limitations on movement in the Occupied Territories, "the importance of media – and particularly television – as the primary source of public information has increased" (Ibid.). Farewell or last-will videos made by the bombers "provide compelling footage, as do the interviews with families. The bombings themselves produce graphic images of body parts and devastated buildings" (Brooks, 2002). In effect, "vast segments of Palestinian culture have been given over to the creation and nurturing of suicide bombers. Martyrdom has replaced Palestinian independence as the main focus of the Arab media" (Ibid.).

> Then there are the 'weddings' between the martyrs and dark-eyed virgins in paradise (announcements that read like wedding invitations are printed in local newspapers so that friends and neighbors can join in the festivities), the marches and celebrations after each attack, and the displays of things bought with the cash rewards to the families. Woven together, these images make gripping packages that can be aired again and again. (Ibid.)

Recruitment videos made by terrorist groups are also broadcast by certain networks. In early July 2005, the Al-Arabiya television network aired a segment "showing an Iranian suicide bomber recruiter drive" (Nahmias, 2005a). In the short piece, the Iranian Movement of Martyrdom Seekers declared it had "40,000 'time bombs' ready to attack [and] carry out suicide bombings in Israel and the United States" (Ibid.). Numerous Iranian youths can be seen training in a camp.

> 'This is our choice and we have no fear,' a masked woman told a reporter from Al-Arabiya. 'We adhere to the legacy of our late leader, Imam Khomeini.'
> 'There is no God but Allah!' shout a group of women, covered in hijabs, in unison.
> 'These young women have forsaken the temptations of life, and have chosen the hard way. Indeed, they have chosen martyrdom as a way of liberating Islamic lands,' says the Al-Arabiya reporter. '40,000 time

118

bombs in Iran – this is the number of volunteers so far, and the registration is still open.' (Ibid.)

On July 26, 2005, Iran publicly acknowledged it was running an official "suicide column" program with full-blown training camps within its borders and actively recruiting members of public to become suicide bombers across the country (Nahmias, 2005b). Officials of the Iranian government had denied for many years any involvement in suicide bomber recruiting or training activities. The President of Iran himself has since openly glorified suicide bombers. An article published in the London-based daily *Asharq Al Awsat* reported that senior Iranian leader Ayatollah Muhammad Taki Misbah Yazari, a spiritual counselor of President Muhammad Ahmadinejad, had used an Iranian newspaper to call on the Iranian public "to join the swelling ranks of Iran's homegrown suicide bombers" (Ibid.). The message read as follows:

> Suicide operations are the peak of the nation, and the height of its bravery . . . Commander Khamani has announced that registration for the suicide bomber force is open all over the country, and encourages Iranians to join in order to safeguard Islam and fight against its enemies. This holy organization of the Islamic Republic is aimed at those who are interested in suicide. The volunteer will join specialist courses. Brothers and sisters who believe and are interested in defending Islam are invited to get in touch via P.O. Box Number 1653-664, Teheran, and are asked to send two photos, a copy of their birth certificate. Please enlist in the suicide squad.

The suicide organization, Zaytoon, was created in early 2005 "for men and women who wished to carry out suicide bombings against the enemies of Islam and the Iranian revolution -- in particular, the Americans, British, and Israelis" as well as "Arab and Muslim countries . . . considered friends of the United States" (Ibid.). It is purportedly headed by Elias Nedran, who is the leader of the parliamentary conservative bloc and a former intelligence officer in Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps. Zaytoon has already

119

held several rallies, which have each been attended by hundreds of men and women usually between the ages of 14 and 30. During one of these meetings, Ayatollah Yazari, who is firmly opposed to Iranian reformers, "emphasized the need to volunteer rapidly and to attend specialist training courses which enable members to carry out suicide bombings in Iraq and other areas, including Israel" (Ibid.). What the many volunteers are usually told is that "the gates of heaven are open for you; there are beautiful, black-eyed virgins there who are waiting for you on the banks of golden rivers" (Ibid.).

More recently, Iran also made international news following the October 28, 2005 broadcast of an animated movie on how to become a suicide bomber. The ten-minute graphic cartoon was shown as an after-school special on Iran's IRIB 3TV channel (MEMRITV, 2005). It illustrates recent efforts by certain groups, including religious ones in Palestine and secular ones such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka, to actively recruit children to join the ranks of the suicide bombers. Like women, children present tactical and strategic advantages that are not lost to terrorists.

The Use of the Internet

The World Wide Web has been used for years by terrorist groups and anti-terrorist organizations alike. The former use its openness and instantaneous global reach to get their message to millions of people across the globe, to recruit, advertise, and otherwise communicate about their cause. The latter use the Internet in order to track the activities of known or supposed terrorists around the world, be it "propaganda," recruiting activities, fundraising, secret communications via e-mail or instant messenger ("increased chatter"), and so on.

The Internet is also a fertile ground for political satire and is commonly used to disseminate political caricatures and various forms of cartoons, images, and skits. For instance, a Website called strangemilitary.com features a parody of a self-help book entitled "Jihad for Dummies: The Fundamentals of Fundamentalism," the cover of which reads: "Thinking about SUICIDE BOMBING? Get it right the FIRST time!" or "Learn how to declare your very own fatwa!" German carmaker Volkswagen recently used the Internet to advertise for its new Polo, using the usual slogan "Small but tough" along with a less usual mainstream television ad protagonist: a suicide bomber who detonates his bomb belt inside the Polo without anyone noticing his actions outside the car. Thus suicide bombers have entered the collective mind and are taking root as popular icons even in Western culture.

More seriously, Bin Laden's al-Qaeda network has become a global jihadist movement that has perfected the use of multimedia technology over the past few years. Some argue that it is now essentially Web-directed and primarily steered by ideology and the Internet. The spread of jihadist rhetoric and Wahhabist ideology has been significantly facilitated by the World Wide Web. Al-Qaeda's "online jihad" has in essence provided a "virtual university of global jihad" (Pavlova, 2004). In recent years, al-Qaeda has used the Internet for financing and publicity purposes, to organize recruitment, to network and mobilize further support, and to collect and share information somewhat effortlessly. Al-Qaeda's many Websites, which appear and disappear in a matter of seconds, as well as various related promotional Internet sites have been used notably to post audio messages by Osama bin Laden and other leaders, so as to ensure their worldwide dissemination without editing. In August 2004, al-Qaeda even created a

121

special Website for women, calling upon them "to persuade their men to take up the jihad. The pretty pink web site, which included beauty tips, did not call on women to become bombers" (Bloom, 2005c) and yet, within a year, female Al-Qaeda fighters began resorting to suicide bombings.

The distinctive dynamics of the Internet account for its widely popular use amongst jihadists today and fit within more general media globalization trends:

> The same forces that gave rise to the Al-Jazeera and the Al-Arabiya TV networks are at play with jihadist web sites worldwide. In contrast to the pre-September 11 pro-Bin Laden Internet pages – the majority of which were hosted and maintained from within Europe and the United States – the recent trend is that such web sites are more 'localized.' They are hosted in countries as far apart as Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, Bosnia, and Great Britain, and cater to domestic audiences on their respective languages. The second fact to be observed is the astounding technological advancement and professionalism of their authors and creators. Graphical design is put o maximum effect, and often pictures and videos – taken from their original web sites of appearance – are refurbished into new formats and styles to evoke utmost possible emotional response. (Pavlova, 2004)

Film Portrayals of Suicide Bombers

The Terrorist (1999) is an Indian film directed and written by Santosh Sivan. Shot entirely in Tamil but not explicitly set in Sri Lanka, it follows Malli, a hardcore 19-year-old female terrorist who suddenly has reservations about her suicide assassination mission and doubts the legitimacy of the ultimate sacrifice she has been asked to make. Beyond an aesthetic achievement, this film is a powerful portrayal of Malli's personal struggle, from joining the terrorist group as a child following the death of her young brother to her late teenage years. The story is neither apologetic nor politically charged nor explicitly violent. Yet, the U.S. promotional campaign for the film, which was based freely on the May 1991 assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the

www.manaraa.com

LTTE's Thenmuli "Dhanu" Rajaratnam, describes the heroine as "a natural born killer" whose "death will not be ordinary."

The War Within (2005) is an American film directed by Joseph Castelo, who co-wrote it with Tom Glynn and Ayad Akhtar. Akhtar also plays the main character, a Pakistani man who has a conscience crisis as he is about to carry out a suicide bombing in New York City. Another recent feature film on suicide bombings, *Paradise Now* (2005), tells the story of Said and Khaled, two Palestinian childhood friends who are recruited to carry out a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. The controversial film, which follows the last two days of the young men and delves into the psyche of suicide bombers, was directed by Palestinian and Israeli-born director Hany Abu-Assad, who co-wrote the screenplay with Bero Beyer and Pierre Hodgson. So far, the Arabic-language film has received nominations for several prizes and won 9 major awards, including the Amnesty International Film Prize at the 2005 Berlin International Film Festival and the 2006 Golden Globe for Best Foreign Language Film. Interestingly, the latter was awarded under the category "Palestine" even though the film was officially produced by France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Israel. Many have argued that *Paradise Now* – much like the two movies mentioned above – humanizes suicide bombers and is nothing more than a propaganda tool. On the other hand, film critic Roger Ebert (2005) argues:

> On his video, Said articulates the Palestinian position, expressing anger that the Israelis have stolen the status of victims he believes belongs by right to his own people. Does this speech make the film propaganda, or does it function simply as a record of what such a man would say on such an occasion? I'm not sure it matters. If we are interested in a film that takes us into the lives of suicide bombers, we must be prepared to regard what we find there. Certainly what Said says will not come as a surprise to any Israeli. It's simply that they disagree.

123

We may disagree, too, and yet watch the film with a fearsome fascination. The director and co-writer, Hany Abu-Assad, uses the interesting device of undercutting the heroism of his martyrs with everyday details. During one taping of a farewell message, the camera malfunctions. During another, one of the bombers interrupts his political sermon with a personal shopping reminder for his mother. . . .

It hardly matters, in a way, which side Abu-Assad's protagonists are on; the film is dangerous because of its objectivity, its dispassionate attention to the actual practical process by which volunteers are trained and prepared for the act of destruction.

These three independent films have in common the fact that they put a face on the suicide bombers and show us their human features and humane qualities. They also illustrate the utter lack of suicidality (suicide attempts or ideation) of the bombers. Each one focuses on the uncertainties and doubts of suicide bombers, thus indeed humanizing them. However, though they avoid demonizing the terrorists, they do not glorify the martyrs either. If anything, "that creates not sympathy, but pity; what a waste, to spend your life and all your future on behalf of those who send you but do not go themselves" (Ibid.).

An even more recent film hailing from the United States is Stephen Gaghan's *Syriana* (2005), a "politically-charged epic about the state of the oil industry" based on a Robert Baer book (IMDb, 2005). The reason why this movie stands out is that it is the first to fully integrate the suicide bomber at the core of the narrative. This introduction of suicide terrorism as a major plotline in a big-budget Hollywood production marks a milestone in the global entertainment enterprise. The film has received much praise already, but its shortcomings have also drawn criticism. Ventura (2005) argues that "*Syriana* offers American audiences a peek into the insidious work of fundamentalism on

124

the idle minds. . . . While contextualizing the roots of discontent is a worthy goal, the movie does so at the expense of shedding light on true fanaticism."

Moral Panics and the Politicization of Suicide Terrorism

Suicide terrorism has been described as "the crack cocaine of warfare" (Brooks, 2002), a metaphor reminiscent of the pungent rhetoric used in the "War on Drugs."

> It doesn't just inflict death and terror on its victims; it intoxicates the people who sponsor it. It unleashes the deepest and most addictive human passions – the thirst for vengeance, the desire for religious purity, the longing for earthly glory and eternal salvation. Suicide bombing isn't just a tactic in a larger war; it overwhelms the political goals it is meant to serve. It creates its own logic and transforms the culture of those who employ it. (2002:18)

The occurrence of suicide terrorism, the signification of suicide bombings as a particularly violent and pervasive threat, the wider social implications that have galvanized public attention, and the measures of social control that have been adopted to seek resolution of the crisis and greater societal malaise – all of these correspond to stages of moral panics propagated by the media and resulting in sweeping policy reforms to make the public feel empowered, safe, and satisfied. Major findings concerning the interpretation of, overreaction to, and politicization of suicide terrorism are described below.

Suicide Bombers as Contemporary Folk Devils

Suicide bombers are usually depicted in the media and public policy as irrational individuals, crazed fanatics, immoral cowards, socially inadequate, economically deprived, religious zealots, and suicidal young men who have been brainwashed by evil Islamists to carry out suicide missions. The complex reality of suicide bombers and their motivations is mostly ignored. These issues are further discussed below. One of the

125

Turkish scholars interviewed in mid-2004 for the G-CDMHA project described the issue in these terms:

> Suicide bombings are publicized in a very specific way in Western media. The reports almost always provide the same image of the deranged terrorist, the fanatic, the lunatic who had nothing to lose and everything to win – namely, money for his family, eternal life and virgins for himself. This is wrong. Completely wrong. It is a simplistic portrayal that perpetuates stereotypes and misconceptions about suicide bombings. However, it is acceptable from a political standpoint because it fits the ongoing agenda of the self-proclaimed number one country in the world. How are you going to fuel fears about terrorism and further justify a 'global war on terror' if you start broadcasting reports that try to really decipher what lies behind the act. Most people would think that decomposing motivation and analyzing the persona of the bomber could somehow justify the act in the eyes of some people. God forbid we humanize those evil people! They must be portrayed as mad, pitiless, heartless, cold-blooded killers with nothing to live for. They *are* the contemporary demons, the 'evil' empire that must be fought by the joined forces of the 'good' coalition. That is what it boils down to, in U.S. politics, in the media, in the public's mind: a war between Good and Evil. That is quite clever, you must admit, although not very original. First, it sells news and that means ratings and money for media corporations, especially the ones that side with Bush. Second, it justifies going after a group or its sponsors as swiftly and as hard as possible. People want retaliation, people want justice done. That is not going to happen if you paint a meek picture of terrorists. You have to exploit their actions, beat them at their own game, fire up everyone to 'go and get them.' You have to exaggerate the threat to make sure people get scared about the 'scourge' of terrorism, the 'epidemic' of suicide bombings. Once they feel really unsafe because of your radical talk, you can have them blindly agree to or condone any kind of measure, even the most extreme ones like the use of the atomic bomb in 1945, the war in Iraq today, nuclear war in the future – who knows?

Typical profile of a suicide bomber. On December 12, 1983, the French and U.S. Embassies in Kuwait City were partially destroyed by suicide truck bombs that killed 6 and injured dozens of people. Then a suicide bomber used a truck bomb and killed 15 people at a French Army building in Beirut on December 21, 1983. On December 26, 1983, *Newsweek* published the following ill-fated commentary:

126

Experts in Israel, which has been subject to suicide terrorism for more than a decade, believe the threat is not likely to spread beyond the Middle East. The Israelis have drawn a psychological profile of the suicide terrorist based on an analysis of more than a dozen who survived their high-risk attacks on Israel, as well as a study of World War II Japanese kamikaze strikes. Several characteristics stand out. Guerrillas who undertake certain-death missions tend to have a cultural predisposition to view suicide as an honorable way of entering the afterlife, and more importantly, a psychopathological desire to die. Those elements must be set into play by indoctrination from a highly respected authority figure. Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary Iran would seem to be a perfect breeding ground for such terrorists. According to Israeli findings, the more time that elapses between the terrorist's last exhortation and his arrival at the target, the less likely he is to act. Even a determined terrorist can drop his plans under the impact of such simple culture shock as landing at a faraway airport. One Israeli specialist predicts that 'there will be more suicide strikes against the Americans and French in the Middle East, but not many. There is still less danger that there will be attacks overseas.' (Gelman, 1983)

Since then, suicide terrorism has spread overseas in a spectacular fashion, from Israel to Indonesia, Kenya to Turkey, Tanzania to England and Morocco – and even the United States. The desire has been strong to categorize suicide terrorists into certain deviant types, not necessarily to help understand their motivations and actions but to at least make their castigation easier. Typologies of suicide bombers have been developed primarily to describe Palestinian suicide bombers acting against Israel. One such typology was recently developed for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Kimhi & Even, 2003) and rather inopportunely extended to non-Palestinian suicide bombers by (amongst others) the U.S. military (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2005). The classification distinguishes between four prototypes: the religious fanatic, the nationalist fanatic, the avenger or revenge seeker, and the exploited. To each type correspond certain prerequisites, supporting factors, and hypothetical dominant

personality traits (Table 8). These four profiles are adequate summaries of the ways that

suicide bombers are systematically portrayed in the media and public policy.

Table 8
Kimhi & Even's Classification of Suicide Bomber Prototypes and their Correlates

Prototype	Prerequisites	Supporting Factors	Hypothetical Personality Traits
Religious Fanatic	- Religious indoctrination encouraging and urging suicide attacks - Charismatic religious leaders with great influence on candidates for suicide operations	- Sympathetic public atmosphere within the religious community that praises martyrs, which includes publicity, great honor, and commemoration	Faithful, steadfast, goal-focused, belief in divinely determined fate, influenced by people whom s/he reveres, belief in the world to come
Nationalist Fanatic	- Well-developed political consciousness, along with a sense of an uncompromising struggle to liberate the homeland - A clear feeling that the armed struggle and suicide attacks are an effective and necessary weapon in achieving political goals	- Participation of the organization to which the individual belongs in the suicide attack - Sympathetic public atmosphere that praises the sacrifice - Media that ensures wide coverage both in local community and internationally	Steadfast, sure in his/her ways, willing to sacrifice him/herself for the general public (idealist)
Avenger	Psychological injury based on one or more of the following events: - Death or serious injury of a family member or another close individual - Trauma related to foreign occupation of homeland (personal humiliation, or witnessing the humiliation of a relative) - Personal or family problems resulting in an individual's feeling that his or her life is worthless (culminating in or including depression)	- Sympathetic public atmosphere that praises the martyrs, which includes publicity of names, great honor, and commemoration - Financial support for the family of the deceased suicide terrorist	Hopeless, vengeful, tendency to see their life as worthless
Exploited	Suicide terrorists who are unable to withstand the organization's pressures to "volunteer" for a suicide operation, such as: - Children and youth - Adults in social distress (collaborators, homosexuals, moral offenders) - People with weak personalities	- Sympathetic public atmosphere that praises the martyrs - Suicide terrorists' belief that all their sins will become "white as snow" and that they will be granted full atonement for their past	Dependent, anxious, difficulty withstanding pressure, recognition seeking

128

On the evening of October 1, 2005, a University of Oklahoma (OU) engineering student strapped explosives to himself and detonated them 500 feet away from the campus stadium in Norman, Oklahoma, which was filled with 84,000 college football supporters. The bomb blast shook the stadium and was heard five miles away. The bomber, Joel Henry Hinrichs III, was a 21-year-old white male who did not fit the typical profile of the average suicide bomber. The case, officially described by the Norman police as a suicide bombing, was reportedly investigated by Homeland Security, but then quickly dropped from newscasts. As it turns out, the young man, originally from Colorado, had tried to purchase ammonium nitrate, the same kind of fertilizer used in April 1995 by Timothy McVeigh to destroy a federal building in Oklahoma City. Hinrichs, who had a Pakistani roommate, had apparently converted to Islam and attended the same Norman mosque as Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called "20th hijacker" of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Speculations about the motivation of the young man and his possible ties to an Islamist network at OU and in the greater Norman area were widespread in the local media following the bombing. Muslim students and citizens were targeted by law enforcement (including the FBI) and others in the community. The situation and related rumors worsened after local police and federal agents handcuffed and held at gunpoint an Egyptian OU instructor and several other foreign individuals. To this day, the case has not been clearly elucidated. However, Hinrichs has been consistently described by the media and local authorities as a "loner" who was "deeply depressed." His suicide has now been classified as an "individual act of despair."

The Hinrichs case, as many others, is representative of the discrepancy between the reality of suicide bombings and the interpretation of suicide terrorism by the media

129

and agents of social control. Media reports and political agendas are focused on a virulent Middle Eastern brand of suicide terrorism that entails religious extremism and irrational, delusional, brainwashed bombers with nothing to live for. The public has been sensitized to perceive suicide bombers as "unbalanced sociopaths" and "uneducated religious fanatics" (Bloom, 2005c). The media and political actors neglect the fact that suicide bombings have no necessary connection to Islam and that bombers are by and large "upper-middle class, well-educated, successful, socially connected people who know exactly what they are doing" and who "give their lives to kill people as part of a strategic campaign aimed at the people of the West, to turn us against our governments, and to force them to end the occupations and protections" (Horton, 2005).

The use of women in suicide bombing missions. The Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP), a pro-Syrian, Lebanese secular terrorist group, was the first group to use a female suicide bomber, seventeen-year-old Sana'a Mehaydali, against an Israeli convoy in Lebanon in 1985. The SSNP soon became responsible for a total twelve suicide attacks – five of which were carried out by women. Female bombers increasingly appeared in others parts of the globe after the mid-1980s, including in Sri Lanka (most notably with the 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by a teenaged female Tamil Tiger), Turkey, Israel and the occupied territories, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Chechnya, and now Iraq. 34 percent of the suicide bombings carried out since 1985 have been perpetrated by women (Gunaratna, 2000; Bloom, 2005c). "Most have belonged to secular separatist organizations, such as the LTTE and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)" (Bloom, 2005b). In fact, only secular groups such as the SSNP, the LTTE or the PKK initially recruited and used female bombers for suicide missions. In recent years, however, "the

www.manaraa.com

worrisome emergence of women suicide bombers in religious organizations" has been observed (Bloom, 2005b).

The role of Palestinian women in suicide terror campaigns has now been strongly established, especially within the context of the al-Aqsa Intifada where they became known as the "Army of Roses" (Dickey, 2005; Victor, 2003). The first Palestinian female suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, struck in Jerusalem in January 2002. More than 20 cases involving women have thus far been documented (they constitute about 5 percent of all attacks). As explained by Israeli security forces:

> The terrorist organizations behind the attacks want to exploit the advantages of dispatching females to perpetrate them, primarily within the Green Line. This is under the assumption that a female is thought of as soft, gentle, and innocent and therefore will arouse less suspicion than a man. In the cases in which females were involved, the terrorists were aware of their need for camouflage that would help them blend in on the Israeli street. The female terrorists attempted to Westernize their appearance, among other things wearing clothing that was not conservative, such as short skirts, or maternity clothes, and having modern haircuts. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003b)

These women typically "do not fit the accepted image of the 'average Palestinian woman'" (Ibid.) or, for that matter, that of the average suicide bomber. They come from a variety of economic and social backgrounds, they are often well-educated, and some are mothers with children. The motivational patterns of these women typically fit the "avenger" type described above, though most media reports focus on women being exploited, coerced, and otherwise blackmailed to "volunteer" for suicide missions. Teenage girls especially have been the focus on much media and official scrutiny, since they have been used increasingly as recruiters or facilitators and appear to be even more

131

personally, emotionally, and socially vulnerable than adult women (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003a).

The majority of Chechen suicide bombers are women. 68 percent of attacks involve women and 50 percent of all attacks are carried out exclusively by female bombers. They have been dubbed the "Black Widows" and have effectively altered the face of female suicide terrorism over the past five years (Bloom, 2005c; Dickey, 2005; Reuter, 2004). Their prevalence has been explained by a combination of factors: the tactical advantage of their low suspiciousness level, the publicity- and attention-driven strategic element derived from the "greater psychological impact on the target audience," and "the main undercurrent of the broader suicide terrorism phenomenon in Chechnya" linked to "desperation and hopelessness" and "feelings of helpless anger" or anxiety that are "easily exploited by recruiters" (Reuter, 2004). Since they target mainly Russian objectives, their suicide bombings have not received much coverage in the Western news media. Nonetheless, the Black Widows of Chechnya have become an "example among heroines of jihad" and "an important factor in the spread of suicidal terror" (Dickey, 2005).

> The tales of these Chechen women are as much about tawdry victimization as battlefield heroics. They come from a rugged society where an old tradition, made worse after years of gunslinging war and anarchy, allows men to kidnap the bride of their choice. The kidnappers can settle disputes with the woman's family in cash, or with violence. . . . [O]nce she's been taken, she's unlikely to find another husband. 'No intelligent, nice young man in Chechnya would marry a nonvirgin girl.'. . .
> Some Chechen women who have lost husbands or sons in the war want to live only long enough to take revenge. The first attack by a 'black widow,' in the summer of 2000, killed 27 members of the Russian Special Forces. Then the spectral, silent presence of 18 'widows' during the deadly hostage siege of a Moscow theater in 2002 heightened their mystique. Over a four-month period in 2003, Chechen women carried out

132

six out of seven suicide attacks on Russian targets, killing 165 people. Women bombers allegedly brought down two Russian airliners last year, killing all 90 passengers and crew. (Ibid.)

These two brands of suicide bombings – the Palestinian version and the Chechen type – illustrate a significant characteristic of the peculiar rationale for the involvement of Muslim women in suicide attacks. "The underlying message conveyed by female bombers is: Terrorism has moved beyond a fringe phenomenon and insurgents are all around you" (Dickey, 2005). Moreover, as explained by Bloom (2005c):

> What is so compelling about why women become suicide bombers is that so many claimed to have been raped or sexually abused by enemy forces, according to interviews with those who knew them. Once dishonored, they are no longer marriageable. Joining a terrorist group is one of the few remaining options for women who, according to the strict honor code followed in some Islamic societies, must otherwise be executed by their own families. With their deaths they reinvent themselves as martyrs, redeeming the family name and recouping lost honor.

In early November 2005, a young white woman and Islam convert from Belgium made international news when she blew herself up in Baghdad. Described both as a "girl next door" and "an Islamic extremist," Muriel Degauque "achieved a grim milestone by becoming the first female European convert to commit a suicide bombing in Iraq" (Rotella, 2005). According to one article in the *Los Angeles Times* (Ibid.),

> The 36-year-old woman died Nov. 9 in the car bombing of a U.S. military convoy after traveling with her Moroccan-born husband to Iraq to join other foreign fighters in a network led by militant kingpin Abu Musab Zarqawi. . . .
>   Investigators said the incident illustrated the growing role of converts and women in Europe's increasingly fierce and violent Islamic networks. It also apparently is the first suicide bombing anywhere by a female Islamic convert of European descent.

The added significance of the Degauque incident is that it prompted *Newsweek* to publish a well-timed special report entitled "Women of Al Qaeda" on December 12, 2005

133

(Dickey, 2005) - the first notable attempt by a mainstream news media outlet at a thorough analysis of the participation of women in suicide bombings. The report opens with the following statement:

> Jihad used to have a gender: male. The men who dominated the movement exploited traditional attitudes about sex and the sexes to build their ranks. They still do that, but with a difference: even Al Qaeda is using female killers now, and goading the men. (Ibid.)

The report reviews the evolution of female suicide bombings over the past two decades, from its SSNP origins to its perfection by the LTTE's Black Tigers and including the Palestinian Army of Roses and the Chechen Black Widow bombings. It offers insight into the motivations of female bombers in the global Islamist terrorist network, notably with regard to women and the promise of an afterlife.

> Reem Riashi, a mother of two, recorded a videotape before her mission, saying she hoped her 'organs would be scattered in the air' and her soul 'would reach paradise.' Would there be 72 houris to greet her there? No. The religious scholars who endorse suicide attacks have described an alternative paradise for women. Thauria Hamur, a 26-year-old captured by the Israelis before she could set off a bomb in May 2002, told NEWSWEEK in a prison interview that women martyrs would 'become the purest and most beautiful form of angel at the highest level possible in heaven.' (Ibid.)

Meanwhile, although such investigative efforts as *Newsweek*'s recent report are needed and welcome pieces of information, the recruitment, training and use of female bombers by secular groups remains understudied by the media and neglected by policymakers. The priorities in the current global "War on Terror" have been squarely set within an agenda focused solely upon Islamist terrorism and, more specifically, Middle-Eastern-

134

based or al-Qaeda-related terrorist initiatives. Within such a limited framework, the perpetration of suicide bombings by secular groups.

Symbols and Demonization: The Post-September 11 Rhetoric

"This is not an isolated criminal act we are dealing with, it is an extreme and evil ideology whose roots lie in a perverted and poisonous misinterpretation of the religion of Islam." British Prime Minister Tony Blair uttered that statement following the July 11, 2005 London bombings. His choice of words echoed speeches made after the September 2001 attacks in the United States. The dominant discourses, frames, and representations that have informed the media and public debate over suicide terrorism are now presented with a focus on the post-September 11 framework.

The clash of civilizations model. On the afternoon of September 11, 2001, Israeli leader Ariel Sharon appeared on television to convey his regret, condolences, and assurance of Israel's support in the war on terror. Sharon called for a coalition against terrorist networks, setting the civilized world against the barbaric world of the terrorists and pitting "the free world" against "the forces of darkness" that are trying to destroy "freedom" and "our way of life." Sharon declared "This is a war between good and evil and between humanity and the bloodthirsty" and added that the attacks were "a turning point in the war against international terror." British Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a statement that described the attacks as "perpetrated by fanatics who are utterly indifferent to the sanctity of human life" and continued to assert that "we, the democracies of this world, are going to have to come together to fight it and eradicate this evil completely from our world." In German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's opinion, the attacks "were not only attacks on the people in the United States, our friends in America, but also

135

against the entire civilized world, against our own freedom, against our own values, values which we share with the American people." Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien called the attacks "a cowardly act of unspeakable violence . . . It is impossible to fully comprehend the evil that would have conjured up such a cowardly and depraved assault." Even President General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, one of three countries then recognizing the Taliban government, criticized the attacks and asked for international cooperation to fight the "modern-day evil" of terrorism. Pope John Paul II qualified the attacks as an "unspeakable horror" and, during his weekly general audience in St. Peter's Square, the pontiff told Americans that "those who believe in God know that evil and death do not have the final say" (International, 2001).

On the evening of September 11, 2001, President Bush made a televised and radio-broadcast address to the nation. His opening statement was: "Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts." President Bush then declared: "Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror." He went on to make the following statements:

> America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining. Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. . . . The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources for our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them. . . . America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world and we stand together to win the war against terrorism. Tonight I ask for your prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I pray they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us spoken through the ages in Psalm 23: 'Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me.' This is a day when all

136

Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day, yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world. (Text, 2001)

Bushspeak. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the rhetoric of the Bush administration followed a pattern for which a precedent had been set throughout the day by world leaders. Indeed, as illustrated by the abovementioned speech excerpt, President Bush condemned the "evil" of terrorism and the evil terrorists, whom he referred to as "a faceless coward" soon after the attacks (Bush, 2001). The word "evil" itself was used four times in the very first official speech made on the eve of the attacks. Moreover, President Bush repeatedly portrayed the conflict as a "war between good and evil" in which the United States was going to "eradicate evil from the world" and to "hunt down" and "smoke out evildoers," those "barbaric people." The President's vernacular style soon became referred to as "Bushspeak" and illustrated how he "rarely puts ten words together in a major address without taking a position, passing a judgment, or proclaiming a purpose" (Gourevitch, 2004).

The Bush administration also used various cowboy metaphors (calling for Osama bin Laden "dead or alive" for example), as well as several figures of speech with heavy religious overtones. The most documented one is President Bush's initial description of the anti-terrorism campaign as a "crusade." Although it was in line with his "good vs. evil" interpretation of the situation, he was advised that the term carried a highly offensive historical connotation in connection with earlier wars between Christians and Muslims. At the outset of the campaign, the Pentagon named the war against terror "Operation Infinite Justice." They, too, were advised that only God could dispense such

137

"infinite justice" and that Americans and others could be troubled by a war expanding to infinity. In outlining the goals of the war, not once did President Bush mention democracy. The new name for the war on terrorism became "Operation Enduring Freedom." From that point on, the Bush administration mantra frequently reaffirmed that the global war against terrorism was being fought "for freedom."

The "terrorist" label. An important issue related to the role of the media and their coverage of suicide bombing events relates to the labeling of certain groups as "terrorist" whereas others are continuously referred to in more positive or simply neutral terms – even if they are listed as FTOs in the United States for instance. This has been a point of contention amongst political and media analysts, as well as military experts, for many years. Terrorism, as explained earlier, has yet to be clearly and uniformly defined and remains, as a result, a very subjective concept influenced by socio-political conditions, cultural circumstances, and political agendas. After the September 2001 attacks, President Bush declared open season on terrorists, "freedom haters," and various "evildoers" who instantly became the prime targets of his "War on Terror." Incidentally, President Bush, his administration, and the mass media have failed to include most terrorist groups, as defined by the U.S. Department of State itself, in this global war on terrorism. Any reference to the "War on Terror" usually implicitly refers to "sub-state movements like al-Qaeda whose activities [are] directed against the West, often with the support of radical Middle Eastern governments and intelligence services" (Jenkins, 2003:20). That has prompted many to criticize the new Bush Terror Doctrine as a prejudiced and potentially harmful campaign against an inflated threat that should not have superseded other pressing national or foreign policy issues – including blatant and

138

documented terrorism problems elsewhere in the world. Moreover, some were quick to argue that the United States was "as truly a rogue state as Libya or Iraq" and that, as far as causing harm was concerned, terrorist groups did "not approach the scale of savagery of states, including the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. thus had no moral authority to denounce anyone else as a terrorist" (Ibid.).

The Council on Foreign Relations (2004) argues that "being saddled with the pejorative label 'terrorist' focuses attention on a group's methods, not its message, and can delegitimize its cause in the public eye." Some fighters may welcome the expression, on the other hand, as Jenkins (2003) notes about an Algerian member of al-Qaeda:

> My ideological commitment is total and the reward of glory for this
> relentless battle is to be called a terrorist. I accept the name of terrorist if it
> is used to mean that I terrorize a one-sided system of iniquitous power and
> a perversity that comes in many forms. (2003:17)

As far as suicide bombings are concerned, several alternate expressions have been used to describe essentially similar actions while subjectively framing them in a different way. Western (English-language) media and governmental documents choose the terms "suicide attacks," "suicide terror attacks," or "suicidal bombings" to refer to events involving "suicide terrorism." On the other hand, the same incidents are described in Middle Eastern (Arabic) media and official policies as "martyrdom operations" perpetrated by "liberation fighters" or "resistance movements." For instance,

> [i]n Palestinian Arabic, the phrase for a bombing attack in which the
> perpetrator is killed is an *amaliyya istishhadiyya*, a 'martyrdom operation,'
> or an *amaliyya fida'iyya*, a 'sacrificaial operation.' In the Israeli Arabic-
> language media, the preferred term is an *amaliyya intihariyya*, a 'suicide
> operation.' (Human Rights Watch, 2002:36).

139

This lends a special meaning to the popular saying "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." This qualification is evidently more positive and lays emphasis on the glorified notion of self-sacrifice of the bomber, who is called a *shahid* (martyr) or *shahida* for a woman (*shuhada* in the plural). One of the goals of such a positive construal of the act is to provide an incentive for future recruits or bombers currently in training. Another major justification for the use of the martyrdom concept is that it clearly defines the operation as a testament of one's faith in Allah. As explained in Chapter Two, the legitimacy of suicide bombings has been highly debated among Islamic scholars: while some view it as a purely suicidal act that is in contradiction with the Qur'anic prescription against suicide, others perceive it as a selfless act of someone willing to die while fighting the Cause of God (*jihad fi sabilillah*) through a just *jihad* (struggle) by the sword (*jihad bis saif)*. The latter interpretation justifies the rationalization of suicide bombings as martyrdom operations, as adopted by Hamas, the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, and other Palestinian factions known for perpetrating suicide bombings. Secular groups involved in suicide bombings, such as the LTTE and the PKK (today's KONGRA-GEL or KGK), also refer to their suicide bombing operatives as martyrs and the suicide missions are also described as martyrdom operations in order to give special emphasis to the fact that the bomber gave his or her life in defense of the noble and greater cause fought by the group.

Likewise, there is a strong tendency to describe suicide bombers as "terrorists," "Islamic fundamentalists," "crazed fanatics," and "evildoers" or "evil cowards" who either strike in the Middle East, typically in Israel, or perpetrate attacks in the name of al-Qaeda. Iraqi insurgents, also known alternatively as "freedom haters" and "enemies of

140

freedom," are also graced with the same labels, though the Bush administration and the mainstream media have significantly reduced their unfortunate amalgam of war and terrorism in public discourse over the past few months. Other suicide bombers (e.g., Tamil Tigers, Chechens) are described as "rebels," "insurgents," "radicals," "separatists," "revolutionaries," and so on. Such terms, though mostly accurate in principle, draw attention away from the – technically-speaking – terrorist activities perpetrated by the suicide bombers and backed by whichever groups they belong to. Such subdued phraseology also serves the essential purpose of not calling the attention of the general public to political struggles outside the realm of the paradoxically Middle-East-based "Global War on Terror."

A terminology twist worthy of attention can be found in French-speaking news (e.g., in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Québec). Following a trend that started in France, suicide bombers are described as "terrorists" and sometimes as "human bombs." More importantly, they are referred to as "kamikazes," which evidence a patent misunderstanding of the historical background and intrinsic features of suicide bombings. As explained in Chapter Two, "kamikaze" is a Japanese term that means "divine wind" and was used to characterize World War II Japanese pilots who were recruited for suicide missions against key military targets. They were used for the first time in the November 1944 Battle of the Philippines. Convinced that conventional warfare could not guarantee success, most volunteered for the suicide missions, which were called *tokkotai* ("special attacks"). In the April 1945 Battle of Okinawa, more than 2,000 kamikazes crashed fully fueled fighter planes into over 300 ships, killing 5,000 Americans, which prompted the U.S. government to approve the use of the atomic bomb to bring the war to an end. Taken

141

out of its inherently Far-Eastern context, the term "kamikaze" has obviously little to no meaning when applied to Middle-Eastern, Chechen or Sri Lankan suicide bombers who strap explosives around their waist or drive explosive-laden trucks into buildings. To some extent, the comparison could undergo a test of congruence when the label is applied to the September 11 hijackers, but their actions were not sponsored by a state or a formal government and therefore do not justify such a figure of speech.

Another noteworthy politicized issue that emerged in recent years is that of homicide bombers. In an April 12, 2002 press briefing, former White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer expressly referred to a suicide bombing that had occurred in Jerusalem that morning as a "homicide bombing":

> From there, the President had his intelligence briefings with the CIA and then the FBI. He convened a meeting of the National Security Council. At which point, in the middle of the meeting, the President was informed about this morning's *homicide bombing* in Jerusalem. (Fleischer, 2002; emphasis added)

He then went on to declare:

> The President condemns this morning's *homicide bombing* in Jerusalem. There are clearly people in the region who want to disrupt Secretary Powell's peace mission. And the President will not be deterred from seeking peace. There are people who don't want peace. The President wants peace, and that's why he condemns in the strongest terms possible this morning's *homicide attack*. (Ibid.)

Following Mr. Fleischer's remarks, a journalist aptly asked for clarification. Mr. Fleischer thus explained the White House's new terminology of choice as part of an effort to underscore the negative overtones while putting less emphasis on the notion of self-sacrifice inherent in the tactic of suicide bombing:

> Journalist - Q At the same time that conservative Republicans are sharply criticizing this President for his Mideast policy, which they describe as

142

being too tough on Israel, you, the President, others in this White House have adopted a term called homicide bombings instead of suicide bombings. Is that a coincidence, or is this an attempt to pacify his political base that's criticizing him?

Mr. Fleischer - David, I don't think pacification comes from lexicon. I think people support the President --

Journalist - Then why change the term, why adopt this --

Mr. Fleischer - I think people support the President because of the principles that he has so strongly stood for in the war against terrorism and in his actions here in the Middle East. But the reason I started to use that term is because it's a more accurate description. These are not suicide bombings. These are not people who just kill themselves. These are people who deliberately go to murder others, with no regard to the values of their own life. These are murderers. The President has said that in the Rose Garden. And I think that is just a more accurate description of what these people are doing. It's not suicide, it's murder. (Ibid.)

According to the *St. Pete Times* of April 13, 2002 (New, 2002):

Fox News Channel began using 'homicide bombing' to refer to Friday's Jerusalem attack almost as soon as the news broke. Dennis Murray, executive producer of daytime programming, said executives there had heard the phrase being used by administration officials in recent days and thought it was a good idea.
    CNN and MSNBC used 'suicide bomber' to refer to Friday's attack. ABC News also plans to stick with 'suicide bomber.' 'We believe that is a more descriptive term,' CNN spokeswoman Christa Robinson said. 'A homicide bomber could refer to someone planting a bomb in a trash can.'

CNN mentioned the briefing and the adoption of the new label, along with a report that U.S. officials had confirmed that very same day that Israel had "shared with the administration new documents Israel says show high-level Palestinian Authority involvement in financing and supporting terror strikes on Israel" (King, 2002). However, official attempts to make the phrase "homicide bombing" popular in the news and the mind of the general public failed. Most major news companies dropped the phrase within

143

weeks of Ari Fleischer's briefing. Only News Corp outlets, such as FoxNews and the *New York Post*, have consistently used the phrase since.

<p style="text-align:center">*Summary of Findings*</p>

As highlighted by these results, the social construction of suicide terrorism involves several key players: the suicide bombers and their supporters (i.e., the folk devils), the media, the public, and agents of social control (politicians, law makers, law enforcement, and action groups). Various socio-political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures interact to shape suicide terrorism as a social problem, a threat to society and civilization as a whole, and a pressing issue that can only be solved with immediate, drastic measures. Suicide terrorism is used as a political weapon to promote ideological agendas on both sides of the terrorism equation. It is also exploited as a communication tool and politicized in order to feed into moral panics and the politics of fear. Representations and interpretations of suicide bombings are very much one-dimensional and present the issue as a monolithic way. Simplistic portrayals of bombing attacks and suicide bombers are used to depict suicide terrorism as a pure manifestation of evil. News coverage of suicide bombings is characteristically sensationalized to capitalize on feelings of collective insecurity and warmongering policies.

The results of this study in effect provide a canvas for an in-depth discussion of the data collected, which shall make it possible to not only derive meaningful conclusions from its theoretical import but also make informed policy recommendations based on its practical and empirical significance. The following chapter presents such discussion, conclusions, and recommendations. Suggestions for future research are also mentioned.

Chapter Five

Discussion & Conclusions

Summary of Study

The focal point of this study is suicide terrorism, a violent, complex, and highly adaptable form of terrorism that has received extensive media coverage over the past few years and has become a key issue in contemporary political agendas. More specifically, this study provides an analysis of the subjective definitional and rhetorical processes involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism. The goal of the constructionist approach, strengthened by a symbolic interactionist perspective, was to demonstrate that suicide terrorism is essentially a subjective concept and a socially constructed problem. In effect, the study was designed to move the analysis of suicide terrorism beyond traditional essentialist debates and into more nuanced understandings of cultural meaning, human action, and human interaction. Hence the study focused on determining (a) how the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a subjective representation of events and their alleged causes and (b) how such biased representation is conditioned by deliberate attempts to stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and promote certain political interests. Consequently, the main research question was: "How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism?" A three-fold subset of questions was then developed: (a) "How is suicide terrorism used as a political

145

weapon?"; (b) How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool?"; and (c) "How is suicide terrorism a politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework?".

The study was designed as a qualitative research project in order to fulfill the main objective of improving our understanding of the complex phenomenon of suicide bombings. Such a research design helped to fully capture the definitional and rhetorical mechanisms at play while taking into account the multifarious context in which suicide terrorism is profoundly rooted. The overall strategy favored for this study was a multi-case study, an adaptive and innovative qualitative approach specifically intended to provide an in-depth knowledge of an organizational phenomenon. The instrumental collective case study thus developed allowed the observation and assessment of several sites using cross-case comparisons and explanation-building techniques to analyze the data. Patterns and themes were subsequently discerned across cases, which added depth to the study and solidified its findings. Cases were identified via purposeful sampling, which consisted of sampling unique research sites and key participants, that is, information-rich cases particularly well-suited for the in-depth study of the social construction of suicide terrorism. Data collection methods relied on a triangulation of ideas, that is, a convergence if data sources, theories, and methodologies, in order to help develop themes. Case studies also allowed for extensive data collection drawing on multiple sources of information, including extensive field research, in-depth expert interviews, and analysis of public and official documents. Such a diversity of sources and collected data guaranteed a more complete depiction of the phenomenon.

The study findings, which are recapitulated following the main research questions in the preceding chapter, highlight that many actors are involved in the social

146

construction of suicide terrorism: the suicide bombers and their supporters (the folk devils), the media, the public, and agents of social control. As a result, the social construction of suicide terrorism is conditioned and influenced by the interaction socio-political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures. Suicide bombings are political weapons, used as a communication tool and exploited as a politicized issue that fuels moral panics and the politics (and marketing) of fear surrounding suicide terrorism. Representations and interpretations of suicide bombings are overwhelmingly one-dimensional: they ignore the dynamics of the historical, social, cultural, economic, and psychological dimensions of the events. The media and agents of social control use unsophisticated portrayals of suicide bombings and usually describe suicide terrorism as a mere manifestation of evil. Terrorist groups and suicide bombers are selectively depicted as simplistic enemies, crazed cowards, and demonized foes. News coverage of suicide bombings is characteristically sensationalized: they are presented as extremely violent and elaborate propaganda tools in the hands of dangerous religious fanatics who are distressed, unstable and suicidal, and have nothing to lose. Bombers are also habitually described as poor, uneducated, young males who were brainwashed by the fundamentalist precepts of radical Islam. This is in total contradiction with the reality of suicide bombings. The latter are, in fact, characterized by a combination of primitive means and meticulous planning (recruitment, formation, and training) that results in extensive physical and psychological harm. Moreover, suicide bombers are not primarily suicidal and generally do not suffer from any diagnosable psychological disorders or cognitive impairments impeding effective problem-solving skills. Not all suicide bombings are perpetrated by exponents of a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam or any

147

other religion, for that matter: some secular groups have resorted to the tactic, including the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. The Tigers, in fact, are to this day the most prolific users of suicide bombings. Finally, women and children are increasingly recruited for suicide missions by several secular and religious groups that view them as providing invaluable tactical advantages, but their presence in the media and public policy is still scant.

Such findings are particularly meaningful today, all the more as suicide terrorism has gained in both sustainability and popularity worldwide and the fast-growing radicalization of opposing factions and terrorist cells has increasingly become a concern for policymakers and other agents of social control. More than two thirds of contemporary suicide bombings have occurred since 2000 and at least one suicide bombing is reported about in international news every day. The timeliness and relevance of this study is indisputable. It is therefore critical to thoroughly explore and reflect upon its essential findings, as well as its overall contribution to both knowledge and practice.

Theoretical Implications of Results

Appropriateness of the Theoretical Framework

As evidenced by the findings presented in the previous chapter, the moral signification of suicide terrorism can be successfully illustrated via a social constructionist study of suicide bombings. More specifically, this study shows that the construction of suicide terrorism as a new social problem and burning policy issue, as well as the contested claims made within that framework by the variety of actors involved, can be effectively analyzed and better understood within Cohen's moral panic framework. Consequently, a social constructionist perspective makes it possible to

148

understand not only the emergence of suicide bombers as contemporary folk devils, but also the moral crusade and the moral panic that resulted from it. Additionally, social constructionism does seem to allow us to emphasize the negative and not necessarily anticipated effects of social control policy with regard to suicide terrorism, including the greater cohesion of terrorist groups and their increased polarization against the rest of society and the agents of control (politicians, lawmakers, law enforcement, and action groups) actively involved in the "War on Terror." This methodical social constructionist investigation also enables us to focus on the role played by the mass media – both news and entertainment outlets – in publicizing and sensationalizing suicide bombings, setting off a contagion effect, and promoting the ideological and commercial exploitation of suicide terrorism.

This study further illustrates the meaning and significance of symbols. Symbols are social objects that are "used to represent . . . whatever people agree they shall represent" (Charon, 2004:47-48). Words and acts are symbols. As such, they are social, "defined in interaction, not established in nature" (2004:48). Additionally, they are meaningful: their users clearly understand what the words or acts represent. Consequently, words and acts are also significant. People use certain words or resort to certain actions deliberately, not unintentionally, so as "to give off meaning to others" (2004:49). In concordance with the symbolic interactionist perspective, this study thus shows that the use of language should not be taken for granted. Symbolic communication is inherent in human life and necessary for social reality to develop from human interaction (2004:43). As explained earlier, physical objective reality, which refers to the "situation as it exists" (Ibid.), is subject to interpretation and objective acts are

149

systematically defined within a working context – a socially defined reality. Upon that social reality people also build their personal reality in interaction with themselves to reach their own interpretation and understanding of the physical world and human lived experience. Hence people interpret the reality of suicide terrorism within their own symbolic framework. Their perspectives evolve as they interact with others and within their social worlds or reference groups.

Hence the study findings outlined in Chapter Four coincide with the theoretical framework guiding this research. The analysis of the socio-political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism is discussed in detail below. In particular, the use of suicide bombings as a political weapon, their exploitation as a communication tool, and their politicization in order to feed into moral panics are dissected in an attempt to fully grasp the conceptualization and interpretation processes associated with this violent tactic and thereby improve our understanding of suicide terrorism.

The Use of Suicide Bombings as a Political Weapon

Suicide bombings as a winning practice of asymmetrical warfare. Regarding the success of suicide bombings as political weapons, ICT Education Project head and senior researcher Yoram Schweitzer (2000) once stated that, from the Israeli perspective of now twenty-two years of suicide terrorism,

> one may conclude that it has not been a 'winning card' in the hands of terror organizations, nor has it changed dramatically the inherent imbalance between states and terror organizations in favor of the terrorists. However, it was proven to be an effective instrument in the service of the terrorists' agenda.

150

On the other hand, Pape (2005) argues that "as we saw in the recent London attacks, suicide terrorism works, particularly against democracies." Likewise, suicide terrorism arguably "worked" for the PKK in Turkey or Hizballah in Lebanon and it is currently the best strategic weapon available to Chechen terrorists. Yet, the concrete political outcome of a suicide terror campaign is unimportant compared to the fundamental appeal of the method as a persuasive political weapon against foreign occupation and other sorts of politically-based conflicts. Suicide terrorism is regarded as the "ultimate weapon" (Schweitzer, 2001) and "the most politically destabilizing" form of terrorism (Atran, 2004, August:1). Over the last few years, it has been used increasingly across the world by secular and religious groups that construe it as their most promising tool for political change and promote it – with the welcome though not always intentional help of the media and agents of social control – as the most effective weapon in their arsenal.

Strategic and tactical usefulness. Suicide bombings are characterized by the use of rather primitive means which, thanks to meticulous planning (including the recruitment, formation, and training of the bombers or attack teams), result in considerable physical and psychological harm. Suicide bombings happen without warning and are virtually always successful in wreaking utter chaos upon entire populations. They are prime weapons of psychological warfare and, as such, constitute one of the most dangerous weapons available to terrorists today. Their political nature is enhanced by the fact that terrorists (notably Islamic extremists in recent years) turn their attacks into spectacles of terror and huge media events for the main purpose of promoting their political agenda. The strategic and tactical usefulness of suicide bombings as outstanding political weapons is therefore emphasized in our media-saturated society. In

151

today's global politics and global media world, the purpose of such extravagant terror

spectacles as the September 2001 attacks is not only to gain worldwide attention, but also

to dramatize the issues and grievances of the groups involved and to achieve specific

political goals. The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks has also shown how

spectacles of terror can also be used by democratic leaders (for instance, the Bush

administration) to promote their own geopolitical agendas.

The Use of Suicide Bombings as a Communication Tool

The mass media can be powerful actors in the long-standing battle between

terrorist groups and governments. The media can indeed have an effect on public

perception of terrorist acts and government actions. This, in turn, may affect the latter, as

well as the operations and agenda of the terrorist groups.

> Terrorists, governments, and the media see the function, roles and
> responsibilities of the media when covering terrorist events from differing
> and often competing perspectives. Such perspectives drive behavior
> during terrorist incidents--often resulting in both tactical and strategic
> gains to the terrorist operation and the overall terrorist cause. The
> challenge to both the governmental and press communities is to
> understand the dynamics of terrorist enterprise and to develop policy
> options designed to serve the interests of government, the media, and the
> society. (Perl, 1997)

The media's perspective. What news media outlets strive to accomplish by

covering suicide bombings so considerably is quite simple: they want to beat the

competition, be the first to cover a breaking story, and present it as dramatically as

possible. "Breaking news" has become the catchphrase and the main objective of news

coverage today. "Old news is no news" and "pressure to transmit real time news instantly

in today's competitive hi-tech communication environment is at an all-time high" (Perl,

1997). Wilkinson (1997) further argues that

152

major US networks all compete fiercely for an increased market share of the audience and for the higher advertising revenue they can gain through exploiting the public's insatiable interest in the coverage of major terrorist 'pseudo-events.' (1997:57).

The faster you can provide background information on the "terrorist group" supposedly involved, the more trustworthy and thorough your newscast will be perceived by the audience. It does not much matter if you are providing incorrect information, as long as the news bit sounds persuasive enough. For instance, immediately following the suicide bombings of March 11, 2004 in Madrid, Spain, newsrooms across the world, from Europe to the United States, were focusing their special editions on the Basque separatist group ETA, which had been blamed by the Spanish Prime Minister and was quickly found to have had nothing to do with the al-Qaeda-sponsored synchronized attacks.

Sensationalizing a well-timed story is another important element of contemporary news making that also is characteristic of the creation and diffusion of moral panics (which will be discussed in details below). Spectacular footage, dramatic music, and striking visual effects are used to ensure the news is not only informative but also thrilling to watch. FoxNews and CNN have seemingly entered a "graphics war" to show which network can have the most gripping, enthralling news production of flashy short sequences, occasionally inaccurate information, and strings of interviews with highly-paid "terrorism experts." Other programs, such as *Democracy Now* for instance, would rather focus on a low-budget, objective (and therefore more ethical) presentation of factual news based on sources that have been carefully double-checked and are then dissected by low-profile yet reliable political analysts or military historians. As Wilkinson (1997) explains:

> The free media clearly do not represent terrorist values. Generally they tend to reflect the underlying values of the democratic society. But the media in an open society are in a fiercely competitive market for their audiences, constantly under pressure to be first with the news and to provide more information, excitement and entertainment than their rivals. Hence they almost bound [sic] to respond to terrorist propaganda of the deed because it is dramatic bad news) (1997:54).

Some news media outlets justify their theatrical or sometimes shocking coverage of suicide bombings with a common "people have the right to know" argument. Yet, the hypocrisy of such a statement becomes obvious when a brief analysis of such sensational coverage shows a deliberate attempt to subjectively and arbitrarily select certain pieces while deliberately censoring actual footage of perpetrators at the preparation stage, actual suicide bombings or their bloody aftermath. U.S. coverage of such events, for example, is typically limited to clouds of smoke, gutted buses, and speeding ambulances – but no bodies or severely injured victims are ever shown. The "right to know" argument is usually countered here by an active effort to preserve the psychological well-being of all direct and indirect victims (including viewers or readers). In Europe or Asia, on the other hand, blown up bodies and whatever remains of the suicide bomber(s) are frequently pictured on television or in printed news in order to display the full horror of the bombings and illustrate the gravity of the incidents.

The media additionally try to safeguard their free operation throughout their operations. One of the pillars of democratic societies is freedom of the press. Many journalists covering terrorism and suicide bombings in particular have complained that they have been unable to report the news as accurately and objectively as their professional and ethical standards dictate. This has been especially true for coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, considering the close ties of the U.S. government with its

154

Israeli counterpart, and the Iraqi insurgency. Regarding the latter, claims have multiplied over the past two years concerning restraints imposed on news agencies with regards to producing stories portraying the Bush administration and its so-called "liberation efforts" in a negative light. Freedom of the press has also been jeopardized by terrorist groups who have retaliated against journalists and other members of the press corps involved in terrorism coverage.

> Journalists generally want the freedom to cover an issue without external restraint--whether it comes media owners, advertisers, editors, or from the government. . . . In many instances, this concern goes beyond protecting their legal right to publish relatively unrestrained; it includes personal physical security. They want protection from threat, harassment, or violent assault during operations, and protection from subsequent murder by terrorists in retaliation providing unfavorable coverage (the latter occurring more often abroad than in the United States). (Perl, 1997)

The terrorist perspective. Terrorists essentially want people to have an auspicious, if not sympathetic, view of their cause. Although people who are aware of suicide bombings may not believe the end justifies the means, they may sympathize – or even empathize – with the predicament of the groups resorting to the deadly tactic. "Terrorists believe the public 'needs help' in understanding that their cause is just and terrorist violence is the only course of action available to them against the superior evil forces of state and establishment" (Perl, 1997). Therefore, they must make sure that they establish and preserve healthy, steady relations with the media. Terrorist groups sometimes get directly involved in news media structures, especially small ones they can control by providing financial support, or pursue more sensitive or supportive press personnel who may portray them in a less negative fashion.

155

The main purpose of these groups is to ensure the news media portray them and their cause in a more sensible way. "Terrorist causes want the press to give legitimacy to what is often portrayed as ideological or personality feuds or divisions between armed groups and political wings" (Perl, 1997). They usually believe that a more objective portrayal of the armed struggle on the one hand and the political activities on the other will help them find more supporters, recruit additional followers, and secure more external financial backing.

Terrorist groups further covet media reporting that harms or is in any way detrimental to their enemies. This is especially true when a group does not claim responsibility for a suicide bombing or does not explicitly provide a rationale for it. Al-Qaeda, for instance, has mastered this approach in recent years. This ensures maximum media coverage, the amplification of the feeling of collective insecurity, as well as the intensification of fear and the ensuing moral panic. In addition, such "anonymous terrorism" may cause significant short- or long-term economic losses. It may also "make populations loose faith in their governments' ability to protect them" and "trigger government and popular overreaction to specific incidents and the overall threat of terrorism" (Perl, 1997). This was clearly illustrated in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States.

The key element here is publicity. Terrorist groups are extremely keen on publicity and will exploit media infrastructures to maximize it, even if it is not always positive publicity. As Brian Jenkins once emphasized, "terrorism is theatre" (Council on Foreign Relations, 2004). In the late nineteenth century, Anarchist terrorists of Narodnaya Volya famously described their violent activities as "propaganda by deed."

156

For decades now, "terrorists have tailored their attacks to maximize publicity and get their messages out through all available channels" (Ibid.). Thus the media play a crucial role in the spectacle of terrorism. As Wilkinson (1997) explains:

> In dealing with the relationship between terrorism and the mass media, the most useful approach is to attempt to understand the terrorist view of the problem of communications. It cannot be denied that although terrorism has proved remarkably ineffective as the major weapon for toppling governments and capturing political power, it has been a remarkably successful means of publicizing a political cause and relaying the terrorist threat to a wider audience, particularly in the open and pluralistic countries of the West. When one says 'terrorism' in a democratic society, one says 'media'. For terrorism by its very nature is a psychological weapon which depends upon communicating a threat to a wider society. (1997:53)

Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once declared that "publicity is the oxygen of terrorism" (Perl, 1997; Wilkinson, 1997), which illustrated that public opinion was a foremost terrorist target and how the media provided essential tools to influence and alter it. This may have changed since. While it could have been argued a decade ago that

> terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead . . . the emergence of religious terror groups with apocalyptic outlooks and the availability of weapons of mass destruction may indicate that inflicting mass casualties has supplanted publicity as the primary goal of some terrorist campaigns. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2004)

Suicide bombings appear to be incidents that are particularly tailored to the media. The purpose of groups that use this tactic is to get the attention of governments and the general public, which is facilitated by the mass media. Attracting media attention is a rather easy task for terrorist groups and organizations. They often plan the timing and location of their attacks to ensure maximum media coverage. For instance, many analysts have argued that the coordinated attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in

157

September 2001 were specifically "designed to provide billions of television viewers with pictures symbolizing U.S. vulnerability, and they prompted extensive reporting on al-Qaeda and its Islamist agenda" (Council on Foreign Relations, 2004). Terrorist groups analyze the media closely and learn from their operations and processes. Some – like the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), Lebanon's Hizballah, or the Kurdish KGK (former PKK) – have even put in place their very own media structures, radio broadcasts, and sponsored Websites.

Suicide bombings are glaring examples of premeditated violence targeting symbols (political, economic, religious or otherwise) and sending a political or religious message. "[G]oals might also include winning popular support, provoking the attacked country to act rashly, attracting recruits, polarizing public opinion, demonstrating their ability to cause pain, or undermining governments" (Ibid.). This is clearly illustrated by Israel's typical reaction to Palestinian suicide bombings, which usually consists of immediate retaliation, especially against the families of the bombers, and heavy military intervention, including targeted missile strikes.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the extensive media coverage it has generated further illustrate how media attention can actually benefit terrorist groups. "From the terrorist perspective, media coverage is an important measure of the success of a terrorist act or campaign" (Perl, 1997). Even if the only casualty in a suicide attack is the bomber himself or herself, the incident will garner attention and be broadcast worldwide. Responsibility will be claimed and announced in the news within seconds, which guarantees immediate attention to the claims and overall cause of the group implicated in the bombing. Intensive public opinion debates will ensue and policymakers will also get

158

involved worldwide, which may speed up the political process necessary to legitimately achieve the goals the group is fighting for. Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and several other Palestinian groups have received as much worldwide attention for deadly bombings that claimed dozens of deaths and injured scores of bystanders as they have for attacks that resulted in the sole death of the bomber and some material destruction.

Conversely, it has also been argued that media coverage can harm the cause of a group that resorts to suicide bombings. Indeed, if an attack does not go according to plan, it can easily backfire on the group or organization:

> Attacks can spin out of control or have unintended consequences; too much slaughter can alienate potential supporters and sympathizers; terrorist activities have different meanings for different audiences; and even when terrorists' attack plans work, they cannot necessarily control how their actions are covered or perceived. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2004)

Either way, many groups have learned to use the media to their advantage whenever necessary and thus have turned suicide bombings into a powerful communication tool. Transnational organizations like the LTTE and al-Qaeda have adapted to new technologies and successfully broadcast messages via satellite television or the World Wide Web. It should be noted that the use of the Internet, in particular, has made it possible for these organizations to extend their global network and deliver their ideology to millions of passive and active supporters they would have had great difficulty reaching only a decade ago. They have also been able to communicate furtively via Internet portals, virtual chat rooms or instant messaging services, and to use pseudo-charitable Websites to raise funds for their violent campaigns. Video broadcasts via satellite television

159

(e.g., al-Jazeera, the Arabic cable news network) have included recordings of the last testaments of Palestinian suicide bombers and gruesome footage of suicide bombing scenes in Israel or Sri Lanka, which are typically censored in the United States, as well as statements by leaders of the al-Qaeda terror network, including Osama bin Laden. Another example of a valuable instrument in al-Qaeda's public relations arsenal has been their tendency not to claim responsibility for suicide bombings and other types of attacks, which has helped to disseminate and maintain general feelings of insecurity while compelling more media coverage.

The governmental perspective. What governments fighting suicide terrorism essentially look for is "understanding, cooperation, restraint, and loyalty from the media in efforts to limit terrorist harm to society" (Perl, 1997). Governments overtly want to capture and punish people responsible for suicide bombings or other types of terrorist acts. As a result, they seek coverage that will promote governmental priorities, not terrorist agendas.

> Governments can use the media in an effort to arouse world opinion against the country or group using terrorist tactics. Public diplomacy and the media can also be used to mobilize public opinion in other countries to pressure governments to take, or reject, action against terrorism. (Ibid.)

Therefore, governments tend to view mainstream news media outlets as an instrument of public policy, a mere extension of their official agendas. The media should thus serve as mouthpieces for governments and never as platforms (voluntary or otherwise) for terrorist groups – unless of course if doing so were to hasten the impending doom of the terrorist group. The purpose of such an interpretation of the role of the media is to clearly segregate media structures and terrorist groups and ensure

160

neither one uses the other to their advantage. Governments also use suicide terrorism coverage (or lack thereof) to guard against "disinformation from terrorist allies, sympathizers, or others who gain from its broadcast and publication" (Ibid.). This constitutes a basic damage control technique, in a sense, and illustrates the determination of governments not to provide any mainstream media platforms for terrorist claims making – whether the claims are true or not.

From a governmental (and fundamentally Occidental) viewpoint, the media are also supposed to portray suicide bombers and related terrorist groups as criminals. Media coverage should therefore never promote sympathetic or empathetic reactions in the public. Suicide bombers should not be glamorized, bombings need not be sensationalized. Yet, as explained above, sensationalizing a newsworthy story is a major component of contemporary news making. The objectives of governments and the imperatives of the media sometimes clash as a result of these opposing realities. Governments often disapprove of media representations that may distract attention away from the criminal actions and focus instead on the cause being fought with the help of – amongst other methods – suicide bombings. As a result, governments may seek to control, directly or indirectly, the production and dissemination of news by certain media outlets. This is illustrated by the close ties between the Bush administration and right-wing network FoxNews, which is part of Bush supporter Rupert Murdoch's planetary media conglomerate, and the open reprisal campaign against journalists whose style of reporting was not fully in line with White House policies. Of course, this is in total contradiction with basic but non-negligible (and therefore constitutionally protected) rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of the press.

161

Overall, governments may benefit from regulating how much information terrorists can gain access to. Ongoing and future anti-terrorism measures, for instance, are typically not divulged to the media in order to ensure they remain known only to people directly involved in their development and implementation. Likewise, vulnerability assessments are not – or should not – be made public, or else the media could inadvertently inspire or even facilitate future bombings. That would undoubtedly represent a perverse effect of the media's "right to know" approach to public news reporting. In recent months for instance, public officials harshly attacked continuous coverage of all the "weak points" and other "high-risk potential targets" still left unprotected in the United States and abroad that could be "easy objectives" for suicide bombers. That denoted again how governmental strategic or tactical priorities can easily conflict with the propensity of the media to saturate their coverage with whatever is sensational enough to be deemed newsworthy and likely to generate more ratings (and therefore more money).

In hostage-taking crises, the news media are often the only instrument available for terrorists to both follow outside events as they unfold and get information on how much exposure their actions are receiving. News coverage can therefore make rescue operations (or military intervention) difficult if too much information is provided to the hostage takers. Consequently, governments may decide to prohibit the media from accessing the immediate area or covering the story live altogether. On the other hand, if journalists gain access to the scene, governments typically demand live information be communicated to them first. This is generally justified by a willingness to efficiently diffuse the situation as peacefully as possible. In recent years, as explained in the

162

previous chapter, critical hostage-taking incidents involving Chechen suicide bombers in Russia have illustrated how such events can take an exceptionally deadly turn if they are not handled properly by the media and government authorities alike.

With a related security goal in mind, governmental officials usually do not disclose any sensitive or classified information about preventive or operational measures related to suicide bombings. Fruitful counterterrorism operations are seldom publicized and details almost never provided to the media or the general public. We may know that "dozens of attacks have been thwarted" but we will not know how, when, and where or who was involved. Not only does this give the public a false sense of reassurance that whatever policies are in place are indeed working, it also supposedly prevents would-be suicide bombers to imitate the disrupted attack in the future. One may want to argue, however, that terrorist groups that recruit and train suicide bombers are resourceful and creative enough to figure out how to conduct destructive attacks and wage an efficient psychological warfare. The use of fully-fueled jetliners in high-profile suicide attacks, for example, was not heavily publicized after attempts in Israel and France, and yet, al-Qaeda successfully coordinated devastating attacks in the United States years later.

The media may also be exploited by politicians and government agencies needing to improve their public image or looking for a complete public relations makeover. Thus certain politically favorable news outlets or journalists may be favored over others for "exclusive interviews" or "breaking news" coverage. This recurring practice effectively turns the network into a political platform – but in an ironically acceptable fashion since it serves the interests of the governments involved.

Governments also benefit heavily from the process of demonization that media portrayals of suicide bombers and supporters of suicide terrorism feed into. This is encouraged by media saturation: the more the news features stories about suicide bombers, casting them as folk devils and "freedom haters," the more persuasively the media will convey their message of fear, global threat, and collective insecurity to the general public. Once public concern and media attention are galvanized, the demonization of suicide bombers and related terrorist groups is emphasized by the use of threatening metaphors and simplistic statements, the construal of suicide terrorism as a scourge or an epidemic, the construction and propagation of fear, the warrior mentality and "War on Terror" rhetoric of the social control agents, and the politicization of the issue. These concepts are henceforth discussed in more details within the moral panic framework.

The Politicization of Suicide Terrorism and Moral Panics

Suicide terrorism and moral panics. "The American public has been inundated with highly mediated images of terrorists and terrorism since September 11, 2001" (Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004:327). The complex phenomenon of suicide terrorism and its social construction can be analyzed from the moral panics perspective, as explained in Chapter Two, and broken down into five overlapping phases that apply to crime and criminality in other studies (see Buffington, 2003; Cohen, 2002):

1) A period of social upheaval produced by and contributing to a major shift in the nation's political economy.
2) The generalized perception of endemic crises, represented in public opinion as a crime wave, and taking the form of a series of moral panics about the state of the nation.
3) A concerted response (especially but not exclusively on the part of state policymakers), represented in public opinion as a war on crime

164

and taking the form of "new" discourses, practices, institutions, and technologies of social control.

4) The consolidation of a new criminal justice paradigm, often in the form of new laws and institutions, along with its inevitable contestation and negotiation by vested elite interest groups and the often targeted popular classes.

5) The accumulation of "anomalies" – inconsistencies, contradictions, failures – in the dominant criminal justice paradigm that render it unstable and thus vulnerable to the next sustained period of social upheaval (which restarts the cycle). (Buffington, 2003)

The social, political, and legal climate of the United States since September 11, 2001, in addition to its avowed fight against terrorism, is a perfect illustration of this five-phase cycle. Without over-simplifying the events leading up to the September 2001 attacks on U.S. soil or their significant short- and long-term outcomes, one can find explanations for each phase in any and all manifestations of today's U.S.-led War on Terror. The September 11 events characterize Phase One, following several suicide terror attacks against U.S. interests abroad over previous years (e.g., 1998 West Africa attacks against U.S. Embassies, 2000 USS Cole bombing in Yemen).

Phase One (notwithstanding the attacks that occurred abroad) was a spectacular, brief stage, not a continued period of social turmoil per se (such as the Lebanese Civil War, for instance, which began in 1975 and laid the foundation for Hizballah's unprecedented 1980s suicide bombing campaign). Phase Two, the crime wave and subsequent moral panics, was encouraged by official speeches and fueled by the mainstream media. The crisis was emphasized by expressions like "the scourge of suicide terrorism" or "the terrorist cancer," as well as scores of articles presenting suicide terrorism as an "epidemic" that had to be contained by any means necessary.

165

Phase Three, the concerted response, was the product of President Bush's infamous comeback about "hunting down evil cowards" and "smoking out evildoers." Declaring the dawn of a "War on Terror" in the post-9/11 world, much like President Nixon had declared a "War on Drugs" three decades earlier, President Bush introduced a new discourse of fear and warmongering in foreign policy and international relations. Innovative technologies also emerged in the wake of the September 2001 attacks. Security measures and techniques were altered in mass-transit hubs throughout the United States, mainly at airports. Procedures and infrastructures were heavily modified to ensure the public believed maximum security had been achieved and that public spaces were safe again. For instance, airline pilots are now allowed to carry guns for their personal safety and more armed sky marshals are supposedly randomly assigned to domestic and international flights than before the fall of 2001.

Phase Four, the consolidation of a new criminal justice paradigm, quickly followed. In an obvious knee-jerk reaction, a new federal legislation was passed immediately after September 11: the USA PATRIOT Act, also known as the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. The official purpose of this controversial Act is to "deter and punish American terrorists in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes" (United States Senate, 2001). The noticeably problematic and contentious phrase "for other purposes" encompasses the detection by any means (including illegal or unconstitutional ones) and the prosecution of alleged future crimes that are not terrorist in nature. The extension and renewal of the Act has been fought vehemently in Congress. Another major institutional change that was a

166

direct result of the September 2001 suicide terror attacks was the creation of the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a Cabinet department of the U.S. federal government. The DHS mission is to safeguard the people of America from harm and to protect American property from damage or destruction. The reforms it has introduced have been forcefully contested. Nonetheless, government officials have consistently reported successful counterterrorism operations (without further details).

Suicide bombers as folk devils. It is much easier to condemn suicide terrorism than to try to understand it. Likewise, it is easier to attribute devastating suicide bombings to "folk devils" and ascribe a moral meaning to the acts. This helps to amplify the threat, exploit the panic it creates in the public, and market the fear it produces. It also helps propagate war fever, encourages retaliatory feelings and discourses, and promotes military solutions as relevant, proportionate, and necessary ones. Finally, it opens the door for dangerous measures, such as shifty legislative reforms (e.g., the USA PATRIOT Act) and dubious policies (e.g., racial and ethnic profiling).

> A common notion in the U.S. administration and media spin on the war against terrorism is that suicide attackers are evil, deluded or homicidal misfits who thrive in poverty, ignorance and anarchy. This portrayal lends a sense of hopelessness to any attempt to address root causes because some individuals will always be desperate or deranged enough to conduct suicide attacks. But as logical as the poverty-breeds-terrorism argument may seem, study after study shows that suicide attackers and their supporters are rarely ignorant or impoverished. Nor are they crazed, cowardly, apathetic or asocial. The common misconception underestimates the central role that organizational factors play in the appeal of terrorist networks. A better understanding of such causes reveals that the challenge is actually manageable: the key is not to profile and target the most despairing or deranged individual but to understand and undermine the organizational and institutional appeal of terrorists' motivations and networks. (Atran, 2004, August:5)

167

The politicization of religion and religiosity that has characterized agenda setting and policymaking since September 2001 is a precarious choice and a misleading approach at best. "When religion is involved, it sidesteps the issue, since religion provides an absolute rationale" (Ebert, 2005). The Bush administration should not emphasize that it is the responsibility of the United States "to rid the world of Evil," as President Bush has repeatedly declared. Labeling suicide terrorists as "evildoers" or "evil cowards" contributes nothing positive or productive to the fight against suicide terrorism or global terrorism. It shows a profound misunderstanding of the "enemy" and its goals, which goes against any basic military strategies. Publicly pitting the moral world of Good, as defined by the United States, versus the amoral world of Evil of the terrorists only promotes a reductionist and simplistic rhetorical style that actually feeds into the similarly dichotomous Islamic worldview setting the House of God against the House of War that fundamentalists exploit with their radical interpretation of Islam. Additionally, in view of the principle of separation of Church and State, it seems rather misguided for President Bush to rely on scriptures in official terrorism-related speeches. Christian metaphors (such as the crusade imagery that followed the September 2001 suicide attacks) can only exacerbate tensions and further dichotomize the forces at play. Instead of imposing an American style of democracy onto others as the one and only sustainable mode of civilization across the globe, the United States must work towards better understanding the socio-cultural context, the political processes and claims, and the religious values of the countries where suicide bombers and their supporters flourish.

Regarding the introduction of the phrase "homicide bomber" by the White House in 2002 and its subsequent adoption by News Corp media outlets, it appears that they

168

were anything but innocuous. What should not be overlooked here is that Rupert Murdoch's News Corp is one of the largest media corporations on the planet and a major right-wing actor in today's global communications world. Its socio-political and economic influence extends across the world via a multitude of powerful holdings. The latter include the Fox Broadcasting Company, a US-based nationwide broadcast television company, and Fox Television station groups, in addition to major North American, South American, European, Asian, and Australian satellite television providers and cable television services, dozens of key newspapers and magazines worldwide, Internet portals, major movie studios and film production companies, book publishing companies, and more. The adoption and, in effect, promotion of the phrase "homicide bombing" can be criticized as directly supporting attempts by the Bush Administration to not merely clarify its "Terror Doctrine" but shape public perceptions of suicide terrorism and influence national policy through the deliberate and cunning use of doublespeak and dysphemisms. By introducing this new phrase, the Bush administration also tried to produce a new reality in order to influence how people would view bombings and suicide terrorism in general. This seemingly innocent rhetorical device was in fact a premeditated effort to ensure the news media would detect the new catchphrase, disseminate it, and abuse it until it became engrained in public consciousness that the key feature of these bombings was the fact they were perpetrated by terrorists and killed innocent victims. By obliterating an essential feature of suicide bombings – the ensured death of the bomber – and explicitly targeting Palestinian terrorist groups (and especially Arafat), all that the Bush administration, FoxNews, and the like accomplished was refusing even more categorically to legitimize the cause or consider the bombers

169

sensibly. This is not to say that it would have been preferable or more productive to declare the actions of the bombers to be justifiable or legitimate. The peace process could have been improved, however, if the fundamentally valid political claims of the groups and their fighters (namely, the independence of their state) had been considered dispassionately by all involved – while remembering that the end certainly was not justifying the means.

Collective insecurity and the politics of fear. The mass media play a significant role in providing, maintaining, and regulating the available frameworks and definitions of suicide terrorism. As a result, they help structure both public awareness of and attitudes towards suicide bombing campaigns. The mass media, however, are not the only actors involved in influencing the public's perception of suicide terrorism as a critical collective threat. Political actors are also key participants in the social construction of suicide terrorism, the construction and advertising of collective insecurity within a wider threat structure, as well as the marketing of fear. Political actors and strategies help guarantee that "repressive fear" remains "an enduring tool of economic and political domination in the United States (Béland, 2005:2) and to ensure that the fear and collective insecurity that are associated with suicide terrorism (or terrorism in general) supply an impetus for electoral support. This was illustrated by President Bush's heavy "War on Terror" rhetoric during his 2004 reelection campaign.

The context of collective insecurity and the politics of fear is suited for the analysis of the social construction of suicide terrorism (and vice versa):

> Collective insecurity is a social and political construction. Far from
> meaning that people live in a world of pure illusions, the idea of social and
> political construction of reality refers to the manner in which actors

170

collectively make sense of the world in which they live. . . .[C]ollective insecurity first emerges through the transformation of personal and environmental matters into social and political issues. . . . [It] is 'the product of processes by which groups and individuals learn to acquire or create *interpretations of risk*. . . . After perceived sources of insecurity are defined as collective problems affecting a significant segment of the population, they can enter the policy agenda. (2005:4)

Suicide terrorism represents a highly episodic threat (as opposed to a structural one, such as unemployment or lack of healthcare coverage). Within the threat infrastructure, suicide terrorism is therefore more conducive of moral panics and it allows politicians to easily inflate the threat it poses or exploit the feelings of collective insecurity it generates. What political actors want is to shape the threat of suicide terrorism and spread fear among the public, so they can later gain electoral support and influence policy outcomes.

In liberal democracies, politicians pursue at least four main goals within the political field (i.e. the structured arena of political competition). First, they seek election and reelection. Second, once elected, they attempt to increase their institutional power within their party or government. Third, they seek to build a political legacy that could make them look good to their contemporaries and to future generations. Fourth, in some contexts, politicians promote an ideological agenda or a certain vision of 'public interest' in a manner that may prove unpopular and, consequently, detrimental to the attainment of the three others goals." (2005:10)

Two important stratagems come into play here: credit claiming and blame avoidance. They are used by politicians either to claim responsibility for "good news" related to the fight against terrorism or to protect elected officials from getting blamed for "bad news," such as further suicide bombing attacks, which could "exacerbate economic, social, and environmental insecurity" (2005:11). Unfavorable news are politically hazardous since "elected officials are regularly blamed for 'bad news' even when it is not directly related to their decisions" (Ibid.). After the September 11, 2001 events, for

171

instance, the Bush administration was heavily criticized for its reluctance or inability to prevent the attacks. A national bipartisan commission, commonly known as the "9/11 Commission," was even specially appointed to investigate the "terrorist attacks upon the United States" and the failures of the administration (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Therefore, blame avoidance strategies are useful when suicide bombings or other terrorist incidents occur as they enable politicians to "blame their predecessors for the gaps in the security apparatus that could have facilitated terrorist actions" (Béland, 2005:12-13). This is exactly what President Bush did by blaming the Clinton administration for laying a solid foundation for the massive intelligence failure that precipitated the September 2001 attacks.

In addition, the threat of suicide terrorism is bound to be the center of political attention since it saturates contemporary media coverage. Government officials and the public are seemingly passionate about finding an immediate solution to the crisis and imposing severe punishment on the cowardly and evil culprits, regardless of the inherent complexities of suicide terrorism. "Violent, spectacular, and highly episodic threats like terrorism are quicker to stimulate sweeping legislative actions" (2005:15) and a prefect illustration of this knee-jerk reaction is the enactment (and recent relative extension) of the infamous USA PATRIOT Act, a 342-page document that became law on October 24, 2001 (United States Senate, 2001).

Finally, the social construction of suicide terrorism, the amplification of the threat, and the increase in insecurity and fear related to it clearly influence how political agendas are established and outlined. The public interpretation of the suicide terrorist threat is what politicians rely on "to depict themselves as the best providers of collective

172

protection in order to increase their popular support and shape a positive and lasting legacy" (2005:15-16). This is arguably what happened after the September 2001 attacks when President Bush chose to depict the whole world as a dangerous place and military force as the only logical – not only justified but also mandatory – option against international terrorism. As a decisive stage in the social construction of suicide terrorism, agenda setting and execution "constitutes a key phase of the policymaking process" (Béland, 2005:15). Hence it is essential to further probe the significant practical implications of the results this research project has yielded.

Practical Implications of the Results

Specifying and exploring the findings of this qualitative study is a difficult task that requires a prudent appraisal of their relevance and application to everyday policymaking or practice and a certain reserve concerning their relative significance. This innovative study neither provides definitive answers nor aspires to be the ultimate analysis of suicide terrorism. One of the major strengths of this study is its potential for significantly contributing to our empirical understanding of suicide terrorism. This empirical and interpretive research was designed to substantively advance our knowledge about the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and its socially constructed nature. As such, although it is not purely empirical, it could yield empirically significant results by providing researchers and policymakers with much insight into the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and its prevention. There is no panacea for suicide terrorism and the purpose of this research project was certainly not to find or even suggest a universal remedy for suicide bombings. Nevertheless, much practical wisdom can be derived from

173

this theoretical contribution as a whole and, more specifically, from the results that arose from a cunning combination of complementary research instruments.

Countering Suicide Terrorism

Contrary to common belief and what policymakers and the media have insinuated in the past few years, suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It originated in ancient times and has simply evolved over time, developing as other forms of terrorism have. Thus, rather than a new weapon in the arsenal of terrorists groups, suicide terrorism is a long-standing, highly adaptive and extremely violent tool of propaganda by deed that is constantly reshaped by technological advances and contemporary social events. Its causes, manifestations, and ramifications vary across time, countries, cultures, and groups. The use of fully-fueled commercial jetliners in the September 2001 attacks, for example, proves how adaptable and destructive suicide terrorism can be and how the phenomenon is all but dwindling away. This is also confirmed by the increasing number of suicide bombing operations, most notably in the Middle East and Western Europe, in response to the U.S.-led "War on Terror" and the illegal occupation of Iraq.

The urgency of developing efficient preventive measures to uncompromisingly combat suicide terrorism was evidenced by the unprecedented attacks orchestrated by al-Qaeda in the United States in September 2001. By proving its ability to permeate U.S. defensive measures and reach almost all of its intended symbolic targets, al-Qaeda showed the United States and other Western countries just how vulnerable they truly were to suicide terrorism.

Suicide Terrorism Prevention: Why Preventive Measures Have Not Worked

The findings of this study (and history, incidentally) illustrate the fact that certain counter-terrorism measures, though favored by some countries, do not work to fight and prevent suicide terrorism. First of all, conventional top-heavy coercive methods (e.g., strategic bombardment, invasion, occupation) cannot efficiently reduce popular support for suicide bombers, help capture the latter, or help eliminate such a complex and adaptable phenomenon as suicide terrorism. Coercive and repressive measures in both Israel and Russia, for instance, have failed to stop Palestinian and Chechen suicide bombings. It appears that army intervention usually feeds into the problem instead of helping solve it. Indeed, it usually results in an upsurge in popular support for terrorist groups favoring suicide bombings. As a result, the impact of such groups on the larger society (notably its ruling elites) becomes greater. Preemptive strikes against wrongly perceived supporters of suicide terrorism typically increase the incidence of and support for suicide terror attacks. As for heavy retaliation campaigns following suicide bombings, they generally reinforce and intensify people's sense of victimization and readiness to behave according to organizational doctrines and policies structured to take advantage of such feelings. Finally, it should be noted that the outcome of the study also demonstrates why fundamentally ill-advised ethnic or racial profiling techniques and practices can only exacerbate ethno-cultural tensions and eventually encourage support for suicide terrorist campaigns. They also take attention and resources away from homegrown terrorists who may be appealed by the overall ideology opposed to President Bush's outlook on the "War on Terror" and may be enticed by the strategic and tactical advantages presented by suicide bombings.

175

Social control policies are futile unless they address the actual threat objectively and take into account all its complexities. Three possible lines of defense are possible against suicide terrorism. The last line of defense consists of drastically reducing receptivity of potential recruits to recruiting organizations. The middle line of defense requires infiltrating and breaking up recruiting institutions and isolating group leaders. The first line of defense involves preventing suicide bombers from reaching their intended targets. Each line shows potential for effective prevention, but certain impediments may render them useless.

The last line of defense (preventing suicide bombers from reaching their intended targets) is the most expensive and least likely to succeed. Setting up checkpoints and conducting more random bag or body searches are not very effective security measures against people determined to die. Vulnerable and accessible targets will always be found by determined suicide bombers. Furthermore, deploying uniformed soldiers or police officers, creating covert observation stations or using complex surveillance systems in order to intercept potential bombers requires a great deal of human, technological, and financial resources that may not always be available.

The middle line of defense (infiltrating and breaking up recruiting institutions and isolating group leaders) may be a valuable short-term option. However, it can easily backfire considering it is likely to lead to the growth of more opposition groups or factions dedicated to the same greater cause. Still, this approach and the previous one are the most popular in today's War on Terror.

The first – and most propitious – line of defense (significantly decreasing the responsiveness of prospective recruits) requires overcoming various obstacles for positive

176

outcomes to be reached. The first hurdle is reducing poverty, which may be ineffective and could be counterproductive if a decline in poverty for the entire population results in a reallocation of resources that takes away some people's wealth. Boosting literacy rates is another issue to tackle: it may prove ineffective and could hinder the attainment of desired goals if improving literacy enables more people to get a hold of terrorist propaganda. Finally, putting an end to occupation or alleviating perceived degradation is a promising approach that may be ineffective if people believe the victory to have been brought about by terror (see Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon following a string of suicide bombings).

Some Promising Counterterrorism Practices

Suicide terrorism is first and foremost an institution-level phenomenon. Countering and preventing suicide terrorism may therefore involve finding a balance between a reasonable amount of coercion and adequate incentives, so as to induce change and lead communities to stop supporting institutions that recruit suicide attackers. There are of course several pitfalls to watch for. First of all, destroying the social fabric or the political structure until people stop backing suicide terrorism operations (or their sponsors) is not only difficult to achieve but also morally unacceptable. For instance, the Kamikaze pilots met their demise at the end of World War II, but only after the 1945 nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Moreover, retaliation is morally objectionable, especially if the retaliating party is looking for allies in its fight against terrorism. For example, Israel's systematic military strikes following suicide bombings have not garnered many supporters and Israel is often pointed at as the terrorist actor in the Israelo-Palestinian conflict. Finally, coercive tactics or military strategies alone can

177

intensify the problem of suicide terrorism instead of providing any immediate or long-term solution. The example of the U.S.-led war in Iraq and the ensuing relentless suicide bombing campaign organized by the Iraqi insurgency is emblematic of the harmful consequences such interventions may have.

Another important point to consider is that terrorist groups obtain information, recruit new members, and essentially survive owing to their ethnic, political, and religious connections. Terrorist groups consequently cannot prosper unless they get support from the community. Hence the foundation of community support for groups and organizations sponsoring suicide bombing operations must be the major long-term priority of those who want to counter suicide terrorism. It is also crucial to understand and take into consideration that popular backing of suicide terrorism will not cease to exist on its own and people will not spontaneously stop being influenced by promises of spiritual or financial rewards.

What the United States and its allies in the "War on Terror" should focus on, as should any other countries involved in the actual fight against suicide terrorism worldwide, is the dynamics of the phenomenon and the complex socio-cultural context it is rooted in. Scrutinizing political and economic conditions is critical but not enough. Identifying sacred values in different cultures and the dynamic mechanisms through which they win people over is what will allow for a comprehensive understanding of how to keep such values from degenerating and leading to conflict between people. Sacred values strengthen cultural identity and faith in society. Where suicide terrorism is motivated by religion, for instance, these feelings are affected and reshaped by terrorist group leaders, recruiters, and trainers, typically to the advantage of the group and not the

178

individual. Suicide terrorism prevention will thus require collaborative efforts by international policymakers in order to fully comprehend the socio-historical, political, and cultural circumstances and recruitment methods that motivate people to sacrifice their own lives in support of a greater cause.

Informing the general public is also important, insofar as people will become desensitized and more confident if they are aware of the nature of the threat and can readily access reliable information. Working with the media in a concerted effort to decrease popular support of suicide terrorism is therefore primordial. Above all, the media should avoid: providing sensational coverage of suicide bombing operations; presenting suicide bombings as an effective tactic and a winning strategy for achieving political goals; glorifying suicide bombers; presenting simplistic, one-dimensional explanations for suicide bombings; and illustrating or reporting "how to" descriptions of suicide bombing techniques.

The top priorities to successfully combat and prevent suicide terrorism should be:

1. Working with the international community to address the real or perceived historical and personal grievances of populations that have been unable to fulfill basic objectives, such as personal safety, cultural recognition, social stability, and collective peace;

2. Encouraging Muslim communities to stop supporting religious schools and charities that play a part in terrorist networks;

3. Financing civic education and interfaith programs;

4. Creating sustained dialogue lines with Muslim religious leaders and community notables in order to ensure that Islamic customs and religious law better

179

correspond to international legal principles of crime, punishment, and human rights;

5. Encouraging moderates in the community to consider other fruitful options for a new social order.

6. Allowing moderate members of the terrorist groups to challenge the contradictions or shortcomings of their own worldviews (e.g., viewing others as evil), values (e.g., lack of respect for life), and behavior (e.g., support for killing), and to confront other group members in order to bring about long-term changes;

7. Supporting democratic self-determination, which will reduce suicide terrorism more efficiently than further military intervention or counterinsurgency aid;

8. Promoting economic choice without forcing people to radically alter their business traditions (people should not have to renounce newly acquired economic freedom for a system of privatization, "free market" or globalization);

9. Actively opposing violations of civil liberties and human rights by refusing the political or military support of the countries that officially back the U.S. "war on terrorism" but steadily violate the fundamental human rights of their people and reject any free political expression. In such countries as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia, the practices of extremely repressive regimes can only spawn more popular resentment and terrorism – and therefore should not be supported.

Using Intelligence: Why Might Is Not Always Right

Suicide terrorism should be fought with intelligence, not use of force. Under the Bush administration, Cold War intelligence policies regarding national security

180

information have been thoroughly modified in response to ongoing terrorist threats against the United States. The suicide terrorist attacks of September 2001 shed light on the deficiencies of the counterterrorism apparatus of the United States and the failures of its own intelligence gathering and analysis mechanisms. The homeland security plan subsequently devised by the Bush administration entails innovative intelligence efforts aimed at quashing threats within the United States, protecting U.S. borders, reducing infrastructure vulnerabilities, and improving emergency responses. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is now responsible for organizing such strategies and ensuring that detailed and comprehensive information reaches the people who need it.

Until recently, intelligence gathering and analysis was perceived as hermetically separate from the policymaking community and the rest of the government. It has now become painfully obvious that such separation hinders counterterrorism efforts. The intelligence community must therefore strive to provide useful, timely, and accurate intelligence that meets the needs of civilian and military policymakers, as well as strategic and tactical decision-makers. The processes involved are part of what is commonly referred to as the Intelligence Cycle, which consists of six phases: collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, production, and dissemination of information. Both the White House and the intelligence community face a slew of coordination issues in their efforts to avoid errors, missed opportunities, as well as contradictory policies or superfluous measures.

All actors concerned with the fight against suicide terrorism should keep in mind that intelligence is not purely domestic and unilateral. It must be construed within an international and multilateral framework. As the U.S. counterterrorism intelligence

181

structure is being wholly reshaped, it is important to remember that a lot can be learned from the successes and failures experienced by America's allies in their fight against terrorism. Valuable counterterrorism lessons can be learned from the experience of the domestic intelligence agencies of such countries as the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, or even Israel. Optimizing information-gathering techniques is consequently of utmost importance if governments want to develop effective and efficient preventive security measures to counter suicide terrorism worldwide.

To avoid intelligence and communication breakdowns between all the actors involved in the intelligence community, it is indispensable to ensure the highest levels of coordination between all the agencies involved in the intelligence cycle around the world. The U.S. federal government is striving to improve how threat information is analyzed and disseminated, although much more progress is needed. A potentially useful initiative that could enhance government performance is the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which was introduced by President Bush in early 2003 (see Appendix C). Improving terrorism warnings and sharing actionable intelligence may also prove beneficial. For example, the DHS color-coded national threat level system, known as the Homeland Security System (see Appendix D) has been sharpened over the past couple of years in order to guarantee more reliable information specific to certain geographic areas and based on both actual and potential threats.

It is crucial to develop not only more threat assessments but also more vulnerability assessments. Improving threat and vulnerability assessments makes it possible to develop national risk assessments for critical target sets (e.g., social or economic infrastructures, U.S. landmarks). Moreover, this could help State and local

182

governments in high-risk areas to conduct location- or community-specific risk assessments (including real-time risk assessments in response to actionable intelligence). At the same time, such assessments and the funding they generate must of course not exclude low-risk target areas. Hence the way the DHS decides on or heightens alert levels must be reliable and invariable. Flexibility in handling alerts is good; inconsistency is not.

Adjusting Priorities and Re-Setting Agendas

Suicide terrorism is arguably the most serious threat in today's war on terrorism. In order to counter and pre-empt suicide terrorism, the international intelligence community and governments around the world must concentrate their counterterrorism efforts on interrupting suicide terror attacks in their preparatory phase. Interrupting suicide terrorism at the planning and preparation stage is essential.

It is impossible to assert or even envisage that terrorism, especially suicide terrorism, will ever be eradicated. People have fought over religious, political, and other ideological causes for centuries and it would be naïve to trust that they will some day spontaneously stop doing so. Nonetheless, focused and concerted counterterrorism efforts are critically needed to concretely curtail the increasing success and popularity of suicide bombing operations and, ultimately, prevent or even interdict suicide terrorism. Ever since the early 1980s, policymakers have clearly struggled with the problems posed by the resurgence and gradual metamorphosis of terrorist suicide attacks. The challenge is getting even more complex today as terrorist groups use creative ways of reaching out to new recruits, garnering community support, and taking advantage of technology to attain their goals, while guaranteeing maximum destruction and casualties. The demise of

183

suicide terrorism may in fact depend on the willingness of Western governments to promote substantial reforms of their own political and socioeconomic structures.

In order to prevent suicide terrorism, it is crucial to fully comprehend what combination of psychological and social-cultural factors exhorts people to join a terrorist group and unites them behind common ideologies and grievances. It is furthermore important to bear in mind that radicalization and the sustainability and growing popularity of suicide terrorism are directly affected by the foreign policies of the Western nations leading the "global war on terrorism," as well as their overall social, political, economic, and cultural agendas.

Since it is a prime and avowed enemy of terrorist groups today, especially those resorting to suicide terrorism, the United States has a momentous responsibility to ensure that multilateral and international counterterrorism efforts are well-directed, productive, and uniform across the globe (i.e., not focused solely upon countries where special interests are to be preserved or advanced). The etiology and dynamics of suicide terrorism as a complex, extremely violent, and highly adaptive form of terrorism must be thoroughly studied and clearly understood. Target hardening, intelligence gathering and analysis, as well as reducing community support for suicide bombings should be top priorities. The U.S. and others in the intelligence community must further take into account the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other unconventional tactics in conjunction with the perpetration of suicide terror attacks.

Acting unilaterally and relying heavily on military intervention are not acceptable or productive solutions against suicide terrorism. Governments and the intelligence community must instead consider alternatives that will prove more sensible and useful in

184

the short and long term. They must take into account that supporters of suicide terrorism may be highly receptive to what soft-power options entail, which most Muslims are actually favorable to, such as democratically electing a government, enjoying civil liberties and human rights, exercising freedom of expression, celebrating a cultural heritage, taking advantage of educational opportunities, and having unlimited economic choices.

In order to build these substantial conclusions into findings that genuinely have a practical significance, much future research is needed. Suicide terrorism has become one of the most massively debated issues in the media and political agendas today, both in the United States and abroad. Only through rigorous scholarly research will we be able to improve our insight into suicide bombings and to resourcefully impinge upon the misrepresentation of and overreaction to suicide terrorism as a pressing socio-political problem.

Study Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

The main objective of this research project was to provide a theoretical framework to help answer key questions on the complex subject of suicide terrorism. How is it used as a political weapon? How is it exploited as a communication tool? How is it a politicized issue that fuels moral panics? This study, inasmuch as it is essentially exploratory, does not offer final answers to these important questions. It does, however, offer a set of theoretical remarks based on a social constructionist approach and a symbolic interactionist perspective that may well guide future scholarship about this most important issue. This study additionally derives its strength from its potential to inform practice and effect major policy changes thanks to a sound theoretical input. Nonetheless,

185

in order to stimulate further research about the social construction of suicide terrorism and the symbolism of social reality, it is important to highlight the main limitations of this contribution. Following this overview of study limitations, suggestions for future research will be offered.

Limitations

As stated earlier in this study, the credibility of a qualitative study depends upon the common understanding and interpretation of concepts by the researcher and the study participants. Qualitative studies, by definition, call for a more personal analysis of the data collected. One may then reasonably argue that the integrity of the data collected for this study could have been compromised by researcher bias. In addition, the study distinctively focuses on the subjective definitional and rhetorical processes involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism. This increases the likelihood of bias in the analysis phase. For example, with media sources alone, analytical procedures had to be constantly adapted to check for accuracy (factual and technical errors), bias and distortion (media accounts are rarely neutral), and audience context (potential misinterpretation by an outsider). Ensuring the credibility of the analysis and the findings was therefore fraught with obstacles. However, each of them was conscientiously and methodically surmounted.

First of all, credibility was optimized by conducting prolonged fieldwork during the initial G-CDMHA grant project on the phenomenology and etiology of suicide terrorism. Interim data analysis and data substantiation ensured that study findings matched participant reality. Precise accounts of interviews using verbatim statements made by the interviewees, in addition to strictly quoted excerpts from documents ensured

186

that the exact language used by the participants or in the analyzed documents were transformed into objective data. Likewise, low-inference descriptors were used, so as to accurately record detailed descriptions of specific situations. The use of mechanically recorded data (through the extensive use of digital voice recorders, videotapes, and photographs) further ensured the accuracy and easy corroboration of the data collected. Interviewees were asked to double-check the accuracy of the information collected. After each interview, participants were also asked to review the exactness of the information gathered and transcribed during their interview(s). Finally, negative cases or conflicting data likely to either stand out as exceptions to observed patterns or alter data patterns, if any, were controlled for, recorded, analyzed, and reported.

From a purely methodological standpoint, it should further be noted that a thorough symbolic interactionist study of the construction of suicide terrorism, in order to be true to the Blumerian tradition, should include extensive fieldwork within the secular and religious groups that have been stigmatized and, in essence, demonized as fanatical terrorists. To fully comprehend the transactional or interactionist nature of the phenomenon, researchers should invest their scholarly efforts in an objective analysis of the folk devils, their identity and status, their actions, their environments, and the various symbols attached to them. Such approach would be costly and time-consuming, not to mention extremely dangerous, but it would undoubtedly enrich our knowledge and understanding of suicide bombings worldwide and, as a result, promote more productive and effective measures to prevent suicide terror attacks.

The limitations of the chosen purposeful sampling technique were considered, as clarified in Chapter Three, as was the subsequent likelihood of error inherent in the

187

qualitative study design. However, the sampling breadth of this study was wide enough that it included cases from very diverse areas of the world, political or religious backgrounds, socio-cultural frameworks, and more. Changes over time were not a significant risk factor insofar as the socially constructed understanding of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism appears constant regardless of time and place. As for case-specific data collection methods, they were as thorough as possible, including all available and accessible information sources. In retrospect, it seems that snowball sampling and informal enquiries would also be useful techniques, all the more as bureaucratic hurdles and the clandestine nature of most groups studied can occasionally make it difficult to access informants.

As for the transferability of the findings of this study, it depends on their usefulness to other qualitative researchers who would approach the analysis of suicide bombings with comparable research questions or practical inquiries. As explained in earlier descriptions of pertinent methodological concerns, the generalizability of the findings requires their applicability as an analytic synthesis or as grounded theory. This is necessary for other researchers to conduct further research on the social construction of suicide terrorism. Knowledge may thus be generated not by replicating this study but, rather, where extensive corroborating data becomes available through additional case studies of the social construction of suicide terrorism.

In this study, finding transferability was maximized by paying special attention to: (a) the researcher's role and relationship with the study participants; (b) the site and key informant selection process via purposeful sampling; (c) the social context of both the phenomenon and the study itself; (d) the data collection and analysis strategies (including

188

the triangulation of data and methods); (e) the accuracy of the narrative data; (f) the typicality of the selected groups or sites; (g) the specificity and flexibility of the analytic framework; and (h) potential alternative interpretations. It is important to note that the chosen intellectual framework of this study ensures that both the collection and the analysis of the data are constantly steered by the use of specific theoretical concepts and models. Since this study is explicitly informed by a body of theory – namely social constructionism and, more specifically, symbolic interactionism – researchers or policymakers focusing on similar parameters are ultimately free to decide if the cases presented in this analysis are transferable to new and comparable research settings, or generalizable for policymaking purposes. Ultimately, what is most important to remember here is that the need for generalization of these qualitative findings is secondary – or almost insignificant – compared to the significance of the in-depth understanding and the wealth of knowledge obtained on the phenomenon of interest.

Future Research

First and foremost, future research on suicide terrorism and its social construction should rely more steadily on the collection of raw data to contribute original information to our knowledge base of the phenomenon on the whole. Researchers should recoil from the literature integration trend that is plaguing suicide terrorism research today. Such approach is intellectually questionable and does not contribute to the advancement of the scholarly study of suicide terrorism. More multiple-case studies including in-depth interviews instead of mere historical surveys should be developed in order to extend the findings of this study and continue to enrich our understanding of the reality of suicide bombings. Overall, more qualitative studies involving triangulation of data and methods

189

appear to be crucial to the formation of a methodologically sound, reliable body of scholarly literature on this highly relevant socio-political issue.

Moreover, it is of utmost importance today to favor methodological designs that will enable researchers to integrate micro and macro levels of analysis in order to study suicide bombings and bombers more comprehensively, both at the individual level and at the institutional or structural level. Viewing suicide terrorism as the sole outcome of individual rational choice is simplistic. Likewise, interpreting suicide bombings as the manifestations of structural dysfunction is dubious at best. In order to be comprehensive and reliable scholarly research should, instead of opting for one-dimensional explanations, delve into individual motivational factors while incorporating group dynamics and social or institutional elements as well. Terrorist campaigns never happen in a vacuum: the importance of individual factors must be evaluated against the significance of structural ones and vice versa. Future research must therefore integrate a combination of psychological, political, historical, economic, and socio-cultural factors to explicate what exhort people to join a terrorist group, unite behind common ideologies and grievances, and give their own life for what they perceive to be a noble cause.

A related and potentially promising research endeavor would consist of studying suicide bombings from a perspective focusing on the social causes of the act of suicide itself. Instead of concentrating on or exaggerating the individual motivations of the bombers, such as suicidality or other pathological or clinical features, informed researchers should favor a more pragmatic methodology based on the fundamentally selfless nature of the act. Give up one's life in a suicide bombing is more an expressive act than an instrumental one. It is the expression of an emotion resulting from group

190

dynamics and ideological motivation to fight for a just cause and die a noble death. Researchers should not consider suicide bombings as the outcome of a cost-benefit calculation or as a means to an end, as is regularly the case in the extant literature. In order to be fruitful, scholarly efforts should instead be focused on analyzing suicide bombings as ultimate examples of altruistic suicide, in the Durkheimian sense, not manifestations of egoistic, anomic, or fatalistic types of suicide characterized by lack of status or religious integration or by the state of social regulation.

The political ramifications of the social construction of suicide terrorism deserve much more attention in scholarly writings. Specifically, more studies need to investigate the politicization of suicide bombings and their resonance within more general trends: the politicization of law and order and the politicization of religion and religiosity. These are significant elements of today's U.S.-led "War on Terror" and foreign policy as a whole, both inside and outside of the United States. Researchers should try to determine how these multiple facets of politicization affect public policy regarding terrorism in general and suicide terrorism in particular, all the more as the sustainability and increasing popularity of the tactic are significantly conditioned by the foreign policies of the Western nations implicated in the "War on Terror."

Similarly, the threat infrastructure of anti-terrorism policies is worthy of further analysis as well. The research community and policymakers (and ultimately society at large) would greatly benefit from a careful examination of the reasons why suicide terrorism has generated such a moral panic while other insecurity episodes have not (and probably never will). It would also be tremendously worthwhile to scrutinize why suicide bombings have been only marginalized and essentially minimized in some areas of the

world, while they have resulted in outbursts of fear, anger, and anxiety elsewhere. Future studies should therefore probe not only the role of the mass media in the social construction of suicide terrorism and the creation of synthetic panics that stigmatize and demonize "the Other," but also how political actors actively contribute to the politics of collective insecurity, including the subjective or selective formation of the threats and the propagation and marketing of fear. Such studies could focus on both proactive involvement (political actors who are influential in getting a threat on the policy agenda) and reactive roles (political actors who try to influence the threat awareness and assessment once others have turned the threat into a key socio-political issue).

Scholars should earnestly endeavor to contribute to the development of a more impartial analysis of suicide terrorism and its social construction not only by contributing sound research to academic journals with a limited readership, but also by offering their scientific, unbiased knowledge to the media and policymakers. Newsmaking criminologists, for instance, could play a significant role in the presentation of a more objective interpretation of suicide bombings and a more realistic image of the dynamics involved. This would help demystify the phenomenon by offsetting the subjective and overdramatic nature of contemporary media coverage of suicide bombings, which typically favors the sensationalistic and highly selective treatment of events in regions of the world where the United States has political or economic interests. Truly fair and balanced information would finally take over the promotion of self-interests.

Above all, principled scholars must strive to develop an original and cohesive research agenda to not only ensure fruitful investigative efforts but also promote a thorough, objective investigation of the complex dynamics of suicide bombings. Suicide

192

terrorism must be analyzed methodically and – above all – dispassionately, as a relative phenomenon that occurs within diverse cultures and evolves within a variety of symbolic frameworks and moral universes. More studies of suicide bombings should focus on the dynamics of the phenomenon, as well as the dynamics of human interaction in general as it influences people's symbolic framework for interpreting and understanding this violent tactic. Suicide terrorism should not be viewed as a static or monolithic social problem that does not vary across countries or cultures. Only a dispassionate and methodically sound analysis including a variety of perspectives on the issue will foster a clear understanding of the reality and dynamics of suicide bombings.

Only objective, elaborate scholarly studies and methodical investigations of the phenomenon and its intricate context can effectively filter through the socio-political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism. Such analyses have the potential to significantly affect all major actors in the moral panic surrounding suicide bombings today: the folk devils, the media, the public, and the agents of social control involved in rule creation and enforcement. Today, the dominant interpretational framework promotes a simplistic dualism of suicide terrorism as a violent political and religious weapon that evidences a fundamental misunderstanding of suicide bombings, in addition to a misleading, counterproductive, and therefore harmful construal of the threat they pose worldwide. This has already had serious adverse consequences: a chronic lack of knowledge about the context and symbols of suicide terrorism; the trivialization and misrepresentation of meanings and beliefs associated with suicide bombers; a mass media and ideological exploitation of suicide bombings as deviant or even evil acts; extreme perceptions and

www.manaraa.com

moral campaigns that spill into subjective interpretations of the actors behind the violence (on both sides) and result in moral panics; the adoption of misguided, inappropriate, and arbitrary policies; the polarization of demonized deviants against the rest of society; and the increased cohesion of terrorist groups in response to misguided counterterrorism measures or suppression attempts by ill-advised agents of social control. Still, amidst all these negative outcomes is a fantastically fertile ground for excellent research in the near future. May the high potential for controversy not be a deterrent.

References

Abuza, Z. (2004). *Tentacles of terror: Al-Qaeda's southeast Asian network*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Adler, P., & Adler, P. (Eds.) (2003). *Constructions of deviance: Social power, context, and interaction* (4th edition). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.

Ali, T. (2002). *The clash of fundamentalisms: Crusades, jihads and modernity*. New York: Verso.

Almogy, G., Belzberg, H., Mintz, Y., Pikarsky, A. K., Zamir, G., & Rivkind, A. I. (2004). Suicide bombing attacks: Update and modifications to the protocol. *Annals of Surgery, 239*(3), 295-303.

Almogy, G., Luria, T., Richter, E., Pizov, R., Bdolah-Abram, T., Mintz, Y., Zamir, G., & Rivkind, A. I. (2005). Can external signs of trauma guide management? Lessons learned from suicide bombing attacks in Israel. *Archives of Surgery, 140*, 390-393.

Archick, K. (2003). Europe and counterterrorism: Strengthening police and judicial cooperation. In K. Archick & P. Gallis (Eds.), *Europe and counterterrorism* (pp.1-34). New York: Nova Science.

Archick, K., & Gallis, P. (Eds.) (2003). *Europe and counterterrorism*. New York: Nova Science.

Arena, M. P., & Arrigo, B. A. (2005). Social psychology, terorrism, and identity: A preliminary re-examination of theory, culture, self, and society. *Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 23*, 485-506.

Atran, S. (2003). Genesis of suicide terrorism. *Science, 299*, 1534-1539.

Atran, S. (2004). Mishandling suicide terrorism. *The Washington Quarterly, 27*(3), 67-90.

Atran, S. (2004, August). *Trends in suicide terrorism: Sense and nonsense*. Paper presented at the meeting of the World Federation of Scientists Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism, Erice, Italy.

Audet, J., & d'Amboise, G. (2001, June). The multi-site study: An innovative research methodology. *The Qualitative Report, 6*(2). Retrieved January 15, 2005, from http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR6-2/audet.html

Barak, G. (Ed.) (1994). *Media, process, and the social construction of crime: Studies in newsmaking criminology.* New York: Garland Publishing.

Bassiouni, M. C. (1981). Terrorism, law enforcement, and the mass media: Perspectives, problems, proposals. *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 72*(1), 1-51.

Becker, H. S. (1988). Herbert Blumer's conceptual impact. *Symbolic Interaction, 11*(1), 13-21.

Becker, H. S. (1994). Outsiders. In J. E. Jacoby (Ed.), *Classics of Criminology* (2nd edition) (pp. 264-271). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

Becker, H. S. (2003). Labeling theory. In P. Adler & P. Adler (Eds.), *Constructions of deviance: Social power, context, and interaction* (4th edition) (pp.70-74). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.

Becker, H. S., & McCall, M. M. (Eds.) (1990). *Symbolic interaction and cultural studies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Béland, D. (2005). *The political construction of collective insecurity: From moral panic to blame avoidance and organized irresponsibility.* Retrieved November 30, 2005, from http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/Beland.pdf

Ben-Yehuda, N. (1993). *Political assassinations by Jews*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge.* Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

Berko, A. (2004). *The moral infrastructure of chief perpetrators of suicide terrorism: An analysis in terms of moral judgment*. Retrieved June 20, 2004, from http://www.ict.org.il

Bernard, H. R. (1996). Qualitative data, quantitative analysis. *Cultural Anthropology Methods Journal, 8* (1), 9-11.

Best, J. (1995). *Random violence: How we talk about new crimes and new victims.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Best, J. (2003). Deviance: The constructionist stance. In P. Adler & P. Adler (Eds.), *Constructions of deviance: Social power, context, and interaction* (4th edition) (pp. 90-93). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.

Beyler, C. (2003a). *Chronology of suicide bombings carried out by women*. Retrieved April 4, 2003, from http://www.ict.org.il

Beyler, C. (2003b). *Messengers of death: Female suicide bombers*. Retrieved April 4, 2003, from http://www.ict.org.il

Bloom, M. (2005a). *Dying to kill: The allure of suicide terror.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Bloom, M. (2005b). Mother. Daughter. Sister. Bomber. *Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists, 61*(6), 54-62.

Bloom, M. (2005c). Terror's stealth weapon: Women. *The St. Petersburg Times.* Retrieved December 12, 2005, from http://www.sptimesrussia.com/story/16262

Blumer, H. (1956). Sociological analysis and the variable. *American Sociological Review, 21*, 683-690.

Blumer, H. (1969). *Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Bond, M. (2004). The making of a suicide bomber. *New Scientist, 182,* 34-37.

Bourdon, S. (2002, May). The integration of qualitative data analysis software in research strategies: Resistance and possibilities. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 3*(2). Retrieved July 10, 2005, from http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs

Brooks, D. (2002, June). The culture of martyrdom. *The Atlantic Monthly*. Retrieved December 27, 2004, from http://www.theatlantic.com

Buffington, R. (2003, May). *Periodization and its discontents: The social construction of crime and criminality in modern Mexico.* Paper presented at the Conference on Reforming the Adminstration of Justice in Mexico, La Jolla, CA.

Busch, K. G., & Weissman, S. H. (2005). The intelligence community and the war on teror: The role of behavioral science. *Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 23*, 559-571.

Bush, G. W. (2001). *U.S. feels 'quiet, unyielding anger.'* Retrieved September 12, 2004, from http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/white.house/

Campbell, D. T., & Stanley, J. C. (1966). Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research on teaching. In N. L. Gage (Ed.), *Handbook of research on teaching*. Chicago: Rand NcNally.

Caracci, G. (2002). Cultural and contextual aspects of terrorism. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), *The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 3. Theoretical understanding and perspectives* (pp. 57-82). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Charon, J. M. (2004). Symbolic interactionism: An introduction, an interpretation, an integration (8th edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Chechnya's 'black widow' bombers (2003). Retrieved December 13, 2004, from http://www.cnn.com

Cohen, S. (2002). *Folk devils and moral panics* (3rd edition). London: Routledge.

Council on Foreign Relations (2004). *Suicide terror: Was 9/11 something new?* Retrieved November 12, 2004, from http://cfrterrorism.org/terrorism/suicide.html

Crenshaw, M. (1992). Current research on terrorism: The academic perspective. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 15*(1), 1-12.

Creswell, J. W. (1997). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five traditions.* London: Sage Publications.

Crotty, M. (1998). *The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspective in the research process.* London: Sage Publications.

Dale, S. F. (1988). Religious suicide in Islamic Asia: Anticolonial terrorism in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32(1)*, 37-59.

Davidson, L. (1986, Spring). Terrorism in context: The case of the West Bank. *Jounral of Palestine Studies, 15*(3): 109-124.

Dickey, C. (2005, December). Women of al-Qaeda. *Newsweek*. Retrieved December 5, 2005, from http://www.newsweek.com

Eshel, D. (2001). Israel reviews profile of suicide bombers. *Jane's Intelligence Review, 13*, 20-21.

Farberman, H. A. (1985). The foundations of symbolic interaction: James, Cooley, and Mead. In H. A. Farberman & R. S. Perinbanayagam (Eds.), *Studies in Symbolic Interaction: Supplement 1 – Foundations of interpretive sociology: Original essays in symbolic interaction* (pp. 13-27). Greenwich, CT: Jai Press.

Farberman, H. A., & Perinbanayagam, R. S. (Eds.) (1985). *Studies in Symbolic Interaction: Supplement 1 – Foundations of interpretive sociology: Original essays in symbolic interaction*. Greenwich, CT: Jai Press.

Feagin, J., Orum, A., & Sjoberg, G. (Eds.) (1991). *A case for case study*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Fighel, J. (2002). *Top Muslim clerics endorse suicide attacks - A challenge to the United States?* Retrieved April 4, 2003, from http://www.ict.org.il

Fine, G. A., & Kleinman, S. (1968). Interpreting the sociological classics: Can there be a "true" meaning of Mead? *Symbolic Interaction, 9*(1), 129-146.

Fisher, B. M., & Strauss, A. L. (1979a). George Herbet Mead and the Chicago tradition of sociology (Part one). *Symbolic Interaction, 2*(1), 9-25.

Fisher, B. M., & Strauss, A. L. (1979b). George Herbet Mead and the Chicago tradition of sociology (Part two). *Symbolic Interaction, 2*(2), 9-20.

Fleischer, A. (2002, April 12). *Press briefing.* Retrieved May 7, 2003, from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020412-1.html

Fontana, A., & Frey, J. H. (1994). Interviewing: The art of science. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 361-376). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Fuller, R., & Myers, R. (1941). The Natural History of a Social Problem. *American Sociological Review, 6*, 320-329.

Ganor, B. (2002a). Suicide attacks in Israel. In International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), *Countering suicide terrorism* (pp. 140-153). New York: Anti-Defamation League.

Ganor, B. (2002b). Suicide terrorism after September 11. In International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), *Countering suicide terrorism* (pp. 167-176). New York: Anti-Defamation League.

Gergen, K. J. (1999). *An invitation to social construction.* London: Sage Publications.

Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). *The discovery of grounded theory*. Chicago: Aldine de Gruyter.

Glausiusz, J. (2003). The surprises of suicide terrorism: An anthropological take on suicide terrorism. *Discover*. Retrieved September 16, 2004, from http://www.discover.com

199

Goode, E., & Ben-Yehuda, N. (1994). *Moral panics: The social construction of deviance*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Gourevitch, P. (2004). Bushspeak: The President's vernacular style. *The New Yorker*. Retrieved October 27, 2004, from http://www.newyorker.com

Griffiths, E. (2005, December 28). *Russian security forces under fire over Beslan siege*. Retrieved December 28, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au

Griset, P. L., & Mahan, S. (2003). *Terrorism in perspective*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Gunaratna, R. (2000). Suicide terrorism: A global threat. *Jane's Intelligence Review, 12*, 52-55.

Gunaratna, R. (2001). Terror from the sky. *Jane's Intelligence Review, 13*, 6-9.

Gunaratna, R. (2002). Suicide terrorism in Sri Lanka and India. In International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), *Countering suicide terrorism* (pp. 101-108). New York: Anti-Defamation League.

Hacking, I. (2000). *The social construction of what?* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hawkins, R., & Tiedeman, G. (1975). *The creation of deviance: Interpersonal and organizational determinants.* Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing.

Hewitt, C. (2000). Patterns of American terrorism, 1955-1998: A historical perspective on terrorism-related fatalities. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 12*(1), 1-14.

Hoepfl, M. C. (1997). Choosing qualitative research: A primer for technology education researchers. *Journal of technology Education, 9*(1). Retrieved January 13, 2005, from http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JTE/v9n1/hoepfl.html

Hoffman, B. (2003). The logic of suicide terrorism. *Atlantic Monthly*. Retrieved November 7, 2004, from http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200306/hoffman

Hoffman, B., & McCormick, G. H. (2004). Terrorism, signaling, and suicide attack. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27*, 243-281.

Holsti, O.R. (1969). *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Horton, S. (2005, July 23). *Poisonous misinterpretations*. Retrieved September 13, 2005, from http://www.antiwar.com

Hudson, R. A. (2000). *Who becomes a terrorist and why: The 1999 government report on profiling terrorists*. Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press.

Human Rights Watch (2002). *Erased in a moment: Suicide bobming attacks against Israeli civilians.* Retrieved November 27, 2003 from http://www.hrw.org

International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.) (2002). *Countering suicide terrorism*. New York: Anti-Defamation League.

International reactions to the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington (2001). Retrieved April 13, 2004, from http://www.september11news.com/InternationalReaction.htm

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003a). *Blackmailing young women into suicide terrorism.* Retrieved October 24, 2004, from http://www.mfa.gov.il

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003b). *The role of Palestinian women in suicide terrorism.* Retrieved October 24, 2004, from http://www.mfa.gov.il

Israeli, R. (2002). A manual of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 14*, 23-40.

Israeli, R. (2003). *Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic martyrology.* London: Frank Cass.

Jacobs, J. B., & Henry, J. S. (1996). The social construction of the hate crime epidemic. *The Journal of Criminal law and Criminology, 86*(2), 366-391.

Jacobs, J. B., & Potter, K. A. (1998). *Hate crimes: Criminal law and identity politics.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Jacinto, L. (2002). *Death wish: Suicide Bombers have historic links and tactical advantages*. Retrieved April 30, 2002, from http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/suicide 020416.html

Jenkins, P. (1994a). The 'ice age' – The social construction of a drug panic. *Justice Quarterly, 11*, 7-31.

Jenkins, P. (1994b). *Using murder: The social construction of serial homicide.* New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Jenkins, P. (2003). *Images of terror: What we can and can't know about terrorism*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). *Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Kantner, L., Sova, D., & Anschuetz, L. (2005). *Organizing qualitative data from lab and field: Challenges and methods.* Retrieved December 1, 2005, from http://www.teced.com

Kimhi, S., & Even, S. (2003). *Who are the Palestinian suicide terrorists?* Retrieved April 4, 2004, from http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v6n2p5Kim.html

King, J. (2002). White House condemns 'homicide bombing.' Retrieved June 30, 2005, from http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/04/12/Bush.mideast.reax/

Kitsuse, J. I., & Spector, M. (1995). The definition of social problems. In E. Rubington & M. S. Weinberg (Eds.), *The study of social problems: Seven perspectives* (5th edition) (pp. 294-301). New York: Oxford University Press.

Kluger, Y., Mayo, A., Hiss, J., Ashkenazi, E., Bendahan, J., Blumenfeld, A., Michaelson, M., Stein, M., Simon, D., Schwartz, I., & Alfici, R. (2005). Medical consequences of terrorist bombs containing spherical metal pellets: Analysis of a suicide terrorism event. *European Journal of Emergency Medicine, 12*, 19-23.

Kondaki, C. (2001). Suicide terrorism, an age-old weapon, adds technology. *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 29*, 8-9.

Kushner, H. W. (1996). Suicide bombers: Business as usual. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19*, 329-337.

Kushner, S., & Norris, N. (1981). Interpretation, negotiation and validity in naturalistic research. *Interchange, 11*, 26-36.

Laqueur, W. (2003). *No end to war: Terrorism in the twenty-first century*. New York: Continuum.

LeCompte, M. D. (1993). A framework for hearing silence: What does telling stories mean when we are supposed to be doing science? In D. McLaughlin & W. Tierney (Eds.), *Naming silenced lives: Personal narratives and the process of educational change* (pp. 9-27). New York: Routledge.

Lewis, J. D. (1976). The classic American pragmatists as forerunners to symbolic interactionism. *Sociological Quarterly, 17*, 347-359.

202

Lincoln, Y., & Guba, E. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Loseke, D. R., & Best, J. (Eds.) (2003). *Social problems: Constructionist readings.* New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Luft, G. (2002). The Palestinian H-bomb. *Foreign Affairs, 81*, 2-8.

Maines, D. R., Sugrue, N. M., & Katovich, M. A. (1983). The sociological import of G. H. Mead's theory of the past. *American Sociological Review, 48*, 161-173.

Mansdorf, I. J. (2003). *The psychological framework of suicide terrorism*. Retrieved April 4, 2004, from http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp496.htm

Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (1998). *Designing qualitative research* (3rd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

McKinney, J. C. (1991). The contribution of George H. Mead to the sociology of knowledge. In K. Plummer (Ed.), *Symbolic interactionism – Volume I* (pp. 113-118). Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing.

McMillan, J. H., & Schumacher, S. S. (1997). *Research in education: A conceptual introduction*. New York: Longman.

Meltzer, B. N., Petras, J. W., & Reynolds, L. T. (1991). Criticisms of symbolic interactionism. In K. Plummer (Ed.), *Symbolic interactionism – Volume II* (pp. 23-63). Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing.

MEMRITV (2005, October 28). *IRIB 3TV Iranian animated after-school special*. Retrieved November 30, 2005, from http://www.memritv.org

Miller, D. L. (1973). George Herbert Mead: Symbolic interaction and social change. *The Psychological Record, 23*, 294-304.

Miller, M. M., & Riechert, B. P. (1994, August). *Identifying themes via concept mapping: A new method of content analysis*. Paper presented at the meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Knoxville, TN.

Moghadam, A. (2003). Palestinian suicide terrorism in the second Intifada: Motivations and organizational aspects. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26*, 65-92.

Mrena, R., Paakkonen, R., Back, L., Pirvola, U., & Ylikoski, J. (2004). Otologic consequences of blast exposure: A Finnish case study of a shopping mall bomb explosion. *Acta Oto-Laryngologica, 124*(8), 946-952.

203

Nahmias, R. (2005a). *'40,000 time bombs in Iran.'* Retrieved September 12, 2005, from http://www.ynetnews.com

Nahmias, R. (2005b). *Iran admits 'suicide column' program.* Retrieved September 12, 2005, from http://www.ynetnews.com

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (2004). *The 9/11 Commission report: Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Nyatepe-Coo A. A., & Zeisler-Vralsted, D. (Eds.) (2004). *Understanding terrorism: Threats in an uncertain world*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson / Prentice Hall.

Pape, R. (2005). *Causes of global suicide terrorism*. Retrieved November 12, 2005, from http://www.washingtonpost.com

Pape, R. A. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *American Political Science Review, 97*(3), 1-19.

Patton, M. Q. (2001). *Qualitative research and evaluation methods* (3rd edition). London: Sage Publications.

Pavlova, E. (2004). *Jihad online: The public face of al-Qaeda?* Retrieved April 13, 2005, from http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo04/paper/andalo04-pavlova.pdf

Paz, R. (2001). The Saudi fatwah against suicide terrorism. *Peacewatch, 323*. Retrieved September 15, 2002, from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2001/323.htm

Perina, K. (2002). Suicide terrorism: Seeking motives beyond mental illness. *Psychology Today, 35*, 15-24.

Perl, R. F. (1997). Terrorism, the media, and the government: Perspectives, trends, and options for policymakers. Retrieved November 1, 2005, from http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/crs-terror.htm

Pinker, S. (2002). *The blank slate: The modern denial of human nature*. New York: Viking.

Pipes, D. (1986, Summer). The scourge of suicide terrorism. *National Interest*. Retrieved August 13, 2003, from http://www.danielpipes.org/article/175

Plummer, K. (Ed.) (1991a). *Symbolic interactionism – Volume I*. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Plummer, K. (Ed.) (1991b). *Symbolic interactionism – Volume II*. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Poland, J. M. (2004). *Understanding terrorism: Groups, strategies, and responses* (2nd edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall.

Prus, R. (1996). *Symbolic interaction and ethnographic research: Intersubjectivity and the study of human lived experience.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Reinharz, S. (1992). *Feminist methods in social research*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Reuter, J. (2004). *Chechnya's suicide bombers: Desperate, devout, or deceived?* Retrieved April 13, 2005, from http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/reports/

Ropers, R. (1973). Mead, Marx and social psychology. *Catalyst, 7,* 42-61.

Rotella, S. (2005, December 1). Female Belgian suicide bomber in Iraq marks grim first. *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved December 2, 2005, from http://www.latimes.com

Rothe, D., & Muzzatti, S. L. (2004). Enemies everywhere: Terrorism, moral panic, and US civil society. *Critical Criminology, 12*, 327-350.

Schwandt, T. (1997). *Qualitative inquiry: A dictionary of terms.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Schweitzer, Y. (2001). *Suicide bombings – The ultimate weapon?* Retrieved September 30, 2002, from http://www.ict.org.il

Schweitzer, Y. (2002). Suicide terrorism: Development and main characteristics. In International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), *Countering suicide terrorism* (pp. 77-88). New York: Anti-Defamation League.

Searle, J. (1995). *The construction of social reality*. New York: Free Press.

Selegut, C. (2003). *Sacred fury: Understanding religious violence*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

Shadish, W. R. (1995b). Philosophy of science and the quantitative-qualitative debates: Thirteen common errors. *Evaluation and Program Planning, 18*(1), 63-75.

Shibutani, T. (1988). Herbert Blumer's contributions to twentieth-century sociology. *Symbolic Interaction, 11*(1), 23-31.

205

Shott, S. (1976). Society, self and mind in moral philosophy: The Scottish moralists as precursors of symbolic interactionism. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 12*, 39-46.

Siegel-Itzkovich, J. (2001). Israeli minister orders hepatitis B vaccine for survivors of suicide bomb attacks. *British Medical Journal, 323*, 417.

Silke, A. (2004). *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements & Failures.* London: Frank Cass.

Simon, S., & Stevenson, J. (2003, Winter). Confronting Hamas. *National Interest, 74,* 59-69.

Simonsen, C. E., & Spindlove, J. R. (2003). *Terrorism today: The past, the players, the future* (2nd edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Smith, B. (1998). *'It doesn't count because it's subjective!' (Re)conceptualising the qualitative researcher role as 'validity' embraces subjectivity*. Paper presented in the Advance Paper section of the AARE Annual Conference, Adelaide, Australia, September 1998. Retrieved January 13, 2005, from http://www.aare.edu.au

Smith, J. (1992). Interpretive inquiry: A practical and moral activity. *Theory Into Practice, 31*(2), 100-106.

Spector, M., & Kitsuse, J. I. (1977). *Constructing social problems*. Menlo Park, CA: Cummings.

Sprinzak, E. (1998, Autumn). The great superterrorism scare. *Foreign Policy, 112*, 110-124.

Sprinzak, E. (2000a). Extremism and violence in Israeli democracy. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 12*(3/4), 209-236.

Sprinzak, E. (2000b). Outsmarting suicide terrorists. *Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved January 4, 2003, from http://csmonitor.com

Stemler, E. (2001). An introduction to content analysis. Retrieved January 11, 2004, from http://www.ericdigests.org/2002-2/content.htm

Stigler, J. W., Gonzales, P., Kawanaka, T., Knoll, S., & Serrano, A. (1999). *The TIMSS Videotape Classroom Study: Methods and Findings from an Exploratory Research Project on Eighth-Grade Mathematics Instruction in Germany, Japan, and the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Stork, J. (2002). *Erased in a moment: Suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilians*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). *Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Strenski, I. (2003). Sacrifice, gift and the social logic of Muslim 'Human Bombers.' *Terrorism and Political Violence, 15,* 1-34.

Stryker, S. (1980). *Symbolic interactionism: A social structural version*. Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/Cummings Publishing.

Suicide terrorists hunted in Chechnya (2003, July 24). *Pravda*. Retrieved April 13, 2005, from http://english.pravda.ru/accidents/21/93/374/10575_chechnya.html

Telhami, S. (2002). Why suicide terrorism takes root. *The New York Times*, A23. Waldman, A. (2003). Masters of suicide bombing: Tamil guerrillas of Sri Lanka. *The New York Times*, A1.

Tellis, W. (1997). Introduction to case study. *The Qualitative Report, 3*(2). Retrieved January 29, 2006, from http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-2/tellis1.html

Text of Bush's address (2001, September 11). Retrieved September 11, 2004 from http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/

Thorne, S. (2000). Data analysis in qualitative research. *Evidence-Based Nursing, 3,* 68-70.

Turk, A. T. (2002a). Terrorism. In J. Dressler (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, Volume 4* (2nd edition) (pp. 1549-1556). New York: MacMillan.

Turk, A. T. (2004). Sociology of terrorism. *Annual Review of Sociology, 30*, 271-286.

United States Senate (2001). *The USA PATRIOT Act*. Retrieved November 2003, from http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.pdf

US Army Training and Doctrine Command (2005). *Suicide bombing in the COE*. Retrieved August 22, 2005, from http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/sup3.pdf

van Biema, D. (2001, December 17). Why the bombers keep coming. *Time Atlantic*. Retrieved August 15, 2003, from http://www.timeatlantic.com

Van de Voorde, C. (2005). Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). *Police Practice and Research, 6*(2), 181-199.

207

Van de Voorde, C. V., & Mason, T. J. (2004). *Countering suicide terrorism: Phenomenology, etiology, risk assessment, and prevention.* Tampa, FL: Global Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action.

van Leeuwen, M. (Ed.) (2003c). *Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies.* The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

Victor, B. (2002). *Shahidas: Les femmes kamikazes de Palestine* [Shahidas: The female kamikaze of Palestine]. Paris : Flammarion.

Victor, B. (2003). *Army of roses: Inside the world of Palestinian women suicide bombers*. New York: Rodale.

Waskul, D. D. (2002). The naked self: Being a body in televideo cybersex. *Symbolic Interaction, 25*(2), 199-227.

Waskul, D. D. (2003). *Self-games and body-play: Personhood in online chat and cybersex*. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang.

White, J. R. (2003). *Terrorism: An introduction* (4th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth.

Whittaker, D. J. (2001). *The terrorism reader*. New York: Routledge.

Whittaker, D. J. (2002). *Terrorism: Understanding the global threat.* London: Pearson Education.

Wilkinson, P. (1997). The media and terrorism: A reassessment. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 9*(2), 51-64.

Wolfson, A. (2003, September 16). Demystify it: How to defeat suicide terrorism. *National Review Online*. Retrieved December 12, 2004, from http://www.nationalreview.com

Yin, R. (1994). *Case study research: Design and methods* (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Young, J. (2005). *Constructing the paradigm of violence: Mass media, violence and youth.* Retrieved November 30, 2005, from http://www.ukobservatory.com

Zafar, H., Rehmani, R., Chawla, T., Umer, M., & e-Azam, M. (2005). Suicidal bus bombing of French national in Pakistan: physical injuries and management of survivors. *Journal of Emergency Medicine, 12*, 163-167.

Zwi, A. B. (2002). Studying political violence: We should push for more from epidemiology. *International Journal of Epidemiology, 31*, 585-586.

Bibliography

Abrams, P. (1991). The historical sociology of individuals – Monsters and heroes: Careers and contigencies. In K. Plummer (Ed.), *Symbolic interactionism – Volume II* (pp. 223-255). Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Adler, P., Adler, P., & Fontana, A. (1987). Everyday life sociology. *Annual Review of Sociology, 13*, 217-235.

Akers, R. L., & Sellers, C. S. (2004). *Criminological theories: Introduction, evaluation, and application* (4th edition). Los Angeles: Roxbury.

Al-Hail, A. (2004, November 4). *In the midst of terror phobia and the 'war on terrorism': A pause should be considered to read into Islamic ideology.* Retrieved November 14, 2004, from http://www.aljazeerah.info

Al-Hasan, B. (1986). Who has the right to condemn terrorism? *Journal of Palestine Studies, 15*(3), 150-151.

Alexander, Y., & Kilmarx, R. A. (Eds.) (1979). *Political terrorism and business: The threat and response.* New York: Praeger.

Amnesty International (2005). *Sri Lanka: Act now to prevent escalation of violence and abuse.* Retrieved December 5, 2005, from http://news.amnesty.org

Anderson, G. (2001). A lesson in modern terrorism. *Vital Speeches of the Day, 68*(4), 117-124.

Anti-Defamation League (2002). *Arab leaders glorify suicide terrorism.* Retrieved October 15, 2002 from http://www.adl.org/israel/israel_suicide_terror.asp

Apter, D. (1997). *The legitimization of violence.* New York: New York University Press.

Archick, K. (2003). Europe and counterterrorism: Strengthening police and judicial cooperation. In K. Archick & P. Gallis (Eds.), *Europe and counterterrorism* (pp.1-34)*. New York: Nova Science.

Ardila, R. (2002). The psychology of the terrorist: Behavioral perspectives. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), *The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 1. A public understanding* (pp. 9-16). Westport, CT: Praeger.

210

Arendt, H. (1970). *On violence*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Arnold, T. E. (1988). *The violence formula: Why people lend sympathy and support to terrorism*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Arosalo, S. (1998). Social conditions for political violence: Red and white terror in the Finnish civil war of 1918. *Journal of Peace and Research, 35*(2), 147-166.

Ashenberg-Straussner, S. L., & Kolko Phillips, N. (2004). *Understanding mass violence: A social work perspective*. Boston: Pearson.

Assaf, M. (2003). Palestinian suicide terrorism in the second Intifada: Motivations and organizational aspects. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26*, 65-92.

Aughey, A. (1988). Political violence in Northern Ireland. In H. H. Tucker (Ed.), *Combating the terrorists: Democratic responses to political violence* (pp. 75-111). New York: Facts on File.

Auvinen, J. (1997). Political conflict in less developed countries, 1981-1989. *Journal of Peace Research, 34*(2), 177-195.

Aya, R. (1979). Theories of revolution reconsidered: Contrasting models of collective violence. *Theory and Society*, 8(1), 39-99.

Azam, J.-P. (2005). Suicide bombing as inter-generational investment. *Public Choice, 122*(1-2), 177-198.

Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (1973). Values and violence: A test of the subculture of violence thesis. *American Sociological Review, 38*(6), 736-749.

Bandura, A. (1990). Mechanisms of moral disengagement. In W. Reich (Ed.), *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (pp. 161-191). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Barkan, S. E., & Snowden, L. L. (2001). *Collective violence*. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

Barkun, M. (2000). Violence in the name of democracy: Justifications for separatism on the radical right. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 12*(3/4), 193-208.

Barry, R. (1980). Just war theory and the logic of reconciliation. *New Scholasticism, 54*, 129-152.

211

Baruch, E. H. (2003). Psychoanalysis and terrorism: The need for a global 'talking cure.' *Psychoanalytic Psychology, 20*(4), 698-700.

Beck, J. M. (2000). The continuity of Basque political violence: A geographical perspective on the legitimisation of violence. *GeoJournal, 48*, 109-121.

Beer, F. A. (1979). The epidemiology of peace and war. *International Studies Quarterly*, *23*(1), 45-86.

Beinin, J., & Stork, J. (Eds.) (1997). *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Belsey, A., & Chadwick, R. (Eds.) (1992). *Ethical issues in journalism and the media*. London: Routledge.

Benson, M., & Kugler, J. (1998). Power parity, democracy, and the severity of internal violence. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *42*(2), 196-209.

Benzies, K. M., & Allen, M. N. (2001). Symbolic interactionism as a theoretical perspective for multiple method research. *Journal of Advanced Nursing, 33*(4), 541-547.

Blalock, H. M. (1989). *Power and conflict: Toward a general theory*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Blossfeld, H. P. (1996). Macro-sociology, rational choice theory, and time: A theoretical perspective on the empirical analysis of social processes. *European Sociological Review*, *12*(2), 181-206.

Bonanate, L. (1979). Some unanticipated consequences of terrorism. *Journal of Peace Research*, *16*(3), 197-211.

Bonner, J. (1986). *Introduction to the theory of social choice.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Borum, R., & Gelles, M. (2005). Al-Qaeda's operational evolution: Behavioral and organizational perspectives. *Behavioral Science and the Law, 23*, 467-483.

Boswell, T., & Dixon, W. J. (1990). Dependency and rebellion: A cross-national analysis. *American Sociological Review*, *55*(4), 540-559.

Boswell, T., & Dixon, W. J. (1993). Marx's theory of rebellion: A cross-national analysis of class exploitation, economic development, and violent revolt. *American Sociological Review*, *58*(5), 681-702.

Brady, M. P. (2002). Quotidian warfare. *Signs, 28*(1), 446-447.

Brass, P. R. (1997). *Theft of an idol: Text and context in the representation of collective violence*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Brindle, D. (1999). Media coverage of social policy: A journalist's perspectiv. In B. Fanklin (Ed.), *Social policy, the media and misrepresentation* (pp. 39-50). New York: Routledge.

Brownfield, D. (1986). Social class and violent behavior. *Criminology, 24*, 421-437.

Brubaker, R., & Laitin, D. D. (1998). Ethnic and nationalist violence. *Annual Review of Sociology, 24*, 423-452.

Brush, S. G. (1996). Dynamics of theory change in the social sciences: Relative deprivation and collective violence. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40*(4), 523-545.

Buchanan, A. (1979). Revolutionary motivation and rationality. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9*(1), 59-82.

Bueno de Mesquita, E. (2003). *The quality of terror*. Retrieved January 10, 2004, from http://www.princeton.edu/~pegrad/papers/bueno.pdf

Busch, K. G., & Weissman, S. H. (2005). The intelligence community and the war on teror: The role of behavioral science. *Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 23*, 559-571.

Byman, D. (1998). The logic of ethnic terrorism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21*, 149-169.

Cairns, E. (1996). *Children and political violence*. Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishers.

Carey, B. (2002). Are suicide bombers insane? *Los Angeles Times,* August 18, 2002. Retrieved September 16, 2002, from http://www.supportisrael.info/are_suicide_bombers_insane.htm

Carey, J. W., Morgan, M., & Oxtoby, M. J. (1996). Intercoder agreement in analysis of responses to open-ended interview questions: Examples from tuberculosis research. *Cultural Anthropology Methods, 8*(3), 1-5.

Cettina, N. (2003). The French approach: Vigour and vigilance. In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), *Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies* (pp.57-70). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

213

Chadwick, E. (1997). Terrorism and the law: Historical contexts, contemporary dilemmas, and the end(s) of democracy. *Crime Law and Social Change, 26*(4), 329-350.

Chai, S. K. (1993). An organizational economics theory of antigovernment violence. *Comparative Politics, 26*(1), 99-110.

Chechnya's 'black widow' bombers (2003). Retrieved December 13, 2004, from http://www.cnn.com

Chermak, S. (1994). Crime in the news media: A refined understanding of how crimes become news. In G. Barak (Ed.), *Media, process,and the social construction of crime: Studies in newsmaking criminology* (pp. 95-129). New York: Garland Publishing.

Chermak, S. (2003). Marketing fear: Representing terrorism after September 11. *Journal of Crime, Conflict and the Media, 1*(1), 5-22.

Chernick, M. W. (1988). Negotiated settlement to armed conflict: Lessons from the Colombian peace process. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 30*(4), 53-88.

Chosak, J., & Sawyer, J. (2005). *Hamas's tactics: Lessons from recent attacks*. Retrieved November 2, 2005, from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org

Chowdhari Tremblay, R. (1996). Nation, identity and the intervening role of the state: A study of the secessionist movement in Kashmir. *Pacific Affairs, 69*(4), 471-497.

Chowning Davies, J. (1974). The J-curve and power struggle theories of collective violence. *American Sociological Review, 39*(4), 607-610.

Clarke, A. E., & Gerson, E. M. (1990). Symbolic interactionism in social studies of science. In H. S. Becker & M. M. McCall (Eds.), *Symbolic interaction and cultural studies* (pp. 179-214). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Clarke, R. A. (2004). *Against all enemies: Inside America's war on terror*. New York: Free Press.

Claster, D. S. (1992). *Bad guys and good guys: Moral polarization and crime*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Clutterbuck, R. (Ed.) (1986). *The future of political violence: Destabilization, disorder and terrorism*. New York: Saint Martin's Press.

Cohen, S. (1972). *Folk devils and moral panics*. London: McGibbon and Kee.

Cohen, S., & Young, J. (Eds.) (1973). *The manufacture of news: A reader.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Cohen, S., & Young, J. (Eds.) (1981). *The manufacture of news: Social problems, deviance and the mass media*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Collier, P. (2000, March). *Policy for post-conflict societies: Reducing the risks of renewed conflict*. Paper presented at the Economics of Political Violence conference, Princeton, NJ.

Collins, R. (1983). Micromethods as a basis for macrosociology. *Urban Life, 12*(2), 184-202.

Combs, C. C. (1997). *Terrorism in the twenty-first century*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Conboy, M. (2002). *The press and popular culture*. London: Sage Publications.

Cone, J. D., & Foster, S. L. (1993). *Dissertations and theses from start to finish: Psychology and related fields*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Conteh-Morgan, E. (2004). *Collective political violence*. New York: Routledge.

Cooper, C. D. (2001). *Not just a numbers thing: Tactics for improving reliability and validity in qualitative research*. Retrieved January 13, 2005, from http://www.aom.pace.edu/rmd/ 2001forum/methods_article_with_refs.pdf

Coronil, F., & Skurski, J. (1991). Dismembering and remembering the nation: The semantics of political violence in Venezuela. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 33(2), 288-337.

Corsi, J. R. (1981). Terrorism as a desperate game: Fear, barganing, and communication in the terrorist event. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25*(1), 47-85.

Corsun, A. (2003). *Political violence against Americans 2002*. Washington, DC: Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis.

Craig, S. C., & Wald, K. D. (1985). Whose ox to gore? A comment on the relationship between political discontent and political violence. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 38(4), 652-662.

Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379-399.

Crenshaw, M. (1985). An organizational approach to the analysis of political terrorism. *Orbis, 29*, 465-489.

Crenshaw, M. (1988). Theories of terrorism: Instrumental and organizational approaches. In D. C. Rapoport, *Inside terrorist organizations* (pp.13-31). New York: Columbia University Press.

Crenshaw, M. (1990). The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice. In W. Reich (Ed.), *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (pp. 7-24). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Crenshaw, M. (2000). Democracy, commitment problems and managing ethnic violence: The case of India and Sri Lanka. T*errorism and Political Violence, 12*(3/4), 135-159.

Crenshaw, M. (2002). "Suicide" terrorism in comparative perspective. In International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), *Countering suicide terrorism* (pp. 21-29). New York: Anti-Defamation League.

Crenshaw, M. (Ed.) (1983). *Terrorism, legitimacy, and power: The consequences of political violence.* Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.

Crenshaw Hutchinson, M. (1972). The concept of revolutionary terrorism. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16*(3), 383-396.

Cullen, F. T., & Agnew, R. (Eds.) (1999). *Criminological theory: Past to present – Essential readings*. Los Angeles: Roxbury.

Cullen, S. M. (1993). Political violence: The case of the British Union of Fascists. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 28(2), 245-267.

Dartnell, M. Y. (1995). *Action Directe: Ultra-left terrorism in France, 1979-1987.* London: Frank Cass.

Davidson, S. G. (1993). Canada's counter-terrorism experience. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 5*(1), 83-105.

Davies, J. C. (1962). Toward a theory of revolution. *American Sociological Review, 27*(1), 5-19.

Davies, J. C. (1969). The J-curve of rising and declining satisfaction as a cause of some great revolutions and a contained rebellion. In H. D. Graham & T. R. Gurr (Eds.), *The history of violence in America* (pp. 690-739). New York: Bantam.

Davies, J. C. (1974). The J-curve and power struggle theories of collective violence. *American Sociological Review, 39*(4), 607-610.

Davis, J. M. (2003). *Martyrs : Innocence, vengeance and despair in the Middle East.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

de Figueiredo, R. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2001). *Vicious cycles: Endogenous political extremism and political violence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies.

Deacon, D. (1999). Charitable images: The construction of voluntary sector news. In B. Fanklin (Ed.), *Social policy, the media and misrepresentation* (pp. 51-68). New York: Routledge.

Delli Carpini, M. X., & Williams, B. A. (1987). Television and terrorism: Patterns of presentation and occurrence, 1969 to 1980. *The Western Political Quarterly, 40*(1), 45-64.

DeFronzo, J. (1996). *Revolutions and revolutionary movements.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

den Boer, M. (2003). The EU counter-terrorism wave: Window of opportunity or profound policy transformation? In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), *Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies* (pp.185-206). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

Denny, F. M. (2002). September 11, 2001: Percussion and transition in America's view of the world. *September 11 and Beyond: Prentice Hall Authors Speak Out* (pp. 35-38). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Denzin, N. K. (1988). Blue velvet: Postmodern contradictions. *Theory, Culture and Society, 5*, 461-473.

Denzin, N. L. (2000). *Handbook of qualitative research* (2nd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Desjarlais, R., & Klienman, A. (1994). Violence and demoralization in the New World Disorder. *Anthropology Today, 10*(5), 9-12.

Deutsch, K. (1954). *Nationalism and social communication*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Diener, E. (1976). Effects of prior destructive behavior, anonymity, and group presence on deindividuation and aggression. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,33,* 497-507.

217

Diener, E. (1979). Deindividuation, self-awareness, and disinhibition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37,* 1160-1171.

Diener, E., Lusk, R., DeFour, D., & Flax, R. (1980). Deindividuation: Effects of group size, density, number of observers, and group member similarity on self-consciousness and disinhibited behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39,* 449-459.

Dolnik, A. (2003). Die and let die: Exploring links between suicide terrorism and terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26*(2), 17-35.

Donohue, L. K. (2001). In the name of national security: U.S. counterterrorist measures, 1960-2000. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(3), 15-60.

Douglass, W. A., & Zulaika, J. (1990). On the interpretation of terrorist violence: ETA and the Basque political process. *Comparative Studies in Society and History, 32*(2), 238-257.

Dressler, J. (Ed.) (2002). *Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, Volume 4* (2nd edition). New York: MacMillan.

Drummond, J. T. (2002). From the northwest imperative to global jihad: Social psychological aspects of the construction of the enemy, political violence, and terror. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), *The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 1. A public understanding* (pp. 9-16). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Du Toit, A. B. (1990). Discourses on political violence: The problem of coherence. *South African Journal of Philosophy, November*, 91-213.

Durkheim, E. (1951). *Suicide: A study in sociology*. New York: Free Press.

Ebert, R. (2005). *Paradise Now: Questions, from here to eternity*. Retrieved November 30, 2005, from http://rogerebert.suntimes.com

Eckstein, H. (1965). On the etiology of internal wars. *History and Theory*, *4*(2), 133-163.

Eckstein, H. (1980). Theoretical approaches to explaining collective political violence. In T. R. Gurr (Ed.), *Handbook of political conflict*. New York: Free Press.

Edgerton, R. B. (1976). *Deviance: A cross-cultural perspective.* Menlo Park, CA: Cummings Publishing.

Eggen, D., & Wilson, S. (2005). *Suicide bombs potent tools of terrorists*. Retrieved November 2, 2005, from http://www.washingtonpost.com

218

Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. *Academy of Management Review, 14*(4), 532-550.

Eisenman, D. P., Gelberg, L., Liu, H., & Shapiro, M. F. (2003). Mental health and health-related quality of life among adult Latino primary care patients living in the United States with previous exposure to political violence. *Journal of the American Medical Association, 290*(5), 627-634.

Ekblad, S. (2002). Ethnopolitical warfare, traumatic family stress, and the mental health of refugee children. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), *The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 2. Clinical aspects and responses* (pp. 27-48). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Elazar, D. S. (2000). Electoral democracy, revolutionary politics, and political violence: The emergence of Fascism in Italy, 1920-1921. *British Journal of Sociology, 51*(3), 461-487.

Ellens, J. H. (2002). Psychological legitimization of violence by religious archetypes. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), *The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 3. Theoretical understanding and perspectives* (pp. 149-162). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Ellina, M., & Moore, W. H. (1990). Discrimination and political violence: A cross-national study with two time periods. *The Western Political Quarterly*, *43*(2), 267-278.

Elster, J. (1985). Rationality, morality, and collective action. *Ethics, 96*(1), 136-155.

Emmanuel, S. (2002). The female militant romanticised. *Women in Action, 15*(4). Retrieved December 8, 2003, from http://www.isiswomen.org

Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2000). Is transnational terrorism becoming more threatening? A time-series investigation. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *44*(3), 307-332.

Englander, E. K. (2003). *Understanding violence* (2nd edition). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Ergil, D. (2002). Suicide terrorism in Turkey: The Workers' Party of Kurdistan. In International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), *Countering suicide terrorism* (pp. 109-133). New York: Anti-Defamation League.

Ericson, R. V. (1992). Media, State and nation: Political violence and collective identities. *The British Journal of Sociology, 43*(3), 506-508.

Esposito, J. L. (2002). *Unholy war: Terror in the name of Islam.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Esquith, S. L. (2000). War, political violence, and service learning. *Teaching Philosophy, 23*(3), 241-254.

Esquith, S. L. (2003). Re-enacting mass violence. *Polity, 35*(4), 513-536.

Eubank, W., & Weinberg, L. (2001). Terrorism and democracy: Perpetrators and victims. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(1), 155-164.

Eyre, L. A. (1984). Political violence and urban geography in Kingston, Jamaica. *Geographical Review*, *74*(1), 24-37.

Ezeldin, A. G. (1987). *Terrorism and political violence: An Egyptian perspective*. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago.

Fanklin, B. (Ed.) (1999b). *Social policy, the media and misrepresentation.* New York: Routledge.

Fashina, O. (1989). Frantz Fanon and the ethical justification of anti-colonial violence. *Social Theory and Practice, 15*, 179-212.

Fearon, J. D. (1994). *Ethnic war as a commitment problem*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (September), New York.

Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. *International Organizations, 49*, 379-414.

Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (1996). Explaining interethnic cooperation. *American Political Science review, 90*(4), 715-735.

Feierabend, I. K., Feierabend, R. L., & Nesvold, B. A. (1969). Social change and political violence: Cross-national patterns. In H. D. Graham & T. R. Gurr (Eds.), *Violence in America: Historical and comparative perspectives* (pp. 632-681). New York: Bantam Books.

Feierabend, I. K., Feierabend, R. L., & Nesvold, B. A. (1973). The comparative study of revolution and violence. *Comparative Politics*, *5*(3), 393-424.

Felson, R. B. (1996). Mass media effects on violent behavior. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *22*, 103-128.

Ferracuti, F. (1981). On violence: Paradoxes and antinomies. *Social Research, 48*(1), 3-222.

Ferrell, J. (2003). Cultural criminology. In M. D. Schwartz & S. E. Hatty, *Controversies in critical criminology* (pp. 71-84). Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing.

Filler, D. M. (2003). Terrorism, panic and pedophilia. *Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law, 10*(3), 345-382.

Fine, S. (1955). Anarchism and the assassination of McKinley. *The American Historical Review*, *60*(4), 777-799.

Finkel, S. E., & Muller, E. N. (1998). Rational choice and the dynamics of collective political action: Evaluating alternative models with panel data. *American Political Science Review, 92*(1), 37-49.

Finkel, S. E., Muller, E. N., & Opp, K. D. (1989). Personal influences, collective rationality, and mass political action. *The American Political Science Review, 83*(3), 885-903.

Fisher, B. M., & Strauss, A. L. (1978). The Chicago tradition and social change: Thomas, Park and their successors. *Symbolic Interaction, 1*(2), 5-23.

Flanigan, W. H., & Fogelman, E. (1970). Patterns of political violence in comparative historical perspective. *Comparative Politics*, *3*(1), 1-20.

Foran, J. (1993). Theories of revolution revisited: Toward a fourth generation? *Sociological Theory, 11*(1), 1-20.

Fording, R. C. (1997). The conditional effect of violence as a political tactic: Mass insurgency, welfare generosity, and electoral context in the American States. *American Journal of Political Science*, *41*(1), 1-29.

Fox, J. (2003). Are religious minorities more militant than other ethnic minorities? *Alternatives: Global, local, political, 28*(1), 92-117.

Fox, J., & Squires, J. (2001). Threats to primal identities: A comparison of nationalism and religion as impacts on ethnic protest and rebellion. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(1), 87-102.

Franklin, B. (1999a). Soft-soaping the public? The government and media promotion of socil policy. In B. Fanklin (Ed.), *Social policy, the media and misrepresentation* (pp. 17-38). New York: Routledge.

Freeman, M. (1972). Theories of revolution. *British Journal of Political Science*, *2*(3), 339-359.

Freeman, M. (1978). Edmund Burke and the theory of revolution. *Political Theory*, *6*(3), 277-297.

Friedman, D., & Hechter, M. (1988). The contribution of rational choice theory to macrosociological research. *Sociological Theory, 6*(2), 201-218.

Funes, M.J. (1998). Social responses to political violence in the Basque Country: Peace movements and their audience. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *42*(4), 493-510.

Gage, N. L. (Ed.). (1966). *Handbook of research on teaching*. Chicago: Rand NcNally.

Gartner, S. S., & Regan, P. M. (1996). Threat and repression: The non-linear relationship between government and oppositional violence. *Journal of Peace Research, 33*(3), 273-287.

Gates, J. M. (1986). Toward a history of revolution. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, *28*(3), 535-544.

Gautier, C. (2002). *Some problems in the characterisation of violence in politics: The example of fanaticism and its causes.* Malden, MA: UNESCO/Blackwell Publishers.

Geller, D. S. (1987). The impact of political system structure on probability patterns of internal disorder. *American Journal of Political Science*, *31*(2), 217-235.

George, D. (1988). Distinguishing classical tyrannicide from modern terrorism. *The Review of Politics, 50*, (3), 390-419.

Georges-Abeyie, D. E. (1981). Terrorism and the liberal state: A reasonable response. *Police Studies, 4*(3), 34-53.

Gibbs, J. P. (1989). Conceptualization of terrorism. *American Sociological Review, 54*(3), 329-340.

Gibson, K. (1989). Children in political violence. *Social Science and Medicine*, *28*(7), 659-668.

Gibson, K. (1991, July). *The indirect effects of political violence on children: Does violence beget violence?* Paper presented at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Girard, R. (1972). *La violence et le sacré* [Violence and the sacred]. Paris: Grasset.

Glasser, S. B. (2005, May 15). 'Martyrs' in Iraq mostly Saudis. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved September 23, 2005, from http://www.washingtonpost.com

222

Godson, R. (1994). Crisis of governance: Devising strategy to counter international organized crime. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 6*(2), 163-177.

Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Press.

Golafshani, N. (2003). Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research. *The Qualitative Report, 8*(4), 597-607.

Goldberg, D. T. (1989). *Ethical theory and social issues: Historical texts and contemporary readings*. Orlando, FL: Holt Rinehart Winst.

Goldman, E. (1974). *The psychology of political violence*. New York: Gordon Press.

Goldstein, A. P., & Segall, M. H. (Eds.) (1983). *Aggression in global perspective*. New York: Pergamon Press.

Goldstone, J. A. (1982). The comparative and historical study of revolutions. *Annual Review of Sociology, 8*, 187-207.

Goldstone, J. A. (1986). The comparative and historical study of revolutions. In J. A. Goldstone (Ed.), *Revolutions: Theoretical, comparative, and historical studies* (pp. 1-17). San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Goldstone, J. A. (1991a). *Revolution and rebellion in the early modern world.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Goldstone, J. A. (1991b). An analytic framework. In J. A. Goldstone, T. R. Gurr, & F. Moshiri, *Revolutions of the late twentieth century* (pp. 37-51). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Gould, R. V. (1999). Collective violence and group solidarity: Evidence from a feuding society. *American Sociological Review, 64*(3), 356-380.

Gouldner, A. W. (1982). Marx's last battle: Bakunin and the First International. *Theory and Society, 11*(6), 853-884.

Graaff, J. (2001). South African explanations of political violence: 1980-1995. *South African Journal of Philosophy, 20*(1), 102-123.

Graham, H. D., & Gurr, T. R. (Eds.) (1979). *Violence in America: Historical and comparative perspectives*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Green, D. P., & Seher, R. L. (2003). What role does prejudice play in ethnic conflict? *Annual Review of Political Science, 6*, 509-531.

Green, R. T., & Korth, C. M. (1974). Political instability and the foreign investor. *California Management review, 17*(1), 23-31.

Grofman, B. N., & Muller, E. N. (1973). The strange case of relative gratification and potential for political violence: The V-curve hypothesis. *The American Political Science Review, 67*(2), 514-539.

Guelke, A. (1995). *The age of terrorism and the international political system.* London: Tauris.

Guelke, A. (2000). Violence and electoral polarization in divided societies: Three cases in comparative perspective. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 12*(3/4), 78-105.

Gupta, D. K., Singh, H., and Sprague, T. (1993). Government coercion of dissidents: Deterrence or provocation. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37*(2), 301-339.

Gurr, T. R. (1970). *Why men rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gurr, T. R. (1973). The revolution – Social-change nexus: Some old theories and new hypotheses. *Comparative Politics, 5*(3), 359-392.

Gurr, T. R. (1978). Burke and the modern theory of revolution: A reply to Freeman. *Political Theory, 6*(3), 299-311.

Gurr, T. R. (1993). Why minorities rebel. *International Political Science Review, 14*(2), 161-201.

Gurr, T. R. (Ed.) (1980). *Handbook of political conflict*. New York: Free Press.

Gurr, T. R., & Bishop, V. F. (1976). Violent nations, and others. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20*(1), 79-110.

Gurr, T. R., & Ruttenberg, C. (1967). *The conditions of civil violence: First tests of a causal model*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.

Gwala, N. (1989). Political violence and the struggle for control in Pietermaritzburg. *Journal of Southern African Studies, 15*(3), 506-524.

Hagtvet, B. (1994). Right-wing extremism in Europe. *Journal of Peace Research, 31*(3), 241-246.

Haïm, L. (2003). *Les bombes humaines: Enquête au coeur du conflit Israélo-Palestinien* [Human bombs : Investigation at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict]. Paris: Editions de la Martinière.

Hall, J. R. (1990). Social interaction, culture, and historical studies. In H. S. Becker & M. M. McCall (Eds.), *Symbolic interaction and cultural studies* (pp. 16-45). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hall, P. M. (1987). Interactionsim and the study of social organization. *Sociological Quarterly, 28,* 1-22.

Hall, P. M. (1991). A symbolic interactionist analysis of politics. In K. Plummer (Ed.), *Symbolic interactionism – Volume II* (pp. 168-208). Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Hamilton, L. C., & Hamilton, J. D. (1983). Dynamics of terrorism. *International Studies Quarterly, 27*(1), 39-54.

Han, H. H. (Ed.) (1984). *Terrorism, political violence and world order*. Washington, DC: University Press of America.

Han, H. H. (Ed.) (1993). *Terrorism and political violence: Limits and possibilities of legal control*. New York: Oceana Publications.

Hardin, R. (1995). *One for all: The logic of group conflict.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Harper, J., & Yantek, T. (Eds.) (2001). *Media, profit, and politics: Competing priorities in an open society.* Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.

Hartman, J., & Hsiao, W. (1988). Inequality and violence: Issues of theory and measurement in Muller. *American Sociological Review*, *53*(5), 794-799.

Harrison, M. (2004). *An economist looks at suicide terrorism.* Retrieved July 10, 2004, from http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/harrison/papers/

Hassan, R. (2004, April 23). Terrorists and their tools – Part I – Suicide bombings driven more by politics than religious zeal. *Yale Global Online*. Retrieved December 8, 2004, from http://yaleglobal.yale.edu

Hecht, R. D. (2003). Deadly history, deadly actions, and deadly bodies: A response to Ivan Strenski's "Sacrifice, gift and the social logic of Muslim 'human bombers'". *Terrorism and Political Violence, 15*, 35-47.

Hechter, M. (1995). Explaining nationalist violence. *Nations National, 1*(1), 53-68.

Hechter, M., & Kanazawa, S. (1997). Sociological rational choice theory. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *23*, 191-214.

Hedstrom, P., & Swedberg, R. (1996). Rational choice, empirical research, and the sociological tradition. *European Sociological Review*, *12*(2), 127-146.

Held, V. (1997). The media and political violence. *Journal of Ethics, 1*(2), 187-202.

Hicks Maynard, N. (2001). Mega media: How markets are changing news. In J. Harper & T. Yantek (Eds.), *Media, profit, and politics: Competing priorities in an open society* (pp. 122-129). Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.

Hildebrand, D. K., Laing, J. D., & Rosenthal, H. (1976). Prediction analysis in political research. *The American Political Science Review*, *70*(2), 509-535.

Hill, T. E. (1997). A Kantian perspective on political violence. *Journal of Ethics, 1*(2), 105-140.

Hobbes, T. (1968). *Leviathan* [1651]. Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books.

Hoefnagels, M. (1977). *Repression and repressive violence*. Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger.

Hoffman, B. (1998). *Inside terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Holmes, J. S. (2001). Political violence and regime change in Argentina: 1965-1976. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(1), 134-154.

Holody, R. (2004). Social justice in times of mass violence. In S. L. Ashenberg Straussner & N. Kolko Phillips (Eds.), *Understanding mass violence: A social work perspective* (pp. 187-199). Boston: Pearson.

Honderich, T. (1973). Democratic violence. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, *2*(2), 190-214.

Honderich, T. (1976). *Political violence*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Honderich, T. (1989). *Violence and equality: Inquiries in political philosophy*. New York: Routledge.

Hook, S. (1973). Myth and fact in the Marxist theory of revolution and violence. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, *34*(2), 271-280.

Hoole, F. W., & Huang, C. (1992). The political economy of global conflict. *Journal of Politics, 54*(3), 834-856.

Hopmeier, M., Ganor, B., Goodwin, T., & Greinke, D. S. (2003). 'There are no dangerous weapons…': Suicide attacks and potential responses. Retrieved April 11, 2004, from http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Hopmeier.html

Horovitz, D. (2004). *Still life with bombers: Israel in the age of terrorism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Howard, R. D., & Sawyer, R. L. (Eds.) (2004). *Terrorism and counter-terrorism: Understanding the new security environment*. Guilford,CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin.

Howe, J. R., Jr. (1967). Republican thought and the political violence of the 1790s. *American Quarterly*, *19*(2), 147-165.

Howes, D. E. (2003, August). *The challenge of violence for political theory*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA.

Human Rights Watch (1990). *The "drug war" in Colombia: The neglected tragedy of political violence (Americas Watch report)*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Hume, D. (1778). *The history of England: From the invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688* [1983 ed.]. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics.

Hunt, A. (1997). 'Moral panic' and moral language in the media. *The British Journal of Sociology, 48*(4), 629-648.

Introvigne, M. (2000). Moral panics and anti-cult terrorism in Western Europe. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 12*(1), 47-59.

Isaac, S., & Michael, W. B. (1995). *Handbook in research and evaluation: A collection of principles, methods, and strategies useful in the planning, design, and evaluation of studies in education and the behavioral sciences* (3rd edition). San Diego, CA: Edits Publishers.

Israeli, R. (1998). The Arabs in Israel: Identity, criminality and the peace process. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 10*(1), 39-59.

Israeli, R. (2000). Western democracies and Islamic fundamentalist violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 12*(3/4), 160-173.

Jabara, A., & Stork, J. (1986). Political violence against Arab-Americans. *MERIP Middle East Report, 143*, 36-38.

Jackman, R. W., & Boyd, W. A. (1979). Multiple sources in the collection of data on political conflict. *American Journal of Political Science*, *23*(2), 434-458.

Jacoby, J. E. (Ed.) (1994). *Classics of Criminology* (2nd edition). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

Jansen, J. J. G. (1997). *The dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Jenkins, B. M. (1980). *Terrorism in the 1980s*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Jenkins, B. M. (1986). Defense against terrorism. *Political Science Quarterly, 101*(5), 773-786.

Jenkins, B. M., Wildhorn, S., & Lavin, M. M. (1982). *Intelligence constraints of the 1970's and domestic terrorism: Executive summary*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Jenkins, J. C., & Bond, D. (2001). Conflict-carrying capacity, political crisis, and reconstruction: A framework for the early warning of political system vulnerability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45*(1), 3-31.

Jenkins, J. C., & Schock, K. (1992). Global structures and political processes in the study of domestic political conflict. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *18*, 161-185.

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. *World Politics, 30*(2), 167-214.

Johnson, C. (1964). *Revolution and the social system*. Stanford, CT: Hoover Institution.

Johnson, G. D., & Shifflet, P. A. (1981). George Herbert Who? A critique of the objectivist reading of Mead. *Symbolic Interaction, 4*(2), 143-155.

Jones, L., Rrustemi, A., Shahini, M., & Uka, A. (2003). Mental health services for war-affected children: Report of a survey in Kosovo. *British Journal of Psychiatry, 183*, 540-546.

Jongman, A. J. (2001). Database section: Dimensions of contemporary conflict and human rights violations. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(2), 143-177.

Kandori, M. (1992). Social norms and community enforcement. *Review of Economic Studies, 59*, 63-80.

Kapferer, B. (1988). *Legends of people, myths of state: Violence, intolerance, and political culture in Sri Lanka and Australia*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute Press.

Kaplan, J. (Ed.) (2002). Millennial violence: Past, present and future. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 14*(1), 1-29.

Kaplan, K. J., & Schwartz, M. B. (Eds.) (1998). *Jewish approaches to suicide, martyrdom, and euthanasia.* Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.

Kappeler, V., Blumberg, M., & Potter, G. W. (2000). *The Mythology of crime and criminal justice.* Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.

Kara, K. (1968). On the Marxist theory of war and peace. *Journal of Peace Research, 5*(1), 1-27.

Kassimeris, G. (2001). Europe's last red terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November, 1975-2000. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(2), 67-84.

Kay, B. H. (1999). Violent opportunities: The rise and fall of "King Coca" and Shining Path. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 41*(3), 97-127.

Kelly, R. J., & Schatzberg, R. (1992). Galvanizing indiscriminate political violence: Mind-sets and some ideological constructs in terrorism. *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 16*(1), 15-41.

Keohane, R. O. (2002, September). *The globalization of informal violence, theories of world politics, and "the liberalism of fear."* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.

Kerbo, H. R. (1978). Foreign involvement in the preconditions for political violence: The World System and the case of Chile. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22*(3), 363-391.

Keyserlingk, R. H. (1977). *Media manipulation: A study of the press and Bismarck in imperial Germany*. Montreal, Canada: Renouf Publishing.

Kholi, A. (1997). Can democracies accommodate ethnic nationalism? Rise and decline of self-determination movements in India. *Journal of Asian Studies, 56*(2), 325-344.

Khosrokhavar, F. (2002). *Les nouveaux martyrs d'Allah* [Allah's new martyrs]. Paris : Flammarion.

Kieve, R. A. (1986). From necessary illusion to rational choice? A critique of neo-Marxist rational-choice theory. *Theory and Society, 15*(4), 557-582.

King, J. (2002). White House condemns 'homicide bombing.' Retrieved June 30, 2005, from http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/04/12/Bush.mideast.reax/

Kirk, J., & Miller, M. L. (1986). *Reliability and validity in qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Kiser, E., & Hechter, M. (1998). The debate on historical sociology: Rational choice theory and its critics. *The American Journal of Sociology*, *104*(3), 785-816.

Knox, C. (2001). The "deserving" victims of political violence: "Punishment" attacks in Northern Ireland. *Criminal Justice, 1*(2), 181-199.

Kohli, A. (1997). Can democracies accommodate ethnic nationalism? Rise and decline of self-determination movements in India. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, *56*(2), 325-344.

Kolko Phillips, N. (2004). Mass violence and social welfare policy. In S. L. Ashenberg Straussner & N. Kolko Phillips (Eds.), *Understanding mass violence: A social work perspective* (pp. 171-186). Boston: Pearson.

Korbonski, A. (2000). Violence and democracy in Eastern Europe. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 12*(3/4), 237-260.

Korn, A. (2003). From refugees to infiltrators: Constructing political crime in Israel in the 1950s. *International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 31*(1), 1-22.

Korpi, W. (1974). Conflict, power and relative deprivation. *The American Political Science Review*, *68*(4), 1569-1578.

Kowalewski, D. (1992). Counterinsurgent paramilitarism: A Philippine case study. *Journal of Peace Research*, *29*(1), 71-84.

Krain, M. (1997). State-sponsored mass murder: The onset and severity of genocides and politicides. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41*(3), 331-360.

Kressel, N. J. (2002). *Mass hate: The global rise of genocide and terror*. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press.

Kritzer, H. M. (1977). Political protest and political violence: A nonrecursive causal model. *Social Forces*, *55*(3), 630-640.

Kuhn, R., & Neveu, E. (Eds.) (2002). *Political journalism: New challenges, new practices*. New York: Routledge.

Kuran, T. (1998a). Ethnic dissimilation and its international diffusion. In D. A. Lake & D. Rotchild, *Ethnic conflict: Fear, diffusion and escalation* (pp. 35-60). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kuran, T. (1998b). Ethnic norms and their transformation through reputational cascades. *Journal of Legal Studies, 27*(2), 623-659.

Kushner, S., & Norris, N. (1981). Interpretation, negotiation and validity in naturalistic research. *Interchange, 11*, 26-36.

Labuschagne, A. (2003). Qualitative research – Airy fairy or fundamental? *The Qualitative Report, 8*(1). Retrieved February 6, 2005, from http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR8-1/labuschagne.html

Laitin, D. D. (1995). National revivals and violence. *Archives of European Sociology, 36*(1), 3-43.

Landa, J. T. (1994). *Trust, ethnicity, and identity*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Lane, R., & Turner, J. J. (Eds.). *Riot, rout, and tumult: Readings in American social and political violence*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Laqueur, W. (1977). Interpretations of terrorism: Fact, fiction and political science. *Journal of Contemporary History*, *12*(1), 1-42.

Laqueur, W. (1999). *The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Laufer, W. S., & Adler, F. (Eds.) (1989). *Advances in criminological theory: Vol. 1*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Laufer, W. S., & Adler, F. (Eds.) (1989). *Advances in criminological theory: Vol. 1*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Lawal, O. A. (2002). Social-psychological considerations in the emergence and growth of terrorism. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), *The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 4. Programs and practices in response and prevention* (pp. 23-32). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Le Vine, V. T. (2000). Violence and the paradox of democratic renewal: A preliminary assessment. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 12*(3/4), 261-292.

Lee, T. W. (1999). *Using qualitative methods in organizational research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Leighley, J. E. (1995). Attitudes, opportunities and incentives: A field essay on political participation. *Political Research Quarterly, 48*(1), 181-209.

Lentz, H. M. (1988). *Assassinations and executions: An encyclopedia of political violence, 1865-1986*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.

Lentz, H. M. (2002). *Assassinations and executions: An encyclopedia of political violence, 1900 through 2000.* Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.

Levene, M. (2002). *The changing face of mass murder: Massacre, genocide, and post-genocide.* Malden, MA: UNESCO/Blackwell Publishers.

Levitt, M. A. (2003). The political economy of Middle East terrorism. *Middle East Review of International Affairs, 6*(4). Retrieved March 31, 2003, from http://www.ict.org.il/articles

Levy, J. T. (1996). The multiculturalism of fear. *Critical Review, 10*(2), 271-283.

Levy, S. G. (1969). A 150-year study of political violence in the United States. In H. D. Graham & T. R. Gurr (Eds.), *Violence in America: Historical and comparative perspectives* (pp. 84-100). New York: Bantam Books.

Lichbach, M. I. (1987). Deterrence or escalation? The puzzle of aggregate studies of repression and dissent. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *31*(2), 266-297.

Lichbach, M. I. (1989). An evaluation of 'Does economic inequality breed political conflict?' studies. *World Politics*, *41*(4), 431-470.

Lichbach, M. I. (1990). Will rational people rebel against inequality? Samson's choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, *34*(4), 1049-1076.

Lichbach, M. I., & Gurr, T. R. (1981). The conflict process: A formal model. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *25*(1), 3-29.

Lichtman, R. (1970). Symbolic interactionism and social reality: Some Marxist queries. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 15,* 75-94.

Lichtman, R. (1991). Symbolic interactionism and social reality: Some Marxist queries. In K. Plummer (Ed.), *Symbolic interactionism – Volume II* (pp. 64-83). Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Lincourt, J. M., & Hare, P. H. (1973). Neglected American philosophers in the history of symbolic interactionism. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 9,* 333-338.

Lindenberg, S. (1996). Choice-centered versus subject-centred theories in the social sciences: The influence of simplification on explananda. *European Sociological Review*, *12*(2), 147-157.

London, B., & Robinson, T. D. (1989). The effect of international dependence on income inequality and political violence. *American Sociological Review*, *54*(2), 305-308.

Lustick, I. S. (1990). Changing rationales for political violence in the Arab-Israeli conflict. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, *20*(1), 54-79.

Lustig, S. L., Kia-Keating, M., Grant Knight, W., Geltman, P., Ellis, H., Kinzie, D., Keane, T., & Saxe, G. N. (2004). Review of child and adolescent refugee mental health. *Journal of the American Academy of child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 43*(1), 24-36.

MacDonald, M. (1986). *Children of wrath: Political violence in Northern Ireland*. Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishers.

Mack, A. (1981). The utility of terrorism. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 14*(4), 197-224.

Madison, C. A. (1945). Anarchism in the United States. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, *6*(1), 46-66.

Madsen, J. (2004). Suicide terrorism: Rationalizing the irrational. *Strategic Insights, 3*(8). Retrieved October 14, 2004, from http://www.au.af.mil

Magura, S. (1975). Is there a subculture of violence? *American Sociological Review, 40*(6), 831-835.

Maines, D. R. (1977). Social organization and social structure in symbolic intractionist thought. *Annual Review of Sociology, 3,* 235-259.

Malecki, E. S. (1973). Theories of revolution and industrialized societies. *The Journal of Politics*, *35*(4), 948-985.

Malthaner, S., & Waldmann, P. (2003). Terrorism in Germany: Old and new problems. In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), *Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies* (pp.111-128)*.* The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

Malvesti, M. L. (2001). Explaining the United States' decision to strike back at terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(2), 85-106.

Mamdani, M. (2002). Good Muslim, bad Muslim: A political perspective on culture and terrorism. *American Anthropologist, 104*(3), 766-775.

Maniruzzaman, T. (1992). Arms transfers, military coups, and military rule in developing states. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36*(4), 733-755.

Margalit, A., & Elon, A. (2003). *Pourquoi des kamikazes? Les raisons d'un désastre* [Why kamikazes? The reasons of a disaster]. Paris: Seuil.

Markowitz, F. E., & Felson, R. B. (1998). Social-demographic attitudes and violence. *Criminology, 36*(1), 117-138.

Mars, P. (1995a). Foreign influence, political conflicts and conflict resolution in the Caribbean. *Journal of Peace Research*, *32*(4), 437-451.

Mars, P. (1995b). State intervention and ethnic conflict resolution: Guyana and the Caribbean experience. *Comparative Politics*, *27*(2), 167-186.

Marx, G. T., & Wood, J. L. (1975). Strands of theory and research in collective behavior. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *1*, 363-428.

Marx, K. (1934). *The civil war in France.* Chicago: C.H. Kerr.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1919). *The Manifesto of the Communist Party.* New York: Rand School of Social Science.

Mason, T. D. (1984). Individual participation in collective racial violence: A rational choice synthesis. *American Political Science Review, 78*(4), 1040-1056.

Mason, T. D. (1989). Nonelite response to state-sanctioned terrorism. *The Western Political Quarterly*, *42*(4), 467-492.

Mason, T. D., & Campany, C. (1995). Guerrillas, drugs and peasants: the rational peasant and the war on drugs in Peru. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 7*(4), 140-170.

Mason, T. D., & Krane, D. A. (1989). The political economy of death squads: Toward a theory of the impact of state-sanctioned terror. *International Studies Quarterly*, *33*(2), 175-198.

Maxfield, M. G., & Babbie, E. R. (2004). *Research methods for criminal justice and criminology* (4th edition). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.

Maxwell, J. (1992). Understanding and validity in qualitative research. *Harvard Educational Review, 62*(3), 279-300.

May, R. A. (1999). "Surviving all changes in your destiny": Violence and popular movements in Guatemala. *Latin American Perspectives, 26*(2), 68-91.

Mayring, P. (2000). Qualitative content analysis. *Forum: Qualitative Research, 1*(2). Retrieved February 6, 2005, from http://www.qualitative-research.net

McAllister, I., & Rose, R. (1983). Can political conflict be resolved by social change? Northern Ireland as a test case. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27*(3), 533-557.

McCarthy, S. (2002). Preventing future terrorist activities among adolescents through global psychology: A cooperative learning community. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), *The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 4. Programs and practices in response and prevention* (pp. 131-156). Westport, CT: Praeger.

McCauley, C. (2002). Psychological issues in understanding terrorism and the response to terrorism. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), *The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 3. Theoretical understanding and perspectives* (pp. 3-30). Westport, CT: Praeger.

McCormick, G. H. (2003). Terrorist decision making. *Annual Review of Political Science, 6*, 437-507.

McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (1999). *Policing Northern Ireland: Proposals for a new start*. Belfast, Ireland: Blackstaff Press.

McKendrick, B., & Hoffmann, W. (1990). *People and violence in South Africa*. Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press.

McPhail, C., & Rexroat, C. (1979). Mead vs. Blumer: The divergent methodological perspectives of social behaviorism and symbolic interactionism. *American Sociological Review, 44*, 449-467.

McVey, P. M. (1997). *Terrorism and local law enforcement: A multidimensional challenge for the twenty-first century*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.

Mead, G. H. (1930). Cooley's contribution to American social thought. *American Journal of Sociology, 35*(5), 693-706.

Merkl, P. H. (1986a). Approaches to the study of political violence. In P. H. Merkl (Ed.), *Political violence and terror: Motifs and motivations* (pp. 19-59). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Merkl, P. H. (Ed.) (1986b). *Political violence and terror: Motifs and motivations*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Merton, R. K., & Rossi, A. K. (1950). Contributions to the theory of reference group behavior. In R. K. Merton & P. F. Lazarsfeld (Eds.), *Continuities in Social Research*. New York: Free Press.

235

Meyer, P. (2001). The proper role of the news media in a democratic society: Is it enough simply to cover the news? In J. Harper & T. Yantek (Eds.), *Media, profit, and politics: Competing priorities in an open society* (pp. 11-17). Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.

Mian, A., Mahmodd, S. F., Chotani, H., & Luby, S. (2002). Vulnerability to homicide in Karachi: Political activity as a risk factor. *International Journal of Epidemiology, 31*, 581-585.

Michelet, J. (1979). *Histoire de la Révolution française* [History of the French Revolution]. Paris: Robert Laffont.

Mickolus, E. F. (1987). Comment – Terrorists, governments, and numbers: Counting things versus things that count. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31*(1), 54-62.

Midlarsky, M. I. (1988). Rulers and the ruled: Patterned inequality and the onset of mass political violence. *The American Political Science Review*, *82*(2), 491-509.

Miles, M. B., & Huberman, M. (1994). *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook* (2nd edition). London: Sage Publications.

Miller, A. H., & Damask, N. A. (1996). The dual myths of ''narco-terrorism'': How myths drive policy. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 8*(1), 114-131.

Miller, A. H., & Schaen, E. (2000). Democracy and the black urban riots: Rethinking the meaning of political violence in democracy. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 12*(3/4), 345-361.

Miller, B. (1992). Collective action and rational choice: Place, Community, and the individual self-interest. *Economic Geography*, *68*(1), 22-42.

Milte, K. (1975). Terrorism and international order. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 8*(2), 101-111.

Milte, K. L. (1978). Extradition and the terrorist. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 11*(2), 89-94.

Milte, K. L., Shuvayev, D., & Bartholomew, A. A. (1980). Political violence and its assessment: Some issues. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 13*(2), 107-116.

Moaddel, M. (1994). Political conflict in the world economy: A cross-national analysis of modernization and world-system theories. *American Sociological Review*, *59*(2), 276-303.

Moore, M. (1993). Thoroughly modern revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka. *Modern Asian Studies, 27*(3), 593-642.

Moore, W. H. (1995). Rational rebels: Overcoming the free-rider problem. *Political Research Quarterly, 48*(2), 417-454.

Moore, W. H. (2000). The repression of dissent: A substitution model of government coercion. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44*(1), 107-127.

Moser, C. O. N., & Clark, F. C. (Eds.) (2001). *Victims, perpetrators or actors? Gender, armed conflict and political violence*. London: Zed Books.

Muller, E. N. (1972). A test of a partial theory of potential for political violence. *The American Political Science Review, 66*(3), 928-959.

Muller, E. N. (1985). Income inequality, regime repressiveness, and political violence. *American Sociological Review, 50*(1), 47-61.

Muller, E. N. (1986). Income inequality and political violence: The effect of influential cases. *American Sociological Review, 51*(3), 441-445.

Muller, E. N. (1988). Inequality, repression, and violence: Issues of theory and research design. *American Sociological Review, 53*(5), 799-806.

Muller, E. N., & Jukam, T. O. (1983). Discontent and aggressive political participation. *British Journal of Political Science, 13*(2), 159-179.

Muller, E. N., & Opp, K. D. (1986). Rational choice and rebellious collective action. *American Political Science Review, 80*(2), 471-487.

Muller, E. N., & Seligson, M. A. (1987). Inequality and insurgency. *American Political Science Review, 81*(2), 425-452.

Muller, E. N., & Weede, E. (1990). Cross-national variation in political violence: A rational action approach. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34*(4), 624-651.

Muller, E. N., Dietz, H. A., & Finkel, S. E. (1991). Discontent and the expected utility of rebellion: The case of Peru. *American Political Science Review, 85*(4), 1261-1282.

Muller, E. N., Seligson, M. A., Fu. H., & Midlarsky, M. I. (1989). Land inequality and political violence. *American Political Science Review, 83*(2), 577-596.

Muncie, J. (1999). Exorcising demons: Media, politics and criminal justice. In B. Fanklin (Ed.), *Social policy, the media and misrepresentation* (pp. 174-190). New York: Routledge.

237

Munck, R., & De Silva, P. L. (2000). *Postmodern insurgencies: Political violence, identity formation and peacemaking in comparative perspective*. London: Macmillan.

Nafziger, E. W., & Richter, W. L. (1976). Biafra and Bangladesh: The political economy of secessionist conflict. *Journal of Peace Research, 2*(13), 91-109.

Nagengast, C. (1994). Violence, terror, and the crisis of the state. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, *23*, 109-136.

Nasr, K. B. (1997). *Arab and Israeli terrorism: The causes and effects of political violence, 1936-1993*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.

National Center for Policy Analysis (2001). *Suicide terrorists*. Retrieved December 13, 2004, from http://www.ncpa.org

Neal, P. (1988). Hobbes and rational choice theory. *Western Political Quarterly*, *41*(4), 635-652.

Newman, G. (1979). *Understanding violence*. New York: Lippincott.

Nice, D. C. (1988). Abortion clinic bombings as political violence. *American Journal of Political Science*, *32*(1), 178-195.

Nielsen, K. (1977). On justifying revolution. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 37*(4), 516-532.

Nielsen, K. (1981). On justifying violence. *Inquiry, 24*, 21-58.

Nielsen, K. (1982). Political violence and ideological mystification. *Journal of Social Philosophy, 13*, 25-33.

Nkemdirim, B. A. (1977). Reflections on political conflict, rebellion, and revolution in Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies, 15*(1), 75-90.

Norris N. (1997). Error, bias and validity in qualitative research. *Educational Action Research, 5*(1), 172-176.

O'Neil, R. (1999). *Suicide squads*. London: Salamander Books.

O'Day, A., & Yonah, A. (Eds.) (1989). *Ireland's terrorist trauma: Interdisciplinary perspectives*. New York: Saint Martin's Press.

238

Oka, T., & Shaw, I. (2003). Qualitative research in social work. In N. Hisada (Ed.), *Introduction to social work research* (pp. 115-147). Tokyo: Chûô Hôki.

Olzak, S. (1989). Analysis of events in the study of collective action. *Annual Review of Sociology, 15*, 119-141.

Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: Presidential address, American Political Science Association, 1997. *The American Political Science Review, 92*(1), 1-22.

Palmer, D. S. (1992). Peru, the drug business and Shining Path: Between Scylla and Charybdis? *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, *34*(3), 65-88.

Pandey, G. (1992). In defense of the fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim riots in India today. *Representations, 37*, 27-55.

Parfitt, B. A. (1996). Using Spradley: An ethnosemantic approach to research. *Journal of Advanced Nursing, 24*(2), 341-349.

Pastor, L. H. (2004). Countering the psychological consequences of suicide terrorism. *Psychiatric Annals, 34*(9), 701-707.

Patton, M. Q. (1999). Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis. *Health Services Research, 34*(5), 1189-1208.

Payne, S. G. (1990). Political violence during the Spanish Second Republic. *Journal of Contemporary History*, *25*(2/3), 269-288.

Paz, R. (2002). The Islamic legitimacy of suicide terrorism. In International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), *Countering suicide terrorism* (pp. 89-98). New York: Anti-Defamation League.

Pearlstein, R. M. (1991). *The mind of the political terrorist.* Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Research Books.

Pedahzur, A., & Ranstorp, M. (2001). A tertiary model for countering terrorism in liberal democracies: The case of Israel. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(2), 1-26.

Petras, J. W. (1968). John Dewey and the rise of interactionism in American social theory. *Jounral of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 4*, 18-27.

Pilisuk, M., & Wong, A. (2002). State terrorism: When the perpetrator is a government. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), *The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 2. Clinical aspects and responses* (pp. 105-132). Westport, CT: Praeger.

239

Pipes, D. (1986, Summer). The scourge of suicide terrorism. *National Interest*. Retrieved August 13, 2003, from http://www.danielpipes.org/article/175

Pisano, V. S. (1987). *The dynamics of subversion and violence in contemporary Italy*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Pitcher, B. L., Hamblin, R. L., & Miller, J. L. L. (1978). The diffusion of collective violence. *American Sociological Review, 43*(1), 23-35.

Plato (1974). *Plato's Republic* [Translated by G. M. A. Grube]. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publications.

Plomin, R., & McClearn, G. E. (Eds.) (1993). *Nature, nurture and psychology*. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.

Pomper, P. (1974). Nechaev and tsaricide: The conspiracy within the conspiracy. *Russian Review*, *33*(2), 123-138.

Posen, B. R. (1993). The security dilemma and ethnic conflict. *Survival, 35*(1), 27-47.

Post, J. M. (1990). Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces. In W. Reich (Ed.), *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (pp. 25-40). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Post, J. M. (2005). The new face of terrorism: Socio-cultural foundations of contemporary terrorism. *Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 23*, 451-465.

Potter, G. W., & Kappeler, V. E. (Eds.) (1998). *Constructing crime: Perspectives on making news and social problems*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.

Premo, D. L. (1981). Political assassination in Guatemala: A case of institutionalized terror. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, *23*(4), 429-456.

Prentice-Dunn, S., & Rogers, R. W. (1980). Effects of deindividuating situational cues and aggressive models on subjective deindividuation and aggression. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39,* 104-113.

Prus, R. (1987). Generic social processes: Maximizing conceptual development in ethongraphic research. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 16*(3), 250-293.

Punamaki, R. L. (1990). Relationships between political violence and psychological responses among Palestinian women. *Journal of Peace Research*, *27*(1), 75-85.

Quillen, C. (2001). Terrorism with weapons of mass destruction: The congressional response. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(1), 47-65.

Quinet, E. (1987). *La révolution* [Revolution]. Paris: Belin.

Rangnekar, D. K. (1960). The nationalist revolution in Ceylon. *Pacific Affairs*, *33*(4), 361-374.

Reich, W. (1990a). Understanding terrorist behavior: The limits and opportunities of psychological inquiry. In W. Reich (Ed.), *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (pp.261-279). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Reich, W. (Ed.) (1990b). *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Reinares, F. (2003). Democratization and state responses to protracted terrorism in Spain. In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), *Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies* (pp.57-70). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

Rezneck, S. (1927). The political and social theory of Michael Bakunin. *The American Political Science Review*, *21*(2), 270-296.

Richani, N. (1997). The political economy of violence: The war-system in Colombia. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 39*(2), 37-81.

Richards, P. (1999). New political violence in Africa: Secular sectarianism in Sierra Leone. *GeoJournal, 47*, 433-442.

Richardson, J. T. (2001). Minority religions and the context of violence: A conflict/internationalist perspective. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(1), 103-133.

Richardson, L. (1998). Global rebels: Terrorist organizations as trans-national actors. *Harvard International Review, 20*(4), 52-56.

Riches, D. (Ed.) (1986). *The anthropology of violence*. Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishers.

Rochberg-Halton, E. (1987). Situation, structure and the context of meaning. *Sociological Quarterly, 23*, 455-476.

Rock, P. (1991). Symbolic interactionism and labelling theory. In K. Plummer (Ed.), *Symbolic interactionism – Volume I* (pp. 227-243). Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Rosand, E. (2003). Security council resolution 1373, the counter-terrorism committee, and the fight against terrorism. *The American Journal of International Law, 97*(2), 333-341.

Rosenbaum, H. J., & Sederberg, P. C. (1974). Vigilantism: An analysis of establishment violence. *Comparative Politics*, *6*(4), 541-570.

Rosenberger, J. (2003). Discerning the behavior of the suicide bomber: The role of vengeance. *Journal of Religion and Health, 42*(1), 13-20.

Ross, J. I. (1993). Structural causes of oppositional political terrorism: Towards a causal model. *Journal of Peace Research*, *30*(3), 317-329.

Ross, J. I. (2003). *The dynamics of political crime*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Ross, J. I., & Gurr, T. R. (1989). Why terrorism subsides: A comparative study of Canada and the United States. *Comparative Politics*, *21*(4), 405-426.

Rothgeb, J. M., Jr. (1991). The effects of foreign investment upon political protest and violence in underdeveloped societies. *Western Political Quarterly*, *44*(1), 9-38.

Rubin, B. (Ed.) (1989). *The politics of terrorism: Terror as a state and revolutionary strategy*. Washington, DC: Foreign Policy Institute.

Rubington, E., & Weinberg, M. S. (Eds.) (1995). *The study of social problems: Seven perspectives* (5th edition). New York: Oxford University Press.

Rudestam, K. E., & Newton, R. R. (1992). *Surviving your dissertation: A comprehensive guide to content and process*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Ruggie, J. (1998). *Constructing the world polity: Essays on international institutionalization*. New York: Routledge.

Ruggiero, V. (2003). Terrorism: Cloning the enemy. *International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 31*(1), 23-34.

Rule, J. B. (1989). Rationality and non-rationality in militant collective action. *Sociological Theory, 7*(2), 145-160.

Rummel, R. J. (1985). Libertarian propositions on violence within and between nations: A test against published research results. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29*(3), 419-455.

Runciman, W. G. (1966). *Relative deprivation and social justice*. London: Routledge.

Ryan, J. J. (1994). The impact of democratization on revolutionary movements. *Comparative Politics*, *27*(1), 27-44.

Samarasinghe, D. S. (2001). Overplaying the terrorist card. *Foreign Policy, 122*, 14

Sambanis, N. (2001). Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical inquiry (Part 1). *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45*(3), 259-282.

Samii, B. (2005). *Terrorism: Islamic scholars debate suicide bombing and hostage taking*. Retreived December 22, 2005, from http://www.azadradio.org

Sandelowski, M. (1993). Rigor or rigor mortis: The problems of rigor in qualitative research revisited. *Advances in Nursing Science, 16*(2), 1-8.

Sarraj, E. (2003). Why we have become suicide bombers: Understanding Palestinian terror. *Mission Islam*. Retrieved December 11, 2004, from http://www.missionislam.com

Satz, D., & Ferejohn, J. (1994). Rational choice and social theory. *The Journal of Philosophy*, *91*(2), 71-87.

Schmaus, W. (2004). *Rethinking Durkheim and his tradition*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Schock, K. (1996). A conjunctural model of political conflict: The impact of political opportunities on the relationship between economic inequality and violent political conflict. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *40*(1), 98-133.

Schorkopf, F. (2003). Behavioural and social science perspectives on political violence. In C. Walter, S. Vöneky, V. Röben, & F. Schorkopf (Eds.), *Terrorism as a challenge for national and international law: Security versus liberty?* Berlin: Springer.

Schroeder, M. J. (1996). Horse thieves to rebels to dogs: Political gang violence and the state in the western Segovias, Nicaragua, in the time of Sandino, 1926-1934. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, *28*(2), 383-434.

Schuster, H. (2005). *Suicide bombings as military strategy*. Retrieved November 12, 2005, from http://www.cnn.com

Schwandt, T. (1997). *Qualitative inquiry: A dictionary of terms.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Schwartz, D. C. (1968). On the ecology of political violence: "The long hot summer" as a hypothesis. *American Behavioral Scientist, 11*(6), 24-28.

Schwartz, S. (2002). *The two faces of Islam: The house of Sa'ud from tradition to terror.* New York: Doubleday.

Schweitzer, Y. (2003). *The export and import of suicide bombers*. Retrieved November 1, 2004, from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org

Schweitzer, Y. (2004). *Suicide terrorism: Historical background and risks for the future*. Retrieved November 1, 2004, from http://www.pbs.org

Sederberg, P. C. (1994). *Fires within: Political violence and revolutionary change*. New York: Harper Collins.

Sederberg, P. C. (1995). Conciliation as counter-terrorist strategy. *Journal of Peace Research*, *32*(3), 295-312.

Sémelin, J. (2002). *Extreme violence: Can we understand it?* Malden, MA: UNESCO/Blackwell Publishers.

Sénéchal de la Roche, R. (1996). Collective violence as social control. *Sociological Forum, 11*(1), 97-128.

Senechal de la Roche, R. (2001). Why is collective violence collective? *Sociological Theory, 19*(2), 126-144.

Shabad, G., & Gunther, R. (1982). Language, nationalism, and political conflict in Spain. *Comparative Politics*, *14*(4), 443-477.

Shadish, W. R. (1995a). The logic of generalization: Five principles common to experiments and ethnographies. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 23*(3), 419-428.

Shadish, W. R. (1995c). The quantitative-qualitative debates: DeKuhnifying the conceptual contexts. *Evaluation and Program Planning, 18*(1), 47-49.

Shaheen, J. G. (2001). *Reel bad Arabs: How Hollywood vilifies a people.* Brooklyn, NY: Olive Branch Press.

Shamai, M. (2003). Using social constructionist thinking in training social workers living and working under threat of political violence. *Social Work, 48*(4), 545-554.

Shamir, M. Y. (2004). Suicide bombing: Professional eyewitness report. *Anesthesiology, 100*(4), 1042-1043.

Shay, S. (2002). Suicide terrorism in Lebanon. In International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), *Countering suicide terrorism* (pp. 134-139). New York: Anti-Defamation League.

Shields, L. B. E., Hunsaker, D. M., Hunsaker, J. C., & Humbert, K. A. (2003). Nonterrorist suicidal deaths involving explosives. *American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, 24*(2), 107-113.

Shiqaqi, K. (2002). The views of Palestinian society on suicide terrorism. In International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), *Countering suicide terrorism* (pp. 155-164). New York: Anti-Defamation League.

Shoemaker, D. J., & Williams, J. S. (1987). The subculture of violence and ethnicity. *Journal of Criminal Justice, 15*(6), 461-472.

Shubik, M. (1982). *Game theory in the social sciences: Concepts and solutions.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Shultz, R. (1978). The limits of terrorism in insurgency warfare. The case of the Viet Cong. *Polity, 11*(1), 67-91.

Sigelman, L., & Simpson, M. (1977). A cross-national test of the linkage between economic inequality and political violence. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21*(1), 105-128.

Silke, A. (1998). The Lords of discipline: The methods and motives of paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland. *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, 7,* 121-156.

Silke, A. (1999). Ragged justice: Loyalist vigilantism in Northern Ireland. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 11*(1), 1-31.

Silke, A. (2003). Deindividuation, anonymity, and violence: Findings from Northern Ireland. *The Journal of Social Psychology, 143*(4), 493-499.

Simon, J. D. (1987, Summer). Misunderstanding terrorism. *Foreign Policy, 67,* 104-120.

Simpson, G., & Rauch, J. (1993). Political Violence: 1991. In N. Boister & K. Ferguson-Brown (Eds.), *Human Rights Yearbook 1992* (pp. 212-239). Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press.

Skocpol, T. (1979). *States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol, T. (1994). *Social revolution in the modern world*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol, T., & Trimberger, E. R. (1978). Revolutions and the world – Historical development of capitalism. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 22*, 101-113.

Sloan, S. (1993). US anti-terrorism policies: Lessons to be learned to meet an enduring and changing threat. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 5*(1), 105-131.

Slone, M. (2000). Responses to media coverage of terrorism. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *44*(4), 508-522.

Slone, M., Lobel, T., & Gilat, I. (1999). Dimensions of the political environment affecting children's mental health: An Israeli study. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *43*(1), 78-91.

Snyder, D. (1978). Collective violence: A research agenda and some strategic considerations. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *22*(3), 499-534.

Sommier, I. (2002). *'Terrorism' as total violence?* Malden, MA: UNESCO/Blackwell Publishers.

Sontag, F. (1991). Liberation theology and the interpretation of political violence. *Thomist, April*, 271-292.

Sorel, G. (1990). *Reflexions on violence*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Spencer, J. (1990). Collective violence and everyday practice in Sri Lanka. *Modern Asian Studies*, *24*(3), 603-623.

Sprinzak, E. (2000c). Rational fanatics. *Foreign Policy, 120*, 66-73.

Sprinzak, E. (2001). The lone gunmen. *Foreign Policy, 127*, 72-73.

Starr, H. (1994). Revolution and war: Rethinking the linkage between internal and external conflict. *Political Research Quarterly*, *47*(2), 481-507.

246

Staub, E. (2003). Notes on cultures of violence, cultures of caring and peace, and the fulfillment of basic needs. *Political Psychology, 24*(1), 1-21.

Stavrou, V. (1993). Psychological effects of criminal and political violence on children. *The Child Care Worker, 11*(7), 3-9.

Steele, R. W. (1985). *Propaganda in an open society: The Roosevelt administration and the media, 1933-1941*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Steger, M. B., & Lind, N. S. (Eds.) (1999). *Violence and its alternatives: An interdisciplinary reader.* New York: Saint Martin's Press.

Stephens, G. (1995). Remodeling collective violence: James Tong's rational choice model and the Great Strikes of 1877. *Political Research Quarterly, 48*(2), 345-369.

Stevens, M. J. (2005). What is terrorism and can psychology do anything to prevent it? *Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 23*, 507-526.

Stohl, M. (1975). War and domestic political violence: The case of the United States, 1890-1970. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *19*(3), 379-416.

Stohl, M. (Ed.) (1979). *The politics of terrorism.* New York: Marcel Dekker.

Stohl, M. (Ed.) (1988). *The politics of terrorism* (3rd edition)*.* New York: Marcel Dekker.

Storr, A. (1968). *Human aggression*. London: Allen Lane.

Stout, C. E. (Ed.) (2002). *The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 1-4.* Westport, CT: Praeger.

Stout, C. E., & Felthous, A. R. (2005). Introduction to this issue: Terrorism. *Behavioral Science and the Law, 23*, 449-450.

Stryker, S. (1987). The vitalization of symbolic interaction. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 50*(1), 83-94.

Suarez-Orozco, M. M. (1990). Speaking of the unspeakable: Toward a psychological understanding of responses to terror. *Ethos*, *18*(3), 353-383.

Suicide terrorism: Martyrdom and murder (2004, January 8). *The Economist*. Retrieved August 15, 2004, from http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/economist0801.htm

Surette, R. (1998). *Media, crime, and criminal justice: Images and realities* (2nd edition). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Takeyh, R. (2003). Islamism in Algeria: A struggle between hope and agony. *Middle East Policy, 10*(2), 62-77.

Taylor, I., Walton, P., & Young, J. (1994). The new criminology. In J. E. Jacoby (Ed.), *Classics of Criminology* (2nd edition) (pp. 96-105). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

Taylor, M. (1988). Rationality and revolutionary collective action. In M. Taylor (Ed.), *Rationality and revolution* (pp. 63-97). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, M. (1993). Rational choice, behavior analysis, and political violence. In R. V. Clarke and M. Felson, *Advances in Criminological Theory* (pp. 159-178). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Taylor, M. C. (1982). Improved conditions, rising expectations, and dissatisfaction: A test of the past/present relative deprivation hypothesis. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 45*(1), 24-33.

Taylor, M., & Horgan, J. (1999). The future of terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 11*(4), 1-224.

Testas, A. (2001). The economic causes of Algeria's political violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(3), 127-144.

Thackrah, J. R. (1987). *Encyclopedia of terrorism and political violence*. New York: Routledge.

Theen, R. H. W. (1972). The idea of the revolutionary state: Tkachev, Trotsky, and Lenin. *Russian Review*, *31*(4), 383-397.

Thompson, J. L. P. (1989). Deprivation and political violence in Northern Ireland, 1922-1985: A time-series analysis. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *33*(4), 676-699.

Tilly, C. (1978). *From mobilization to revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Timmerman, K. R. (2003). *Preachers of hate: Islam and the war on America*. New York: Crown Forum.

Trundle, R. C., Jr. (1996). Has global ethnic conflict superseded cold war ideology? *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19*, 93-107.

Tucker, D. (2001). What is new about the new terrorism and how dangerous is it? *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(3), 1-14.

Tucker, H. H. (Ed.) (1988). *Combating the terrorists: Democratic responses to political violence*. New York: Facts on File.

Turk, A. T. (1989). Notes on criminology and terrorism. In W. S. Laufer & F. Adler (Eds.), *Advances in criminological theory: Vol. 1*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Turk, A. T. (2002b). Political violence: Patterns and trends. In R. A. Silverman, T. P. Thornberry, & B. Krisberg (Eds.), *Crime and justice at the Millenium: Essays by and in honor of Marvin E. Wolfgang* (pp. 31-44). Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academics.

Ultee, W. C. (1996). Do rational choice approaches have problems? *European Sociological Review*, *12*(2), 167-179.

Valls, A. (2000). Can terrorism be justified? In A. Valls (Ed.), *Ethics in international affairs: Theories and cases* (pp. 65-79). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

van Belle, D. A. (2000). *Press freedom and global politics*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Van de Voorde, C., & Özeren, S. (2004). *Turkish Hizballah: A case study of radical terrorism*. Retrieved January 13, 2005, from http://www.turkishweekly.net

van Ginkel, B. T. (2003). The United Nations: Towards a comprehensive convention on combating terrorism. In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), *Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies* (pp.207-226). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

van Henten, J. W., & Avemarie, F. (2002). *Martyrdom and noble death: Selected texts from Graeco-Roman, Jewish and Christian Antiquity*. London: Routledge.

van Leeuwen, M. (2003a). Confronting terrorism. In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), *Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies* (pp.1-10). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

van Leeuwen, M. (2003b). Democracy versus terrorism: Balancing security and fundamental rights. In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), *Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies* (pp.227-235). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

van Manen, M. (1990). *Researching lived experience: Human science for an action-sensitive pedagogy*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

von Tagen, M. (1998). *Prisons, peace and terrorism: Penal policy in the reduction of political violence in Northern Ireland, Italy and the Spanish Basque Country, 1968-97*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Walker, C. (2003). Policy options and priorities: British perspectives. In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), *Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies* (pp.11-36). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

Walsh, D. (2003). Irish experiences and perspectives. In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), *Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies* (pp.37-56). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

Walter, E. V. (1969). *Terror and resistance: A study of political violence*. London: Oxford University Press.

Wang, T. Y., Dixon, W. J., Muller, E. N., & Seligson, M. A. (1993). Inequality and political violence revisited. *The American Political Science Review*, *87*(4), 979-994.

Ward, R. H., & Ezeldin, A. G. (Eds.) (1990). *International responses to terrorism: New initiatives*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Warshay, L. H., & Warshay, D. W. (1986). The individualizaing and subjectivizing of George Herbert Mead: A sociology of knowledge interpretation. *Sociological Focus, 19*(2), 177-188.

Weber, R. P. (1990). *Basic Content Analysis* (2nd edition). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Weede, E. (1981). Income inequality, average income, and domestic violence. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *25*(4), 639-654.

Weede, E. (1986). Income inequality and political violence reconsidered. *American Sociological Review*, *51*(3), 438-441.

Weede, E. (1987). Some new evidence on correlates of political violence: Income inequality, regime repressiveness, and economic development. *European Sociological Review, 3*(2), 97-108.

Weede, E., & Muller, E. N. (1998). Rebellion, violence and revolution: A rational choice perspective. *Journal of Peace Research*, *35*(1), 43-59.

Weede, E., & Muller, E. N. (1998). Rebellion, violence and revolution: A rational choice perspective. *Journal of Peace Research*, *35*(1), 43-59.

Weinberg, L. (1991). Turning to terror: The conditions under which political parties turn to terrorist activities. *Comparative Politics, 23*(4), 423-438.

Weiner, N. A., Zahn, M. A., & Sagi, R. J. (Eds.) (1990). *Violence: Patterns, causes, public policy*. Stamford, CT: International Thomson Publishing.

Weisbrod, B. (2002). *Fundamentalist violence: Political violence and political religion in modern conflict*. Malden, MA: UNESCO/Blackwell Publishers.

Wheelock, A., Haney, W., & Bebell, D. (2000). What can student drawings tell us about high-stakes testing in Massachusetts? Retrieved October 3, 2003, from http://www.tcrecord.org/Content.asp?ContentID=10634

White, R. W. (1993). On measuring political violence: Northern Ireland, 1969 to 1980. *American Sociological Review*, *58*(4), 575-585.

White, R. W. (2000). Issues in the study of political violence: Understanding the motives of participants in small group political violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 12*(1), 95-108.

White, R. W., & Falkenberg White, T. (1995). Repression and the liberal state: The case of Northern Ireland, 1969-1972. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *39*(2), 330-352.

Wieviorka, M. (1993). *The making of terrorism.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Wiktorowicz, Q., & Kaltner, J. (2003). Killing in the name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's justification for September 11. *Middle East Policy, 10*(2), 76-94.

Wilkinson, D. Y. (1970). Political assassins and status incongruence: A sociological interpretation. *The British Journal of Sociology*, *21*(4), 400-412.

Wilkinson, P. (1995). Violence and terror and the extreme right. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 7*(4), 82-93.

Williams, G. (1989). J.S. Mill and political violence. *Utilitas, 1*, 102-111.

Williams, K. R., & Timberlake, M. (1984). Structured inequality, conflict, and control: A cross-national test of the threat hypothesis. *Social Forces*, *63*(2), 414-432.

Williams, R. M., Jr. (1994). The sociology of ethnic conflicts: Comparative international perspectives. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *20*, 49-79.

Williamson, R. C. (1965). Toward a theory of political violence: The case of rural Colombia. *The Western Political Quarterly*, *18*(1), 35-44.

Withers, B. (2003). Terrorism and war: Unconscious dynamics of political violence. *Journal of Analytical Psychology, 48*(4), 513-514.

Wolcott, H. F. (1990). *Writing up qualitative research.* London: Sage Publications.

Wolfgang, M. E., & Ferracuti, F. (1982). *The subculture of violence: Towards an integrated theory of criminology.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Wood, M., & Wardell, M. L. (1983). G. H. Mead's social behaviorism vs. the astructural bias of symbolic interactionism. *Symbolic Interaction, 6*(1), 85-96.

Wright, L. (2004, August 2). The terror web. *The New Yorker*. Retrieved December 28, 2004, from http://www.newyorker.com

Yin, R. K. (1994). *Case study research: Design and methods* (2nd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Zapata, B. C., Rebodello, A., Atalah, E., Newman, B., & King, M. C. (1992). The influence of social and political violence on the risk of pregnancy complications. *American Journal of Public Health, 82*(5), 685-690.

Zawadzki, P. (2002). *Working with abhorrent objects: Some moral and epistemological considerations.* Malden, MA: UNESCO/Blackwell Publishers.

Zey, M. (1998). *Rational choice theory and organizational theory: A critique.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Zimbardo, P. G. (1970). The human choice: Individuation, reason, and order versus deindividuation, impulse, and chaos. In W. J. Arnold & D. Levine (Eds.), *1969 Nebraska Symposium on Motivation* (pp. 237-307). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Zulaika, J. (1988). *Basque violence: Metaphor and sacrement*. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.

Appendices

Appendix A: Foreign Terrorist Organizations (2005)

1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

2. Abu Sayyaf Group

3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

4. Ansar al-Islam

5. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

6. Asbat al-Ansar

7. Aum Shinrikyo

8. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

9. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)

10. Continuity Irish Republican Army

11. Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)

12. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)

13. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)

14. Hizballah (Party of God)

15. Islamic Jihad Group

16. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

17. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)

18. Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)

19. al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)

20. Kahane Chai (Kach)

21. Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK)

22. Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)

254

23. Lashkar i Jhangvi

24. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

25. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)

26. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)

27. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)

28. National Liberation Army (ELN)

29. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

30. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

31. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF)

32. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)

33. al-Qa'ida

34. Real IRA

35. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

36. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)

37. Revolutionary Organization 17 November

38. Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

39. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)

40. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)

41. Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (al-Qaida in Iraq) (formerly

   Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, JTJ, al-Zarqawi Network)

42. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

Appendix A: (Continued)

Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.

Identification

The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department (S/CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, S/CT looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.

Designation

Once a target is identified, S/CT prepares a detailed "administrative record," which is a compilation of information, typically including both classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the designation, Congress is notified of the Secretary's intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the designation, as the INA requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period

256

and in the absence of Congressional action to block the designation, notice of the designation is published in the *Federal Register*, at which point the designation takes effect. By law an organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the *Federal Register*.

Until recently the INA provided that FTOs must be redesignated every two years or the designation would lapse. Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), however, the redesignation requirement was replaced by certain review and revocation procedures. IRTPA provides that an FTO may file a petition for revocation 2 years after its designation date (or in the case of redesignated FTOs, its most recent redesignation date) or 2 years after the determination date on its most recent petition for revocation. In order to provide a basis for revocation, the petitioning FTO must provide evidence that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation are sufficiently different as to warrant revocation. If no such review has been conducted during a five year period with respect to a designation, then the Secretary of State is required to review the designation to determine whether revocation would be appropriate. In addition, the Secretary of State may at any time revoke a designation upon a finding that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation, or that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation. The same procedural requirements apply to revocations made by the Secretary of State as apply to designations. A designation may be revoked by an Act of Congress, or set aside by a Court order.

257

Appendix A: (Continued)

Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended

1. It must be a *foreign organization.*

2. The organization must *engage in terrorist activity*, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or *terrorism*, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** *or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.*

3. The organization's terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals *or* the national security (national defense, foreign relations, *or* the economic interests) of the United States.

Legal Ramifications of Designation

1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO. (The term "material support or resources" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) as " any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) provides that for these purposes "the term 'training' means instruction or teaching

258

designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) further provides that for these purposes the term 'expert advice or assistance' means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.''

2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)).

3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

Other Effects of Designation

1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and to encourage other nations to do the same.

2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally.

3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations.

4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations.

5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations.

* Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA defines "terrorist activity" to mean: "any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the following:

(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).

(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained.

(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of such a person.

(IV) An assassination.

(V) The use of any--

(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or

(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.

(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing."

260

Other pertinent portions of section 212(a)(3)(B) are set forth below:

(iv) Engage in Terrorist Activity Defined

As used in this chapter [chapter 8 of the INA], the term 'engage in terrorist activity' means in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization–

1. to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;

2. to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;

3. to gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity;

4. to solicit funds or other things of value for–

(aa) a terrorist activity;

(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or

(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the solicitation would further the organization's terrorist activity;

I. to solicit any individual–

(aa) to engage in conduce otherwise described in this clause;

(bb) for membership in terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or

(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the solicitation would further the organization's terrorist activity; or

261

II.   to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training–

(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;

(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity;

(cc) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or

(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the actor can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the act would further the organization's terrorist activity.

This clause shall not apply to any material support the alien afforded to an organization or individual that has committed terrorist activity, if the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General, or the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of State, concludes in his sole unreviewable discretion, that that this clause should not apply."

(v) Representative Defined

As used in this paragraph, the term 'representative' includes an officer, official, or spokesman of an organization, and any person who directs, counsels, commands, or induces an organization or its members to engage in terrorist activity.

262

Appendix A: (Continued)

(i) Terrorist Organization Defined

As used in clause (i)(VI) and clause (iv), the term 'terrorist organization' means an organization--

I. designated under section 219 [8 U.S.C. § 1189];

II. otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by the Secretary of State in consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney General, as a terrorist organization, after finding that the organization engages in the activities described in subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause (iv), or that the organization provides material support to further terrorist activity; or

III. that is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in the activities described in subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause (iv).

** Section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 defines "terrorism" as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."

Source: United States Department of State, 2005 (http://www.state.gov)

Appendix B: Suicide Terrorism Grant Questions

1. To what extent does your work expose you to or require you to deal with the phenomenon of suicide terrorism?

2. Suicide terrorism is not a *sui generis* phenomenon, but an integral feature of the historical development of oppositional terrorism worldwide. It is usually the result of an assortment of typical tactics, goals, and motives characteristic of more conventional terrorism. Should the same tactics and policies that have been implemented to fight terrorism in general be applied to suicide terrorism? Why / Why not?

3. If you answered "yes" to Question 2, how do you suggest the same policies be applied to both dimensions? If you answered "no," how would you develop policies to specifically and effectively target suicide terrorism?

4. Suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon either. It is rooted in the historical, social, and psychological dimensions of international terrorism, as a result of centuries of opposition between various terrorist groups and their actual or perceived enemies. How can governments, non-governmental organizations (NGO's), and other entities efficiently and effectively take all these different dimensions of suicide terrorism into account?

5. Suicide terror operations are politically motivated violent attacks perpetrated by self-aware individuals who actively and purposely cause their own death by blowing themselves up along with their chosen target(s). How can the inherently political nature of the problem be addressed?

6. Suicide terrorism has become one of the most spectacular and dreadful weapons available to terrorists (along with blowing up airplanes in mid air and using weapons of mass destruction). How high of a priority is suicide terrorism in your agency/country today?

7. If applicable, how has your country addressed the problem of suicide terrorism thus far?

8. If applicable, has your agency/organization compiled a database of past suicide terror attacks? If so, how has it been used?

9. If a suicide terror attack occurred in your jurisdiction or country next week, how prepared would you (i.e., as an agency or a country) be to respond to the critical incident and manage its outcomes?

10. If a suicide terror attack occurred in your jurisdiction or country next week, what protocols would be set into motion in order to respond to and recover from the incident?

11. Has there been any attempt in your country at training first responders and law enforcement personnel in general to respond specifically to suicide terror attacks (at the local, regional or national level)?

12. About fifteen religious or secular terrorist groups have used or are capable of using suicide terrorism against their own governments and foreign governments. How important is it to adapt antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies to the secular or religious nature of the terrorist group resorting to suicide terrorism?

13. How should antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies be tailored to fit the nature of the threat?

14. One of the distinctive characteristics of suicide terrorism is the motive of individual self-sacrifice and martyrdom. How can these two elements be specifically addressed in developing and enforcing policies to counter and prevent suicide terrorism?

15. How can strategies and policies be formulated and enforced in order to address the issue of suicide terrorism at the micro- (individual), meso- (group), and macro- (societal) levels?

16. Should these levels be clearly identified and autonomously targeted by these antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies or policies? Why / Why not?

17. Suicide terrorism represents a substantial intensification of a group's terrorist activity. Suicide terrorism is difficult to combat; it results in high casualty tolls and often inspires considerable religious and/or ideological zeal. When suicide terrorism is associated with religious extremism, what kind of strategies and public policies do you suggest be created/implemented?

18. Secular groups may also resort to suicide bombings in their terrorist campaigns. Two examples are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and KONGRA-GEL (former PKK) in Turkey. The latter has stopped using suicide terrorism as a tactic, whereas the LTTE is still the world leader in suicide terrorism. Given the context of the Kurdish issue, why do you think a group like PKK/KONGRA-GEL gave up?

19. What policies could be enforced in order to incite a secular group (e.g., the LTTE) to stop using suicide terrorism and ultimately cease resorting to terrorism in general?

20. Suicide terror attacks are either battlefield operations (e.g., Japanese Kamikazes during WWII, "enemy combatants" in Iraq in the past few months) or off-the-battlefield operations involving single suicide bombers and sometimes even multiple suicide bombers (e.g., Hamas, LTTE). Should strategies and policies be different depending on the type of operations concerned?

21. Or should they be applicable to both but flexible enough to adapt to the kind of operations a region/country may face?

22. The targets of suicide terror operations are generally varied. They can be either stationary or mobile, human beings or infrastructures; their nature can be civilian, military, political, economic, or cultural. How can comprehensive strategies be developed to include all potential targets?

23. What are the practical risks involved in creating and implementing such wide-ranging strategies (cost, paranoia, etc.)?

24. The high number of casualties in suicide attacks warrants worldwide media coverage, which guarantees suicide terrorist groups exposure on the international scene. How may media coverage affect the effectiveness and potential of antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies?

25. In light of current or recent events, should the role of the mass media be downplayed or enhanced?

Appendix B: (Continued)

26. The participation of women in suicide terrorism, though not a new feature, is an increasing phenomenon that has compelled authorities to react accordingly (e.g., by adapting their profiling techniques). How can preventive and operational strategies address this particular issue?

27. Can criminal/psychological profiling be an effective tool in the fight against suicide terrorism? Why / Why not?

28. The primary purpose of contemporary suicide terrorism is to cause maximum physical damage and subsequently paralyze entire populations with overwhelming fear and angst. This guarantees the devastating, negative psychological effect of the impromptu operations (traumatic stressors) not only on the direct victims of the attacks, but also on entire populations. What policies exist in your country to address the psychological consequences or overall mental health outcomes of suicide terrorism?

- Primary victims (individuals directly exposed to the elements of the suicide terror attack, who experienced the life-threatening situation personally)

- Secondary victims (close family members and personal friends of the primary victims)

- Tertiary victims (individuals whose occupation demand they respond to the attack)

- Quaternary victims (displaced workers, as well as sensitive and caring members of communities in and beyond the directly impacted areas)

268

29. Suicide terrorism is not a domestic problem affecting certain countries, but an international phenomenon that endangers the safety of entire populations. How important is it for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to communicate, share intelligence and expertise, and expand their existing cooperation?

30. Several terrorist groups have been building worldwide networks to mainly ensure their logistical growth and financial stability. Should uniform international policies be formulated and enforced in order to: (a) freeze the financial assets of terrorist groups; (b) prohibit fundraising in the name of religious or social goals to actually finance terrorist operations or propaganda activities?

31. Should uniform international policies be formulated and enforced in order to prohibit governments from sponsoring or actively participating in terrorism and suicide terrorism?

32. What kind of new technologies and tactics could be developed to counter suicide terrorism at the international level?

33. How should existing special counterterrorist units (task forces) be strengthened?

34. Should international funds be allotted to conduct more research on countering suicide terrorism?

35. Additional comments.

Appendix C: Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America (2003)

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center

In his January 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush announced a new initiative to better protect America by continuing to close the "seam" between analysis of foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism.

The President announced that he had instructed the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, working with the Attorney General, and the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense to develop the Nation's first unified Terrorist Threat Integration Center. This new center will merge and analyze terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture.

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has been working together and sharing information like never before. The creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center is the next phase in the dramatic enhancement of the government's counterterrorism effort. The President has now directed his senior advisors to take the next step in ensuring that intelligence information from all sources is shared, integrated, and analyzed seamlessly -- and then acted upon quickly.

The Administration will ensure that this program is carried out consistently with the rights of Americans.

The New Terrorist Threat Integration Center

Elements of the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, the DCI's Counterterrorist Center, and the Department of Defense will form a Terrorist Threat Integration Center to fuse and analyze all-source information related to terrorism.

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will continue to close the "seam" between analysis of foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism.

Specifically, it will:

- Optimize use of terrorist threat-related information, expertise, and capabilities to conduct threat analysis and inform collection strategies.

- Create a structure that ensures information sharing across agency lines.

- Integrate terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture.

- Be responsible and accountable for providing terrorist threat assessments for our national leadership.

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will be headed by a senior U.S. Government official, who will report to the Director of Central Intelligence. This individual will be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security.

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will play a lead role in overseeing a national counterterrorism tasking and requirements system and for maintaining shared databases.

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will also maintain an up-to-date database of known and suspected terrorists that will be accessible to federal and non-federal officials and entities, as appropriate.

In order to carry out its responsibilities effectively, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center will have access to all intelligence information -- from raw reports to finished analytic assessments -- available to the U.S. Government.

A senior multiagency team will finalize the details, design, and implementation strategy for the stand-up of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.

Transforming the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Immediately after September 11, the President directed the FBI and the Attorney General to make preventing future terrorist attacks against the homeland their top priority -- and they have responded.

The FBI has:

- Disrupted terrorist plots on U.S. soil.

- Established 66 Joint Terrorism Task Forces across America, with full participation from, and enhanced communications with, multiple federal, state, and local agencies.

- Created a National Joint Terrorism Task Force at FBI Headquarters.

- Established a 24-7 Counterterrorism Watch center.

- Created new counterterrorism "Flying Squads" to deploy into the field at a moment's notice.

- Created Intelligence Reports Offices to facilitate the vital flow of information.

- Trained new analysts for the Counterterrorism Division, using a curriculum developed with assistance from the CIA.

The FBI is establishing an intelligence program to ensure that the collection and dissemination of intelligence is given the same institutional priority as the collection of evidence for prosecution. A new Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence will have direct authority and responsibility for the FBI's national intelligence program. The FBI is establishing intelligence units in all of its Field Offices.

The FBI is implementing a revolutionary new data management system to ensure that it shares all the FBI's terrorism-related information internally and with the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, and other appropriate agencies.

Last year, by enacting the USA PATRIOT Act, the President and Congress took an important step to enhance the ability of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute terrorism, and to share information with other government agencies.

Enhancing CIA's Counterterrorism Capabilities

Counterterrorism is a long-standing priority of the CIA and the CIA has been pivotal to the major successes in America's War on Terror. The CIA has:

- Disrupted dozens of planned terrorist attacks around the world.

- Continued to expand our insight into terrorist organizations and plans.

- Greatly enhanced its working relationships with foreign partners.

273

Since September 11, 2001, the Director of Central Intelligence has dramatically redeployed analysts and operatives against the terrorist target. He has:

Doubled the size of the Counterterrorist Center.

Quadrupled the number of personnel engaged in counterterrorism analysis.

Detailed 25 experienced analysts to work side by side with their counterparts at FBI.

The DCI created the position of Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Homeland Security to ensure timely, effective and secure flow of intelligence to agencies engaged in Homeland Security.

A Key Role for the Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security will add critical new capabilities in the area of information analysis and infrastructure protection.

The Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate will:

- Perform comprehensive vulnerability assessments of the Nation's critical infrastructure and key assets.

- Receive and analyze terrorism-related information from the Terrorism Threat Integration Center, as well as open sources, the public, private industry, state and local law enforcement, and the entire federal family.

- Map the threats against our vulnerabilities, in order to develop a comprehensive picture of the terrorist threat and our ability to withstand it.

- Take and facilitate action to protect against identified threats, remedy vulnerabilities, and preempt and disrupt terrorist threats, as consistent with the operational authorities of the Department's constituent agencies.

- Set national priorities for infrastructure protection, strategically designed to maximize the return on the investment.

- Take a lead role in issuing warnings, threat advisories, and recommended response measures to America's public safety agencies, elected officials, industry, and the public.

The Department will be a full partner in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will help the Department perform its critical missions. It will provide the Department with a full and comprehensive picture of the terrorist threat that will inform the actions of the Department.

Some of the Department's functions are expected to be performed at the new facility housing the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The integration of elements of the Department into the Terrorist Threat Integration Center will ensure an unimpeded two-way flow of terrorist threat information.

The Department of Homeland Security, working hand in hand with the FBI, will be responsible for ensuring that threat information, including information produced by the Center, is disseminated quickly to the public, private industry, and state and local governments as appropriate.

Contributions of the Department of Defense

The Department of Defense has been a key player in the global war on terrorism, including prosecuting the war on terrorism overseas. Intelligence elements of the Department, including the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, continue to make crucial contributions to our terrorism intelligence collection overseas.

Appropriate DOD intelligence elements will participate fully in the TTIC, providing information, receiving information, and contributing to analytic efforts, under their own current authorities.

DOD will have no new operational authority or responsibility under the President's announced program. The TTIC does not involve new activities by DOD; rather, it seeks to maximize and "fuse" the efforts of all of our counterterrorism intelligence efforts, as has been called for by many experts on both sides of the aisle.

Source: U.S. Department of State, 2003 (http://www.state.gov)

Appendix D: Homeland Security Advisory System

Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies

The world has changed since September 11, 2001. We remain a nation at risk to terrorist attacks and will remain at risk for the foreseeable future. <u>At all Threat Conditions, we must remain vigilant, prepared, and ready to deter terrorist attacks.</u> The following Threat Conditions each represent an increasing risk of terrorist attacks. Beneath each Threat Condition are some suggested Protective Measures, recognizing that the heads of Federal departments and agencies are responsible for developing and implementing appropriate agency-specific Protective Measures:

1. Low Condition (Green). This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist attacks.

Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures they develop and implement:

- Refining and exercising as appropriate preplanned Protective Measures;

- Ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory System and specific preplanned department or agency Protective Measures; and

- Institutionalizing a process to assure that all facilities and regulated sectors are regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all reasonable measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

2. Guarded Condition (Blue). This condition is declared when there is a general risk of terrorist attacks.

In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Condition, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:

- Checking communications with designated emergency response or command locations;

- Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and

- Providing the public with any information that would strengthen its ability to act appropriately.

3. Elevated Condition (Yellow). An Elevated Condition is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks.

In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:

Increasing surveillance of critical locations;

- Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions;

- Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and

- Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans.

4. High Condition (Orange). A High Condition is declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks.

In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:

- Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces organizations;

- Taking additional precautions at public events and possibly considering alternative venues or even cancellation;

- Preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site or dispersing their workforce; and

- Restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only.

5. Severe Condition (Red). A Severe Condition reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. Under most circumstances, the Protective Measures for a Severe Condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial periods of time. In addition to the Protective Measures in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies also should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:

279

- Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs;

- Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing specially trained teams or resources;

- Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; and

- Closing public and government facilities.

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005 (http://www.dhs.gov)

About the Author

Cécile Van de Voorde graduated from law school (Université Pierre Mendès France, Grenoble, France) in 1998 and earned a Master of Arts in Criminology from Indiana State University (Terre Haute, Indiana) in 2000. She joined the University of South Florida as a Presidential Doctoral Fellow in 2001 and was awarded the prestigious fellowship throughout her five years in the USF Department of Criminology. While in the Ph.D. program, Ms. Van de Voorde authored and co-authored several publications, directed a two-year research grant on suicide terrorism, and presented many research papers at national and international meetings. In 2005, she received an Adjunct Professor appointment to teach senior seminars in the Department of Criminology. Her research areas include cultural criminology, media and crime, political violence, and visual studies. In July 2006, she is joining the faculty of the Department of Sociology, Criminal Justice, and Anthropology at Texas Christian University (Fort Worth, Texas) as an Assistant Professor.